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HUMAN GOALS IN THE LIGHT OF SCIENCE

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WHEN PRIMITIVE or ancient man was confronted with the prospects of misfortune such as famine, plague, sickness, or invasion, he responded in the manner in which most animals meet danger, namely, by seeking to avert it. Since man has not changed basically within recorded history, his past responses were pretty much the same as ours today. He would not take things lying down and he firmly cherished the dictum that something must be done. Hope is as vital a psychological phenomenon as are hormonal or autonomic nervous responses or as is increased respiration during heightened muscular activity. Moreover the feeling that something must be done was almost instantaneously transmuted into the credo that something can be done. But clearly, this arbitrary rule of faith was doomed to frustration, and man was in consequence led to the next step, which is: Something Can Be Done If You Know How, if you acquire power or divine wisdom, if you master the mystery of the bewildering and ruthless forces of nature and bend them to your will. And, he went on, there are people who can achieve just that; the holy men, the shamans, the magicians, and the medicine men, the men who are gifted with inner vision, men who see or think or learn, noble men like Solomon, prophets and seers, men who understand God's work and know the healing magic of herbs and simples, who understand the language of birds and trees and animals, who converse with spirits and exploit them—these are the men who Know How and can effect what we, the common run of men, deem impossible. In other words, like ourselves, these ancestors of ours had the will to live, awareness of what was needed, faith in the power of know-how, the recognition that some people are more gifted and more scholarly than others, more willing to invest time in the acquisition of knowledge and its employment for the good of mankind. Hence both the desire for science and the wish to put it to human service are as old as man. Needless to say, the way we go about acquiring science is different from the ways of primitive man, though not as much as some people think.

How did man go about this task of forestalling a threatening menace? The records of history and anthropology tell us the answer. He danced

and he prayed, he painted his face and he shaved his head, he rent his clothes and put sackcloth on his shoulders, he fasted or went on a sitdown strike, or sacrificed his eldest son or youngest daughter. He derived great satisfaction from these measures; he felt he was doing something. Hence results had to be forthcoming. Yet, we know they seldom did, if ever. Surely, these antics, though emotionally so gratifying, could hardly halt an invader, exterminate pests, supply needed food or vitamins, avert a flood, or kill the hosts of germs that ravaged the bodies of his tribesmen.

Man did, however, live to control these forces. In the course of time he kept stumbling upon improved methods of gathering knowledge and learned to sharpen his scientific tools, to discern the gap between belief or hope on the one hand, and reality on the other. He came to realize that if it is good to keep your faith in God it is equally good to keep your powder dry by knowing your environment and subjugating it to your will. From this point of view science is an endless human quest having more or less the same goals throughout the ages, though they were by no means invariably pursued in the most practical or efficient manner. All the same, the desire to know, to comprehend and explain, as well as the desire to use that knowledge, is as old as the desire to ward off evil, hence as old as man.

In what way are we free from the ravages of emotional intrusion or domination, of the facile jump man loves to take between the stimulus of a need or a wish, and the prompt solution his imagination supplies under the influence of fancy or the urge of sentiment? And of course, any solution thus hatched invariably seems so sound and reasonable and just! Rationalization has never failed in presenting any but the finest array of reasons clothed in perfect logic.

We see injustice about us; we see poverty, ignorance, greed, vulgarity, the desire for exclusiveness and superiority, war, crime, segregation, disease and similar evils; and we know we are against them. We shrink from them in horror, rush into the innermost recesses of our minds or the dusty atmosphere of the library of the British Museum as did Karl Marx, and hurrah, we emerge with a solution. Primitive or ancient man did exactly the same thing. From the fertile expanses of their unsullied imagination, from their great love of justice, kindness, decency, and brotherhood, prophets of many lands and cultures brought forth the concepts of fraternity, peace, equality before the Lord, and the relative insignificance of earthly goods as compared with the great wealth and gratification of the spirit. Beyond a doubt these goals produced fine poetry and constituted a great and noble philosophy replete with inspiring social objectives. These works have served us well for centuries and no doubt enriched our lives. But by way of practical justification, it seems all one may rightly claim

is that in all likelihood without these goals life might have been worse, at least for those individuals who badly need this kind of message or solace or spur.

But honestly, have we even thought of applying the tools of science to gain true analytic insight into the nature of these very forces or events we so deeply deplore, and thus supplant them with pleasing institutions which we hope to see in operation for the glory of God and man? What evidence do we have that our goals are realizable, that brotherly love or peace, for example, are feasible and attainable? We talk glibly of a co-operative society, and most people similarly motivated agree it is a fine thing. So is the abolition of disease and senility. But what guarantee or evidence do we have that any of these fine goals are realizable? All we have, so far as one can see, is a heap of cerebral speculations on the causes of the evils discerned, and another potlot of speculations on the conclusion that the removal of those causes will inevitably usher in the desired relations or institutions. Well and good. But is this procedure scientific or realistic? The arguments advanced by the enemies of Galileo or Pasteur possessed all these features, all this reasoned cocksureness, all this Platonic contempt for empirical evidence and factual verification. Surely the fact that I consider a certain relationship, *e.g.,* a coöperative society, desirable, is insufficient to make it a practical goal unless I really attempt to get some evidence in favor of its operating under stipulated conditions. If failure of some coöperatives under captitalism is explained away as the effect of the capitalist milieu, their success under similar conditions might also be explained as due to a capitalist milieu, and evidence should be forthcoming of their guaranteed success in an all-coöperative medium. Moreover, if it is experimentation we want, then surely we must be humble about it all, in true experimental spirit, and at least refrain from killing millions over a working hypothesis, as was and is being done in Soviet Russia.

Similarly, one often hears the slogan: There can be no true democracy without economic democracy. Like many of the reactionary and unscientific slogans of modern times, this too is a product of the nineteenth century. Incidentally the slogans of the French Revolution were Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. No mention there of material goods, perhaps because the deification of material comforts and gadgets had not loomed large in human thoughts until the expansion of industry and the rise of the folklore of capitalism. And as is the faith of "Wall Street," so is the faith of the other streets and alleys. Be that as it may, supposing I set as my goal the slogan: No true democracy without biologic democracy. I have no musical voice but know that some people have better than average voices. We seem to accede that biologic democracy is not easily within reach, though eugenists aim at something like it, claim it practical, and are condemned for it. But

what evidence do we have that economic democracy is feasible and practical? Who has experimented with it within the framework of our values, economic productivity, and culture, and where are the data? And if it is merely a goal, why not experiment modestly and refrain from abuse, accusation, and class "liquidation"?[1]

Another point. Primitive man's need for action against evil forced him to conjure up the wonderfully serviceable devil theory. Look about you, man, and see how the people suffer. See their poverty and oppression and let compassion flood your heart. The evil and injustice you see are the work of the devil and his agents, the witches and the sorcerers. Wake up and organize unless you are callous, stupid, or self-absorbed. If you care for God or for your fellow men, grab a cudgel, spear, scythe, or rifle and exterminate the cause of evil and live to enjoy peace and happiness. Is this not precisely what the nineteenth century bestowed upon us in the gospel of Marx and Engels, the bloody trail of which the world has not yet begun to see the end? Naturally the nineteenth century was an era of enlightenment. The mediæval devil had died and rotted away. But long live the new devil, the capitalist and his agents. To Hitler it was the Jew and his agents. The next step was to proclaim the law of class struggle, so easily translated or perverted, if you will, into race struggle. In either case man lives by brute violence alone. Thus, after a few bright decades of hope and optimism by virtue of faith in the power of science, education, and a better technology, the voice of Cain and the *Communist Manifesto* were echoing again louder than ever in the taverns, salons, and slums of Europe, to flood all corners of the world and bury deep in class war man's only hope for a reign of ethics and decency.

True enough, man has had blood on his hands before, long before, and all along. However, sporadic wars and invasions, passion and violence are one thing, while sanctioning all these tragic outlets of human selfishness, frustration, and aggression with a saintly philosophy of class murder or classocide (so easily transformed into Hitler's genocide) with pie-in-the-sky as compensation for it, is quite another. Hence the far more tragic state of the world today as compared with the age of the Bastille or the days of the Cæsars.

All this in no way tends to deny the fact that there are evils, real and concrete ones, which can be and have been successfully faced. Diseases have been conquered, many social evils have been and are being overcome. But these facts have nothing to do with the mediæval "systems" of social change, class exterminations, and revolutions. In fact the communist revolution has admittedly not yet benefitted the masses or even its officials

[1] In passing it may be noted that class liquidation, such as "Exterminate the kulak as a class," or classocide, is as yet morally unexorcised, though its twin horror of genocide has been unanimously condemned by the U.N.

whose life expectancy is briefer than that of a nazi fighter pilot in the last days of the war.

One thing is certain. The dilemma of man today is in no way a product of modern science or the newly discovered might of the atom. Primitive man was also a scientist in his own way. If it were not for his science he would never have survived. And when he invented the bow and arrow, he was faced with the same problem that confronts us today. Should he use it to improve his food supply or to kill his brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors or strangers? We are faced today with the same question in regard to modern science. The answer has been clearly indicated by the events of the last thirty years. What the victims of nazi and soviet concentration camps will tell you is that there is no substitute for human values, ethics, or decency. No gadget can take their place, no amount of science can dispense with them. Yet it is a fact that there have always been prophets and leaders who inveighed against injustice and exhorted the people to follow the path of righteousness. But nothing came of it. The reason does not lie with capitalism or propaganda. It may well be with man. We all like a good sermon, enjoy its stimulus, and fully approve its message as we sit and listen to the pleasing delivery. After it is over we go home and proceed to behave like a bunch of —— human beings for the rest of the week and come for more the following Sunday. It is both easy and gratifying to blame. But let us leave that to witch hunters and moral or social salvationists. The fact seems to be that there are forces in man which cause him to desire many a noble social goal and yet inhibit him from constructive action toward their realization.

It is the essence of man's tragic fate that delusion is so much like reality, deception so much like truth, and faith so fervent and blind. Hence it is not surprising that those responsible for the modern return of primitivism in its most gruesome terror are the ones who invoke loudest the name of science. Yet, no other study enables one to see man in true historic perspective more clearly than does the history of science, the record of man's ardent and often deceptive quest for verifiable knowledge. In its penetrating light we can see the doomed glamor of the alchemists struggling to attain transmutations of base metals into gold, confident of their evidence, secure in their logic. We can see the passionate zeal of the astrologers as they scan the sky for data on nativities with their involved, concocted yet majestic, astrologic symbolism, little suspecting its artificial allure, its foundation of sheer fancy. Smugly may we marvel at Galileo, Kepler, and Brahe, defending with sincerity, logic, and passion their faith in astrology and see them, by their very works, dig the grave of that faith they so cleverly rationalized and cherished.

It is such an historical perspective which points out to us the utter

folly of the faith which now enslaves the minds and hearts of men the world over and which has taken as many or perhaps more victims than witchcraft, the Crusades, or its own mirror image of nazism or fascism. That cruel folly is communism generated by Marx and Engels one hundred years ago at the very moment when the Western world beamed with hope, and began shaping a solid foundation for unprecedented social progress. Gone seemed then the ignorance and hatreds of the Middle Ages. Science and reason, and particularly technology and democracy, with their expanded social and cultural promises, would surely rule over the world, guided by the law of progress and humanitarianism. Enlightened self-interest would solve and ultimately eliminate conflicts while commerce, learning, and tolerance would surely prevail. It is upon such an idyllic scene that there burst forth like thunder the philosophy of class struggle. Ideas, values, democracy, and liberty were pronounced rubbish and a false front.

Behind them stood merely the great god of economic motivation, the only power governing man and his conduct, both individual and social. Upon such indisputable evidence as the sheer reasoning of his own logic and the tricky culling of a citation here and a statement there from sundry prescientific writers, Marx proclaimed that violence, the law of tooth and claw, was the only force man lived by, hence only brute force could save the oppressed working class, which incidentally never asked to be saved but was busy preparing for a most successful future of organization and bargaining.

It was part of the new philosophy that individual freedom, social progress, human decency, plain and simple compassion, and its poetic expression in love and faith were branded a vulgar sham imposed upon credulous idiots by sly priests and their capitalist manipulators. Violence and struggle were proclaimed the only road to change in attitudes and relationships in society. In addition, socialism also brought forth, or rather, brought back the mediæval idea of a privileged or chosen sect, a progressive, blessed class, and another group or two, a capitalist and a middle class, which are to be governed and suppressed, their children forbidden higher learning and exiled if necessary. As if realizing that man does not easily come by suppression and extermination unless these are wrapped in alluring rationalization and soothing sanctity, Marxism resorted to a dehumanization of the individual, respect for whom had only just emerged into our Western culture. You will not be killing Old Abe Jones or Young Michael Ivanovitch. There are no individuals, there is only a class and its "elements." That did the trick. Even the kindest intellectual cannot feel peevish over killing mere elements of a class that the infallible logic of the prophet has declared guilty of everything evil in the world. Similarly, no communist intellectual in the United States seems

to feel shy at working for the Soviet Union even if it means betraying his homeland which has given him opportunity, education, and freedom. In his mind he is not betraying anybody. He is merely fighting the capitalistic monster. Thus the first modern theory of the devil was launched upon a world that had only just shed its mediæval counterpart. Little wonder then that the offshoot of this philosophic system was nazism, a reflection of the socialist ideology originating in response to a particular bitterness and frustration, similar to that which produced socialism, but within a nationalist matrix. It is apparently the easiest thing in the world to change devils, especially in this particular instance when the nazi devil had the advantage of being most readily accepted in the German culture medium and the emotional release was quite as good as killing capitalists.

These turbulent furies of the modern witchcraft delusions, communism and nazism, are far more menacing a terror than atomic bombs, even if perfected a thousandfold. A bomb strikes only a city, and its existence is no menace to the rural population. But these philosophies breed hatreds and strife wherever men live and hope. A bomb can be avoided, undone, or controlled; but how can the emotional fury and folly of a nazi or communist wave be checked or even appeased? Surely appeal to neither reason, slyness, bribery, nor humanity can be of any aid, as experience has amply shown. Was it reason that stopped the witchcraft rage of the sixteenth century? Could even appeal to the tears and suffering of Christ or any other Godhead quench its burning anxieties and cruelty? Communists and their fellow travelers applaud Christ's challenge to the mob to desist from throwing mere stones at an admitted sinner. But will *they* pay any heed to the plea of a thousand Christs to desist from machine-gunning or imprisoning capitalists, storekeepers, peasants, workers, socialists, artists, scientists, or "deviationists"?

The outlook would indeed be bleak and grim were it not for the new sciences which have recently appeared on the horizon of learning to brighten the sky with signs of promise. These are basically the sciences of man heralded primarily through the new concepts of relativity, cultural anthropology, and the depth psychologies. Through the theory of relativity in physics the proud standard of nineteenth-century rationalism and mechanism was forced to the realization that even in this stronghold of law and objectivity the mind of man and humility are still vital factors. Cultural anthropology revealed that all human beings are the products of a cultural environment which molds and fashions the very nature of man and the expressions of his basic needs, desires, and conflicts, repressing or shrinking some and inflating others, thus leaving its imprint on virtually all human conduct, creating in addition its peculiar suppressions, repressions, and imbalances. The depth psychologies, still in their merest infancy, have

already indicated how complex a being man is, how far he is from being the empty shell of the nineteenth century, presumably slyly manipulated by tricksters. He is a compounded product of biology and culture as seen through the vast intricacies of the ego and its vicissitudes which spring from the interaction of instinctive, cultural, and developmental factors, the scope of which has hardly been explored.

One thing seems to be certain, namely, that what we seem to require is not less science but more science of this new kind. The method of science is a power which mankind will never lightly abandon. If we can master the forces in man which make him follow these primitive patterns of conduct that lead to hate and violence as the most facile outlets to emotionalism, and the ravages of rationalized frustration, and the tragic devil theory; if we can moreover replace these primitive evils by objective analyses leading to mastery and control of man's inner world as well as we have learned to control the outer one—then we would indeed attain the millennium of science and sobriety. But is man capable of attaining such a state? All science of the past indicates that knowledge is power and humble but persistent scientific effort a worthy road. All man's sciences were originally permeated with emotionalism. Astrology, alchemy, magic, and medicine were enslaved by men's inevitable emotional responses in his respective quests for truth. Until the emotional intrusions were discerned and eliminated, no secure or strong science could evolve. Why could not the same process be hoped for in the sphere of human conduct?

Without the guidance of basic ethical and moral values there is little, however, we can do with such knowledge. It is nineteenth-century folly to believe that religion as such is the opiate of the people. Ready-to-hand experience tells the simple story that in dealing with embittered nazis or Southern defenders of white supremacy one stands a better chance of piercing the hard shells of their rationalizations by appeal to simple Christian ethics than by any other system of reference, alas so easily parried. No ethics has yet been advanced that was not based on values, and values seem to be as natural to man as colors and harmonics, pain and pity, hope and idealism, or moral responsibility and group loyalty.

But in the past man followed his faiths with the same human frailties with which he pursued his sciences such as alchemy or astrology. The time has come when science can begin to serve his ethical, moral, religious needs as well as his material ones. The more knowledge of man we acquire, the more realizable our social or ethical goals and standards will become, and the more meaningful. Moreover some may even have to be modified or abandoned, just as we have temporarily suspended the search for the elixir of eternal youth. But the application of the method of science to man, the forging of new techniques suitable to the peculiar material and

particular pursuit, are bound to lead to the expansion of power, and hence to practical results.

Comprehension of these problems is most urgently needed today because of the horrid return of the police state, secret arrests and executions, and the suppression of individual freedom by communist reaction. The religious philosophies of the past cannot apparently serve man in an age of science unless they partake of its spirit, its tools and concepts. On the other hand, mankind has never needed ethical or moral guidance as much as it requires it today. The task of halting the threatening onslaught of brutality and oppression is an immediate issue. Here lies the challenge to all true religious leaders. Had they not better cease their wordy intoning and their abstract style and come down into the home and market place and talk to the plain people the plain language of the prophets of old; translate the great religious principles into modern language and imbue them with strength that will invigorate the urgently needed advance of democracy; help heal its many sores and stem, besides, the coming waves of terror and civil and international war?

The fact that a considerable number of religious leaders have somehow joined the waves of Leninist or Hitlerite cruelty and chant their praises overtly or by insinuation, particularly in Europe, in the name of brotherly love, is merely a sign of the pains of transition. The scientific approach is not easily introduced into a field ruled for centuries by emotion and mysticism. Transition breeds conflict and confusion which in turn only serve to deepen the tragedy.

What is needed is clearer examination of the issues involved even if it means postponement of the slaughter so blandly accepted by these religious enthusiasts. And that does not seem too high a price for possible error especially when the alternative offers ample reward and promise.

An even far more serious menace lies in the new Inquisition which comes bursting forth from Moscow, marching hand in hand with the expanding secret police state and its concentration camps. Precisely at the moment when the contribution of the twentieth century is extending the promise of science to the sphere of man and society, the *Gestapo* of nineteenth-century reaction declares: It shall not pass. In Russia the new sciences of the twentieth century are utterly and hopelessly *verboten,* and those who do not repeat the ignorances of the past are promptly beheaded or exiled to Siberia. Never before has the spirit of scientific investigation encountered such monstrous opposition. Similarly, never before in the history of man has artistic creation met with such tyranny. It took man millennia to come by the social and human sciences which proffer hope for his future and the vista of redemption from the blind groping within the prison of his emotional enslavement. And the mockery of it is that

when modern man has at last grasped its meaning in recent decades and has finally caught its gleam of hope, however thin, tyrants block his efforts in the name of saints of old and ruthlessly suppress or exterminate anthropologists, physicists, psychologists, and biologists, to say nothing of students of sociology and economics who dare explore the new leads. In addition, even artists, musicians, and writers are subjected to this new Inquisition. When have the forces of darkness been so menacing and so brutal?

It is indeed up to the thoughtful public and all scientists of the democratic countries, especially in the relatively hoggishly rich and free U.S.A., to devote as much thought and energy to these topics before it is too late, before the wave of evil grows so close and so cancerous in our own midst that we may have to suspend voluntarily many of our rights and freedoms in the sheer struggle for survival. The time for the free pursuit of the new knowledge may thus become short-lived, and whatever we gain in the interval may be of inestimable value. It is a pity that to the intrinsic difficulties of the new sciences themselves is thus added the nuisance of speed and the burden of fighting for the rights of science and art to exist in the freedom without which they perish. But such are the tolls of man's rocky road.

TELL ME—IS IT A PRAYER?

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For some years now I have been listening to a type of public utterance concerning whose true nature I stand in great doubt. Though spoken for the most part by ministers, with whose professional habits and thoughts I am familiar, there is nothing in content and little in the manner of these deliverances which enables me to determine (a) whether they are religious in nature or not; (b) who is being addressed therein; (c) whether they are to be considered as orations, dramatic monologues, theatre pieces, news bulletins, philosophic discourses, sermons, or just possibly prayers.

The more I think on the matter, however, I favor this latter as the most likely hypothesis; for there are certain abstruse signs, discernible only upon close contextual analysis, which point in that direction. For instance, the program or calendar often lists the period taken by such discourses as "prayer," though there may have been a mistake somewhere; the discourser usually assumes the traditional attitudes and mannerisms of praying; and—a rather convincing piece of evidence to me—he uses certain words like "Let us pray," or "Amen," or even "God." This latter term, of course, may merely mean that it is to be included in our growing body of profane literature. However, on the basis of both internal and external evidence—strong as to the "pray-er's" probable intentions, weak as to the nature of his production—we shall tentatively employ both the terms "prayer" and "pray-er" with regard to these mysterious discourses. Be it understood, however, that we here use such terms only provisionally as befits the discussion of an unproven hypothesis.

I

The *autobiographical discourse,* masquerading as "prayer," is widely current in some religious circles. In this form of utterance—whether for the audience's delectation or suitably to impress God, has always been a bit vague to me—the "pray-er" gives a detailed account of both his outer and inner religious life. Often as not he reminisces about his childhood faith, or even travels well back beyond that into his pedigree to remind the Almighty that he comes from a long line of God-fearing ancestors and pious collateral relatives. Or it may be that with choicest phrase and heart-rending emotion he describes the exceeding muddiness of the miry pit from which he was rescued. In either case, in words ordinarily chosen to praise God, he enthusiastically affirms that since a certain point in his own or his ancestors' lives he has been "ever faithful, ever sure" in his

loyalty to him; and like Peter and the others, before the crucifixion, he passionately avows his unshakable determination to serve God the remainder of his days, come what may.

With the more or less external features of his religious biography disposed of within five minutes, the pray-er then proceeds to unravel the tangled knots of his personal devotional life—a much more difficult and lengthy process. He details at length the conflicts he has fought, the temptations he has faced, the doubts conquered. He brings one right up to the present with a minute description of his current state of feeling. In the process he works himself into a heavy lather of emotion probably unequalled save in the hysterics of Russian purge-trials or in the hear-all-about-my-sin mood of Buchmanite public confessions. And religious etiquette forbids interruption of such a dramatic soliloquy.

Now such devotional heroics are no doubt edifying to some. They at least provide a noble example to go out and do differently therefrom. But the fitting place for such confessional and self-expressive "praying" is surely within one's room, with the door shut and locked and the walls soundproofed. If one wishes to remind the Lord of his long record of faithful service and of how good the pray-er has been to him, at the most let him do it in the bosom of his admiring family where they are used to his bragging. Or if he wishes to reënact the drama of his soul's struggles, the fitting stage for it is the privacy of his own thoughts or just perhaps a confessional period with a close friend. On the public scene it becomes third-rate melodrama. In any case, all such autobiographical "prayers," whatever their mood or length, are as remote from common worship as the mad whirl of a praying dervish.

II

Then of course there is the public *news digest*—including items both sacred and secular—which takes upon itself the cloak of prayer. In it the All-Wise is passed along some highly valuable items of news or instruction which it seems he has lacked up until this very moment. The pray-er of informational inclination loves to outline for the benefit of his Heavenly Hearer the main doctrines of the true gospel in clear, simple words; he presents him with a cogent account of his (the Hearer's) own eternal nature and future plans, adding some constructive suggestions for their implementation; he frequently recalls to him, who never slumbers or sleeps and whose heart was deeply wounded by our transgressions, that we poor mortals live in a very sinful world; and he carefully itemizes for him the specific needs and wants of his worshipers.

One wonders when he hears such "prayers" just how the Eternal Wisdom ever manages to run the world from public occasion to public

occasion—or does this kind pray-er also have a private wire at no extra cost for weekday use?—or what he does when his earthly helpers do not come through periodically with good sound advice. My imagination pictures him waiting breathlessly for the next installment of international news and theological fundamentals—surrounded of course by hosts of angelic amanuenses who will inscribe every precious up-sent word with pencils of crystal on tablets of gold!

Now and then the informational prayer picks up a highly useful sideline along the way. Not only can the Lord be instructed therein—by all means its main function—but it has invaluable uses in giving the assembled people hot religious tips. That instructive story told by Dean Sperry illustrates the perfection which can be achieved in this field of news service by a master of the long prayer. A certain reverend brother, either having forgotten or having been notified after the announcement period in the Sunday morning service was past, of the committal rites for a prominent member of the local church, scheduled for that very afternoon, thought within himself: What shall I do? In a flash of inspiration, so clear that he could not doubt its divine origin, he perceived that the long prayer just coming up was the very place for his announcement. Very cleverly, and almost without intruding upon the spirit of prayer, he inserted a humble petition that the Governor of the universe would grant his assembled people a period of clement weather that afternoon, for the burial services of beloved Brother X in the Mount Auburn Cemetery at 3 o'clock. It was even possible to include the request to omit flowers.

Of course one has to say *something* when praying publicly, perhaps—though a little more silence than is usual would be refreshing; and it is probably impossible to avoid using words or expressing ideas to Almighty God which he has not heard at least once before. Nevertheless let us recall what Jesus said about his Father knowing our needs before we voice them. Hence if the minister wishes to instruct his people in Christian doctrine or give them a world-news digest under sacred auspices, let him do it in the parish letter or in the sermon rather than under cover of talking to God.

III

These thoughts lead us on to a consideration of the *sermon-in-disguise* as prayer. Personally I have never been able to decide who was fooling whom in this type of "praying." By definition it cannot be God who is deceived, for he knows our every thought and the intents of our hearts—including those of the public pray-er. Nor am I to be persuaded that it is the listening people who go astray. Even at an early age the most stupid child has a truly remarkable facility for detecting the nauseous flavor

of the wholesome moral and inspiring preachment, no matter how thickly sugar-coated by story or artifice. Therefore by the rigorous logic of elimination: If the pray-er cannot fool God into thinking that he is not speaking to the people, or the people into thinking that he is communing with God, he is himself the only dupe.

The prayer-sermon is to me the most despicable of all the forms of pseudo prayer. First, it is dishonest. It is as dishonest to seek to slip the keen blade of unwelcome criticism under the fifth rib of our fellow worshiper as he kneels beside us in prayer, as it is to knife a man in the back while we give him the kiss of peace; and it is positively sacrilegious to attempt to club him into agreement with us by the same hands that are even then uplifted to heaven in supplication. It is also hypocritical. It pretends to speak to the Divine Presence, indeed to be almost solely aware of him; but all the time it keeps one eye half-open and one ear cocked toward the assembled congregation. Furthermore, it is cowardly, for it seeks to say under cover of the sacred quiet and receptive mood of prayer what the pray-er dares not say to his fellows directly—either because they have heard the same thing from him so often before or else because he cannot speak it to them openly, face to face. And finally, it is ineffective, for its gross duplicity is evident to the most casual observer.

Now surely there ought to be a difference between the prayer and the sermon, even though the sermon be preached in the spirit of prayer and sometimes uses its language, and though the prayer may abound with the spirit of wisdom and counsel. The one is directed toward the mind and heart of the human listener; the other toward the Divine Auditor, even though it seeks to carry others into his presence on the wings of its devotion. The chief function of the first is often to make us deeply aware of ourselves and of each other; that of the latter is to make us conscious of God. To confuse the two in spirit or language is no mere matter of liturgical ineptness; it is the infallible sign of a deep spiritual malady which we shall later describe.

IV

Of course we cannot pass up this golden opportunity once more to flail at that oft-chastised sinner, the *pray-orator.* And in truth who needs chastisement more? For pray-oratory is of the devil. He who indulges in it is dabbling in a fearful and wonderful art, like unto black magic, by the seductive wiles of which even the greatest of saints, both lay and clerical, have been betrayed into mockery.

Prayer, most especially in its public forms, is a "natural" for spreading one's religious wings. With what possibilities it is blest! Under what holy auspices it can be carried on! In the presence and for the attention of

the Eternal, what in word or deed could be too splendid? Those purple words decked out in crimson, too, too gorgeous for common or even sermonic use can be here indulged. Those deeps of emotion, the subtle sighings of the spirit, self-consciously suppressed in daily conversation with the imperceptive man in the street or the unsympathetic family, can here flow unrestrainedly on in sacred splendor. Those full-throated cadences of speech, the impressive pauses, and those organlike modulations of voice, which only the great natural orators (or politicians) dare use on the public platform, can come into their religious own in the time of prayer when every head is bowed, every eye shut, and the mellow mystical mood of worship possesses all. And also—horridly pleasant thought!—it just *may* be that those who, by careful prearrangement, are present to overhear the impassioned outpouring of the spirit of the man of God to his Maker, will recognize at last the profundity of soul and sweep of imagination which truly characterize this humble servant of the Lord, even though they be somewhat lacking in his other ministrations.

Now oratory—it is wonderful for those who are enabled thereunto. It is also wonderful for those that can endure it—though happily their number seems to be lessening. And it still has an unbelievably large degree of practical usefulness. But in this latter quality it is perhaps more at home in the senatorial filibuster than the public prayer—though in both instances it is completely effective in preventing works of grace. And also in both cases we should proclaim it for what it is—sonorous verbiage dedicated to trivial or ignoble ends.

V

What then is the essence of that deep depravity which destroys the integrity and effectiveness of all the forms of public prayer which we have here considered, and perhaps some others beside? It rears its head at last, unmistakable and ugly, in that form of prayer which follows a classic literary pattern, namely, the *prayer of indirect discourse.* In this type of prayer, even though the pray-er is ostensibly communing directly with his Heavenly Father, now and again he speaks *to* him (or is it *of* him?) in the third person, as though he were not there or were inattentive.

And thus we discover what the real trouble has been all along: *The pray-er is really not praying.* Now that may sound like an uncharitable and dogmatic dictum, but it is the only really good reason that I can think of to explain how a person who is addressing God in direct conversation can possibly use such phrases therein as *"God's* work, kingdom, church, truth," and the like, or ever in the course of the prayer refer to him in the third person. For which of us in speaking to a human friend, face to face, *ever* uses his name in that way?

The reason that the good brother is not praying is that he is sufficiently aware of neither God nor man. He is deficient in a genuine feeling for either. Though he stands in a temple dedicated to God and human welfare, at the time and place of prayer, he is wrapped in a thick cloak of self-concern or some sort of spiritual isolation as truly as the Pharisee in Jesus' parable who went up to the temple to "pray." He is never sufficiently aware of God to forget completely the people before him, or of the people to intercede for and with them to God. He is unable to avoid wondering how he sounds to the congregation when he addresses Deity; and he is unable to break out of his professional self-centredness long enough to enter truly into the aspirations and needs of those who worship with him. His centre of attention wobbles back and forth between God and the assemblage. Consequently, rather than being a shaft of revealing light or high tower of devotion, his prayer bloops along uninspiredly just over the treetops like a semi-inflated balloon, or sweeps by like a many-hued but barren cloud, reaching up neither to heaven in power nor down to earth in blessing.

VI

The remedy for the prayerlessness of public prayers is to be found in the area of their chief spiritual defect. Public prayers will become prayerful when, and only when, the pray-er has both a deep sense of God and a deep love for his fellow worshipers.

Let us consider the first thing first: The *sine qua non* of all true prayer, public or private, is a genuine realization of God's presence. Of course as emotional fact the sense of Divine Presence ebbs and flows with the state of our total being. A man does not "feel" the presence of God with equal intensity at all times. Sometimes, when surrounded by the atmosphere and being in the place of public worship, when as a public pray-er it would be most convenient for him to experience such a strong emotional sense of God's nearness, he feels it least. Thus do spontaneous prayers often become repetitious or emotionally stale, and liturgical prayers degenerate into monotonous intonings.

To be sure, emotional stimulation is not our only mode of sensing God or the only prerequisite for effective public prayer. There are besides the essential qualities of sincerity, the context of an earnest life, and a total alertness of mind and heart. Nevertheless feeling is a great help in praying at all times and places. And a continuous or frequent lack of it is, more often than we care to admit, an adverse spiritual judgment upon us, a witness to our daily prayerlessness or to the meagre actualization of the presence of God in our ordinary lives. Thus does our inner spiritual poverty creep into our public expressions. And the only remedy for such

a condition is the enrichment or rehabilitation of the pray-er's own spiritual consciousness.

Granting the pray-er's own religious life to be of adequate vitality, however, there are still some secondary measures which he may and should take to insure effectiveness in his public praying. Since feeling comes and goes, and not always according to its possessor's convenience, let the public pray-er set down his prayer thoughts and words when he is in prayerful mood and of leisure spirit for later use. And as an invariable rule, whenever he prays in public, let him remind himself at the moment of prayer: "I am in the presence of God. It is to him that my words and aspirations are addressed."

Thus would he approach prayer with a right spirit, and thus would the unregenerate errors of false and presumptuous praying be avoided. For a deep sense of the presence of God would surely keep him from speaking to his Creator as though he were not really there. It would chasten his spirit and purify his language of its flamboyance. As praying to *God,* he would have neither extra energy nor appropriate double-barreled words with which to assault simultaneously his people and the throne of grace. Deeply conscious of whom he was addressing, he would have no desire to impress anyone with his oratory; he would be stripped down to the simple eloquence of true devotion.

Nor is it impossible that while a man is deeply aware of God, he may also be poignantly conscious of his brother and his needs. Indeed it is the Christian teaching with regard to the religious life as a whole that we truly serve God and find the fullness of his fellowship only as we serve and fellowship with man at the same time and in the same deeds. And this has a bearing on public prayer, somewhat as to its manner and method, even more deeply as to its fundamental spirit. For though the mystic may commune with God in solitary rapture and incite men to follow his lonely way by the radiant transfiguration of his praying countenance, the public pray-er must take on himself the more humble and difficult rôle of burden bearer. He must carry the needs of his fellow worshipers on his own back as he ascends the mount of transfiguration. Or perhaps we might more truly call it the mount of intercession. He must bear the low and heavy of soul with him into the heights of inspiration. Indeed, if the truth is to be known, so too must the mystic in some measure bear others' burdens into his private raptures, unless they are to be sterile efforts at self-realization.

Therefore let the public pray-er, with the same breath in which he says, "I am in the presence of God," also say, "I must be the voice of my fellow worshiper. I am not here praying for myself alone or expressing my inner thoughts to God for my own benefit, but I pray for and with all these

gathered here. I must forget my personal needs save as they are also those of my fellows. I must express *their* feeling—making it a little more articulate and spiritual—and *their* aspiration—stretching its wings to a higher altitude than it has yet attained. I cannot reach the Presence save as they accompany me there."

Thus keenly aware that he stands in the presence of his human brother, as well as his Divine Father, the public pray-er will shed others of the sins of prayer. He will escape from the narrow ring of his own thoughts into sympathetic rapport with other worshipers. He will begin to experience what it is to feel the urgency of another's need. He will be less wordy in his own right, being willing sometimes to use the words of others, or only to direct the devotion of the worshipers present, who shall phrase their own petitions in silence, or even to be unafraid of silence itself. And being saved from the monotony of theme and mood in prayer, which comes from being shut up within oneself, he will be enabled to explore alike the riches of prayers of thanksgiving, adoration, confession, intercession, and petition.

Indeed—and this is only a pious hope, I admit—if all of us public pray-ers would always remember both the Divine and human presences in all our praying, our public prayers might become prayers again, or even Christian prayers perchance.

HEINRICH HEINE AND CHRISTIANITY

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THE GERMAN poet, Heinrich Heine, is one of the strangest literary figures of the nineteenth century. Born of Jewish parents (December 13, 1797, in Düsseldorf), educated at the Universities of Bonn, Berlin, and Göttingen, he spent more than half of his literary career as a voluntary exile in Paris. Beginning as an admirer of Napoleon and as champion of the ideas of the French Revolution, he turned later against the communists and democrats, whose atheism, he said, smelled of cheese, brandy, and tobacco. In matters of religion and of philosophy he changed his allegiance, and, after sickness darkened his life, he claimed to have returned to God.

We are here concerned with the religious thought of Heine and, particularly, with his attitude toward Christianity. In general his views on religion have not been taken seriously because there is so much of contradiction in his utterances. His position toward Judaism, while it is clear that he loved the Old Testament and was always friendly toward the Jewish race, is not consistent. He fiercely attacked rabbinism yet scorned Reform Judaism. He praised the deistic Judaism of Mendelssohn but, during his romantic period, he represents himself as an antagonist of Jewish-Mohammedan-Christian Deism. He speaks with warmth for his *ecclesia militans*, the Lutheran Church. He has been called a false Christian, a cynical Protestant, and even an anti-Semitic agitator. In his own day, the Jews shunned him as a deserter of the synagogue and by Christians he was never trusted.

But much has happened during the one hundred and fifty years since the poet's birth to make the spiritual side of this unhappy man a matter of new interest. The anti-Semitism of the Third Reich and the terrors of the last decade have brought the suffering Jew forcibly to our attention and place Heine in a new light. The enigma of his religious experience—is it *in parvo* the pilgrimage of many a cultured Jew, who, a stranger to his father's house, is alternately attracted and repelled by the society and culture of which he has become a part?

The poet's mother was a disciple of Rousseau and a deist, but the old traditions of Jewish life were carefully preserved in the household. As a family of wealth, the Heines were no longer held in the narrow confines of the *Judengasse*. They rejoiced in being Germans. Much later Heine stresses the fact that he is a German, and says that Jews readily take to German culture and life and that to live in Paris unable to speak German even to his wife is a sore deprivation. Heine's mother, proud of her people,

nevertheless had hoped for great things in the gentile world. As an old lady, she confided to her son that his old teacher in the Catholic Lycée in Düsseldorf, Rector Schallmeyer, had urged her to lead her son toward the Catholic church and to the priesthood because his great talents would surely bring him to an exalted ecclesiastical position. At the time when she told Heine this, she had come to believe that it would have been a wise course to follow.

But, together with this willingness to become amalgamated with the surrounding gentile culture, there was constantly a pull in the other direction. During his student days in Berlin certain Jewish scholars organized a *Verein für Kultur und Wissenschaft der Juden.* Heine joined the society. But when his friends went further and attempted to reform the synagogue, he broke with them because they were attempting to make the synagogue into a church with bells and organs. The pull toward Judaism was strengthened by the suspicion that he was being persecuted for his faith. Later he came to believe that Judaism was *eine längst verlorene Sache,* and that the Jewish religion was not at all a religion but a misfortune, a statement which he still later limited to German Judaism. A vacillation between Judaism and Christianity, interrupted at times by a disgust for both, is one of the clues to the tension in the poet's life. This disgust is shown in *Romanzero* in the poem entitled "Disputation." A rabbi and a monk argue before a Spanish sovereign the merits of their respective faiths. Circumcision or baptism will be administered to the population according to the victory in the debate. At the end of the disputation the king, unable to decide, asks the opinion of his queen, who gives her judgment:

> Welcher Recht hat, weiss ich nicht—
> Doch es will mich schier bedünken,
> Dass der Rabbi und der Mönch
> Dass sie alle beide stinken.[1]

The sensitive nature of young Heine was sorely wounded by the brutal attacks on Jews in Hamburg in the 1820's. Here he was, an enthusiastic and patriotic German, rebuffed again and again by Christians because he was a Jew. The hopelessness of the Jewish candidate for government appointment led him to an unexpected step. In the year in which he received his doctor's degree at Göttingen (July 20, 1825) he sought the *Entréebillet zur europäischen Kultur*—a baptismal certificate. He was baptized privately in the town of Heiligenstadt near Göttingen in the home of the Protestant pastor. The step was not opposed by his family. We can

[1] Vol. 1, p. 477. The edition referred to is: Heinrich Heines *Sämtliche Werke,* herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Ernst Elster (Kritisch durchgesehene und erläuterte Ausgabe), 7 Voll., Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig und Wien, 1890.

hardly accuse him of deceiving anybody. The Protestant Christianity of Berlin which he had come to know during his student days had been relieved of the deity of Christ and of all the supernatural elements so that it was "like turtle soup with no turtle in it." In writing to his friend Moser, he spoke lightly of his baptism. It was necessary for a career in public life. If the law had stipulated that a candidate, instead of submitting to baptism, might steal silver spoons, he would have stolen the spoons. Later he justified the step by saying that if Henry IV of France could say that Paris was worth a mass, he could just as properly say that Berlin was worth a sermon.

The attitude of Heine toward Christianity in both its Catholic and Protestant forms has its clearest formulation in his *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* (German 1834, but published earlier in serial form in the *Revue de deux Mondes*). Catholic Christianity imposed a Christian form upon the pagan content of European life and culture. Its success was due to the concessions it made to the pagan concepts of pleasure and beauty. The social order was a compromise between Christian spiritualism and pagan sensualism. Protestantism, on the other hand, sought to make the content of society Christian. Life was spiritualized but it was cast into a pagan form, the old Germanic way of life. In Catholicism sensualism ruled *de facto*, but spiritualism *de jure*. Even in Protestantism sensualism asserted itself again at Münster. But the inevitable effect of the spiritual content, thanks to Luther, is to produce an ethical Christianity in which the mythological element finally disappears or is just so much poetry.

The dualism which Christianity possessed in itself, Heine found later to be in all the world. "Plato and Aristotle! These are not only the two systems but also the two types of distinct human natures, which, since untold ages, have been hostile to each other, no matter what garb they wore."[2] At another time he said: There are two kinds of people in the world: Jews and Greeks. The Greek follows beauty and pleasure. The Jew duty. Heine, in those days, professed to be a Greek.

It has been said that Heine was always hostile to Christianity. His own estimate of his attachment to Protestantism is given in the autobiographical sketch which he wrote in 1835:

> . . . I fought against the Catholic propaganda, the Jesuits of Germany, as much to take vengeance on the detractors, who first attacked me, as to please my Protestant sympathies. At times this may have carried me too far, for Protestantism was not only for me a liberal religion, but also the starting point of the German revolution. I belonged to the Lutheran Confession not only by virtue of baptism but because of a love of conflict, which allowed me to take part in the battles of this *ecclesia*

[2] Vol. 4, p. 214 (*Zur Geschichte der Rel. u. Phil.*).

militans. But although I defended the social interests of Protestantism, I have never concealed my pantheistic sympathies. For this reason I have been accused of atheism.[3]

If Christianity is identified with confessional religion, then it is true that Heine's attitude, especially during the period of Hegel's influence, was that of a cynic. This was at the time when, as he said later, he had learned that he was God. But even in this earlier period the clue to his attitude is discoverable in the fact that he was a cultured but tortured Jew. A cultured Jew constantly looks at Christianity from a longer historical perspective than a similarly cultured gentile. While we see Christianity as a part of our present and immediate past, the Jew is forced by his unhappy position to view it from a long-distance range. Christianity possesses books and employs religious phrases ("the songs of Zion") which belong to his own people. The tragedy of his people has its origin in this new religion which is after all so much nearer to his own than to any other. He appreciates the influence of Christianity especially in its moral precepts but sees also a wide gap between its original form and its later confessional developments. All this is certainly true of Heine. In explaining his idea of Christianity he finds two elements in it—the Indo-Gnostic with its conflict between matter and spirit, and the Jewish-Deistic element with its stress on ethics. In the mediæval church the Indo-Gnostic element was the regulating principle. Luther, one of Heine's heroes, weakened the Gnostic element. Through Luther Christianity became another religion, in which the Jewish-Deistic element preponderates.[4] To Heine, Protestantism was an advance over previous forms of Christianity.

During his early literary activity he valued Protestantism for one thing only: It had opened the door to freedom of thought. German philosophy could not have developed had Protestantism not laid the foundations of free thinking. But just as the ancient cults of Greece and of Rome had been conquered, not by Christianity, but by Greek philosophy, so philosophy will finally overcome Protestantism. This is probably one of the propositions which he later characterizes as *unbesonnen*. But even in those years he did not look upon the destruction of Protestant Christianity as a desirable thing. The German university, with its freedom, stands or falls with the Protestant church. When belief in God goes, then Christian morals will also go. Philosophy will bring terrible destruction which will astonish all of Europe. In 1834 he writes:

> German philosophy is a serious concern for all mankind, and only our remote descendants will be able to decide whether we are to be praised or blamed for developing our philosophy first, and our revolution afterwards. It seems to me that a methodical people, like ourselves, had to begin with the Reformation; then we were

[3] Vol. 7, p. 299 (*Lebensabriss*, written in Paris, January 11, 1835).
[4] Vol. 4, p. 192.

in a position to occupy ourselves with philosophy, and, last of all, to go on to political revolution. This order appears quite reasonable. The heads which philosophy has used, the revolution to serve its purpose can knock off. But philosophy could never have used the heads knocked off by the revolution, had the revolution come first. But do not fear, German Republicans: The German revolution will not be milder and more moderate because the Kantians, the Fichteans, and the philosophers of naturalism have gone before. Through these doctrines revolutionary forces have been developed which tarry only for the day when they will break forth and fill the world with horror and astonishment. Kantians will appear who will not recognize anything of piety even in the world of sense, and will plow over the ground of our European life without mercy in order to eradicate the last roots of the past. Armed Fichteans will appear on the stage who in their will-fanaticism can be conquered neither by fear nor by self-advantage; for they live in the spirit; they despise matter, as the first Christians did, not to be vanquished by the pains of the body nor by its pleasures; . . . the philosopher of naturalism will be terrible because he will ally himself with the primitive forces of nature, because he will be able to call forth the demonic powers of the old German pantheism, and because he has the ancient German lust for war—not fighting to destroy, not to vanquish, but for the sheer love of fighting. Christianity—this is its noblest service—softened this brutal German lust for war, but it could not uproot it. . . . The ancient gods of stone will arise out of the ashes, wipe the dust of a thousand years out of their eyes. Thor will at last leap forth and smash with his giant hammer the Gothic cathedrals.[5]

Although Heine attacked the German Jesuits and the members of the romantic school who became converts to Rome, because they were champions of political reaction whose purpose was forever to enslave the Germans to their autocratic princes, yet Catholic Christianity appealed to his poetic nature. In his *Geständnisse* he writes:

> As thinker and as metaphysician I always admired the consistency of Roman Catholic dogma, and I pride myself on the fact that I never attacked with wit and scorn either the dogma or the cultus. I have been both too much honored and dishonored by those who have called me a spiritual kin of Voltaire. I have been a poet, and for that reason the poetry which blossoms in the symbolism of Catholic dogma and cultus revealed itself to me more than to other people. . . . I was enthusiastic for the blessed Queen of Heaven; the legends of her beauty and her grace I brought to beautiful rhyme, and my first collection of poems contained traces of this beautiful Madonna period.[6]

In one of the most pagan of his prose works, *Die Stadt Lucca,* written in 1829, Heine gives an account of attendance at mass in the Cathedral of Lucca. He was accompanied by a young British lady, whose views of Christianity were rationalistic and whose irreverent remarks during the service embarrassed him. Heine was still in his Greek period, when beauty was more important than truth or duty. The beauty of the symbolism of the service impressed him; but for the celebrant, the old archbishop, there was something more: there was reverence. The sermon, which followed the mass, delivered by a serious young priest, carried him beyond

[5] Vol. 4, pp. 292 ff. [6] Vol. 6, p. 66 (*Geständnisse*).

beauty and symbolism. The ascetic-looking preacher thundered away on hell and heaven, laying stress on hell punishment for sinners. Although a liberal Protestant by profession, Heine says to his companion: "I like him better than many of our mild homeopathic physicians of the soul who pour one ten-thousandth part of reason into a pail of moral water (*Moralwasser*) and, on Sundays, preach us into security with it."[7]

But a change came into Heine's life. In 1848 the ruddy-faced poet was laid low by a disease which was never to leave him. This loss of health was accompanied by a spiritual change. He tells us of this conversion in the postscript to *Romanzero:*

When one is lying on his deathbed . . . he would like to make peace with God and the world. I admit that I have scratched many and have bitten many. I was not a lamb. But believe me, the lambs, so much praised for their mildness, would not behave so mildly if they had the teeth and claws of a tiger. . . . Since I have come to stand in need of God's mercy, I have given amnesty to my enemies. . . . Poems, which only in a general way contained reflections against God, I have assigned to the flames. It is better that the poems burn than the poet. Yes, with the creature as well as with the Creator I have made peace, to the great disgust of my old enlightened friends who charge me with relapsing into the old superstition, as they love to call my return to God. Others, in their intolerance, go still further. All the high clergy of atheism have pronounced the anathema against me. There are fanatical popes of unbelief, who would gladly place me on the rack to make me confess my heresy. Fortunately they have at their disposal no other instruments of torture than their writings. But I am willing to confess all without torture. It is true. I returned to God like the prodigal son after I had for a long time been tending swine with the Hegelians. Was it wretchedness that drove me back? Perhaps a poor and trifling reason! A heavenly homesickness came over me and drove me on through wood and glen, over the dizzy mountain paths of dialectic. On my journey I found the god of the pantheists but I could not use him. This poor dreamy divinity is interwoven and intergrown with the world, as if imprisoned in it, and gapes at you without will and without power. To have a will means to be a person, and to exercise a will there must be elbowroom. If a god is wanted that can give help—and this is after all the main point—his personal nature, his transcendence and his holy attributes, goodness, omnipotence, righteousness, *etc.* must be granted.[8]

In his *Geständnisse,* a work which Heine surely intended to be taken seriously, he confesses that Hegel and his disciples had led him astray:

I was young and proud. It flattered my pride to hear from Hegel that God did not dwell in heaven as my grandmother had believed; but, actually here on earth, and, that I was God.[9]

It astonished him, so he says, that no one else recognized or worshiped him as God. But he got into difficulties, especially of a financial kind, and a God without resources is a very poor God. So in February, 1848, Heine says:

[7] Vol. 3, p. 403. A few pages later on he writes: "Wie schön, wie heilig lieblich, wie heimlich süss war das Christentum der ersten Jahrhunderte, als es selbst noch seinem göttlichen Stifter glich im Heldentum des Leidens."

[8] Vol. 1, pp. 485 f. [9] Vol. 6, p. 48.

I returned to my place in the lowly flock of God's created beings, and I recognized once more the omnipotence of a supreme being, that stands above the vicissitudes of this world and who from now on was to direct the affairs of my earthly life.[10]

He had intended to publish a book on Hegel, but now he threw the manuscript into the fire, convinced that "the most meagre soup of Christian charity is more quickening to poor humanity than the boiled cobwebs of the Hegelian dialectic."

Heine did not try to conceal this change, but his friends tried to hush it up. The result was that there was much misunderstanding and numerous questions were put to him whether he now stood nearer to confessional Lutheranism or to Catholicism. He denies that he finds either Protestant or Catholic creeds any more congenial to him than in the past. Some ask whether a light from heaven had opened his eyes as it had for Saul of Tarsus. No, no road to Damascus; no light from heaven; no ass like Balaam's had ever spoken to him with human voice, although he had to admit that he had heard men who talked like asses.

The reawakening of my religious feeling I owe to the reading of the Sacred Book, and it became a fountain of healing. . . . After I had spent my life rushing around on all the dance floors of philosophy, and had abandoned myself to all kinds of orgies of the spirit, without satisfaction, I discover that I am standing on the same platform on which stands Uncle Tom, on the Bible, and I kneel down beside my black brother in the same devotion. What humiliation! With all my learning I did not get any farther than the poor unlearned Negro, who hardly knew his letters. Poor Tom actually appears to see in the Holy Book deeper things than I do, since I do not yet comprehend the latter part. . . . Tom understands better perhaps because more chastisements appear there, especially the constant scourgings which, as I read the gospels and the Acts, strike me as unæsthetic. The poor Negro slave reads with his back and understands better than we do.[11]

Heine's power of satire is revealed in another passage. The humor is delightful, but it must not blind us to the moral earnestness of the changed man:

. . . I was as haughty as King Nebuchadnezzar just before his fall. Now years later there has been a physical and a spiritual change. How often I have recalled the story of the Babylonian king, who fancied himself a god, but who fell pitifully from the height of his fancy and ate grass like a beast (it must have been lettuce). . . . There are many noteworthy stories in the Bible which deserve the attention of my friends; for example, at the beginning, the history of the forbidden tree in Paradise and of the serpent, the little *Privatdozentin* who, six thousand years before the birth of Hegel, lectured on the whole Hegelian system . . . that man is God.

[10] Vol. 6, pp. 49 f.

[11] Vol. 6, p. 54. Heine published his *Geständnisse* in March, 1854. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* appeared serially in 1851-1852. It was published in book form in Boston in the latter year. Although Heine was tied to his "mattress grave," he must have read the book soon after its appearance. Heine had known of the injustices to the American Negro as early as 1830. In a letter to Börne he speaks with angry scorn of America's zealous churchgoers who treat like dogs men of dark or brown skins, and he refers to a newspaper item on such treatment in New York City. See Vol. 7, p. 45.

"If you eat of the tree of knowledge you will become like God." Eve understood only one point of the entire philosophical demonstration: that the food was forbidden, and because it was forbidden the good woman ate of it. But no sooner had she tasted the delicious apple than she lost her innocence and her naïve helplessness. She noticed that she was far too scantily clad for a person of her social standing, the great grandmother of so many future emperors and kings; so she wanted a new dress. . . . Strange, as soon as woman came to self-consciousness, her first thought: a new dress.[12]

But this high regard for the Bible is already noticeable as early as 1830 in Heine's letters to Ludwig Börne. He spends a vacation in Helgoland, and on July 8, 1830, he begins a letter:

. . . Yesterday was Sunday. . . . A leaden dreariness was hanging over the whole island and almost crushed my head. In despair I took to the Bible . . . and I must admit that, although I am a Greek, I found not only entertainment in the book but edification as well. What a book! High and wide as the world, rooted in the depths of creation and reaching high into the blue mysteries of heaven . . . the sun's rising, its setting, promise and fulfillment, birth and death, the whole drama of mankind, all is in this book. . . . The Jews could easily comfort themselves because they lost only Jerusalem, the temple, the ark of the covenant, the golden vessels, and the treasures of Solomon. Such losses were a small matter in comparison with the Bible, the indestructible treasure which they saved.[13]

In a passage toward the close of this letter he continues:

It is a remarkable drama, how the people of the spirit gradually freed themselves altogether from matter, spiritualized themselves. Moses gave material bulwarks to the spirit against the materialistic attacks of neighboring peoples; everywhere when he planted the spirit, he planted the crude ceremonial law and a selfish nationalism as protective thorns. But after the holy plant of the spirit had struck deep roots and had grown high toward heaven so that it could not be uprooted, then came Jesus Christ and tore away the ceremonial law, which no longer had any useful significance, and he uttered the judgment of condemnation over Jewish nationalism. . . . He called all the peoples of the earth to the kingdom of God, which had belonged to only one chosen people of God; he gave to all mankind Jewish citizenship. . . . Indeed, the Redeemer, who had freed his brethren from the ceremonial law and nationalism, founded cosmopolitanism and became an offering because of his love for mankind. The rulers of Jerusalem allowed him to be crucified and the mob scorned him. . . . But only the body was scorned and crucified; the spirit was glorified, and the martyrdom of the Victor, who won world power for the spirit, was the symbol of this victory. All humanity since then, in imitation of Christ, strives after the death of the flesh and growth in the absolute spirit.

The passage that follows urges a return to a harmony between matter and spirit; Christianity has carried the antithesis too far.

Ten days later (July 18, 1830) he begins a letter as follows:

. . . I have read through the book of Genesis. . . . Out of the Old Testament I frequently leap over into the New. Here too I am amazed at the might of the great book. What holy ground to walk upon! When reading the Bible, one ought to take off his shoes as if approaching a sanctuary.[14]

[12] Vol. 4, pp. 157 f. The same passage occurs in Vol. 6, p. 53.
[13] Vol. 7, pp. 45 ff. (Ludwig Börne).
[14] Vol. 7, pp. 48 ff.

Jesus Christ is not frequently mentioned by Heine, but whenever he is mentioned it is with reverence. In this same letter occurs this contrast between Moses and Jesus Christ:

> What an attractive figure, this God-man! How narrow in comparison appears the hero of the Old Testament! Moses loves his people with a moving inwardness; like a mother he provides for the future of his people. Christ loves humanity; that Sun girdles the whole earth with the warm rays of his love. What an assuaging balm are his words for all the wounds of the world! What a fountain of healing for all sufferers was the blood which flowed on Golgotha!

The New Testament account of Christ's sufferings calls forth, in the same letter, the following estimate:

> What a great drama is the Passion! And how deeply it is motivated by the prophecies of the Old Testament! It could not be avoided; it was the red seal of attestation.

The importance of the Bible in the cultural life of the modern world became a delightful theme. In his *Geständnisse* he says:

> In earlier years, when philosophy was my dominating interest, I knew how to value Protestantism for its service to freedom of thought. . . . Now, in my later and riper days, when religious feeling has welled up within me . . . and I have attached myself to the Bible; I now value Protestantism, apart from its service to freedom of thought, for its rediscovery and the spread of the Sacred Book. [Then he continues in an extended passage of which a summary is given]: The Jews saved the Bible from the burning of the second temple. Protestantism continues their work. The British Bible Society distributes the Old and New Testaments over all the earth, unwittingly preparing the way for the great democracy. The British hope to bring backward peoples under the banner of the English church. In this they will fail. Something better will result. They are spreading the kingdom of the spirit; each man will be bishop in his own household; love of neighbor, purity, and high morality, not to be taught through dogmatic formulations, will grow and thrive. It is remarkable how a Palestinian way of life has developed in the Protestant lands of Northern Europe and in America. Among the Scandinavians and Anglo-Saxons and in north Germany, one might believe himself to be in Palestine. The Protestant Scotsmen, whose names are biblical and whose cant sounds like Jerusalem, are they not Jews who eat swine's flesh? In America small sects ape even the details of Palestinian life. It may be caricature but the caricature will disappear; the genuine, the eternal, and the true will blossom again in these lands as once it did by Jordan and on Lebanon. No palms and camels are necessary to goodness and goodness is better than beauty.[15]

At the end of his postscript to *Romanzero,* in speaking of immortality, he assures his readers that he will meet them in a better world and write them better books. Then he tells the story of Danish missionaries to Greenland who were asked by the heathen whether there were seals in the Christian heaven. When the answer was No, the Greenlanders replied sadly that the Christian heaven was not for them since they could not exist without seals. "Console yourselves, my dear readers, life continues after death, and in another world we shall find our seals again."

To give a correct estimate of Heine's religious position is well-nigh

[15] Vol. 6, pp. 57 ff.

impossible. Born a Jew, educated in his early years in a Jesuit Lycée, baptized a Lutheran, married to a loyal Catholic, Heine partakes of the three great religious traditions. His devotion to the Greek principle of beauty and his later devotion to the Hebraic principle of morality are not so much a contradiction as a sign of tension in his life. This tension accounts for his character better than the generally accepted opinion that a blasted courtship in his early life permanently embittered him. That tension was the outward sign of the inwardly wandering and uncertain Jew. To try to understand Heine may help us to understand the modern Jew, whom Heine called *ein wandelndes Geheimnis.*

Israel Tabak, in his recent book,[16] says that "Heine endeavored, in the final stages of his mental development, to effect a synthesis of Hebrew culture with Western thought." I believe that we can be more specific. It was, primarily, the moral element in Western thought as propagated by Christianity where Hebrew culture found a point of attachment. It was not the thought of synthesis but of continuity that occupied his mind in his last years. This moral element in Christianity was endangered by many hostile movements in Western thought, but it represented a continuation of Judaism and might prove to be its fulfillment. His prophecy that the dissemination of the Scriptures would result in the blossoming of the genuine and the eternal and the true, as once they did by Jordan and on Mount Lebanon, is in accord with the sentiments of his early letter to Börne (quoted above) that Christ completed what Moses began, that Christ tore down the ceremonial law and gave to all men Jewish citizenship. Heine did not become an orthodox Christian after his conversion, but, at the same time, there is no evidence that he considered himself as one who had returned to the synagogue. He had gone beyond Judaism to the perception of the continuation of the Old Testament in the New. The word *Bible,* for Heine, means both Old and New Testaments—a divine book which one should read unshod as if approaching a sanctuary.

Dilettante that he was (writing, beside his immortal lyrics, on philosophy, literary history, criticism, and politics), his keen insight was superior to that of many scholars whose learning crowds their minds but does not clear them. His analysis of the elements in Christianity leaves much to be desired; yet his sympathetic appraisal of the moral element in Hebrew history and of its wholesome influence through the Bible is full and rich. His prophecy regarding a truculent Germany, repaganized by philosophy, seemed fanciful in 1834. In 1934 it looked like sane prophecy. In 1949 it reads like history.

Heine's own words are that he wants a God who can help in time of trouble, a God with elbowroom. In his own words, he came back as a prodigal son from tending swine to Father's house.

[16] Israel Tabak, *Judaic Lore in Heine,* Johns Hopkins Press, 1948, p. 210.

THE WORLD'S GREAT POETRY

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OF THE MAKING of anthologies there is no end—for they always sell. Why do they sell? Like other books, including even certain "best" sellers, including even books widely quoted, more copies are undoubtedly sold than read. (I have been told by more than one proud possessor of Professor Toynbee's great *Study of History* that he hasn't begun it "yet.") But anthologies have a special appeal: someone has done the selecting for us, and that will save us time, in our busy lives. The appeal is decisive and irresistible, for most Americans! And so they get published, handsomer and more inclusive every year, from the Reverend Wm. Dodd's *Beauties of Shakespeare* (1752)[1] to the vast compendia of Burton Stevenson and James D. Morrison. But upon what criterion of selection are their contents chosen? What makes poetry, for example, "great"? Is it quotability, or the fact that it *is* quoted, that it continues to appeal to later generations than the author's own? One may turn for an answer to a professional literary critic, say to Mark Van Doren's charming study of poetry, *The Noble Voice* (1946), where ten "great" poems are passed in review. The book is an aid, in our particular quest, though too often the historical setting of the poet is slighted or ignored[2]—and also the religious factor. From it we begin to learn why the older poets—certainly most of those he discusses—have something permanent to say to the whole human race; something of everlasting significance, whether written in joy or with tears, whether with an earnest intention of edifying or only in order to please the fancy, whether with or without a deep underlying philosophy.

The contrast between almost any page of a great poet and almost any page of what passes for poetry today (in publishers' blurbs and in Sunday book reviews) is almost diametral. Take the oft-quoted lines of T. S. Eliot:

> Here were decent godless people,
> Their only monument the asphalt road
> And a thousand lost golf-balls.[3]

If Mr. Eliot wants to say that, there is no objection: but why does it have to be palmed off as poetry? Written in two lines, or in one, as prose, it would be just as effective as it is when written in three, as if it were poetry. And the same goes for much of the "poetry" that pours from the pens,

[1] Dodd was an interesting figure. See the article on him in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed.

[2] The same is true of much modern writing about "The Bible as literature"—but the Bible simply cannot be understood apart from its historical setting and really loses half its literary beauty when placed in such a vacuum.

[3] From *The Rock*, Harcourt Brace, 1934.

typewriters, and presses of our contemporaries, whether it hails from somewhere "north of Boston," from the "agrarian" middle South, from back of the stockyards in Chicago, from smoky factory towns in the English midlands, or from equally dirty, smoky, stale, and reeking restaurants in Greenwich Village. As much so-called "modern" painting, sculpture, and music begins by ignoring (or in complete ignorance of) the great classic tradition of art in the long human past, so also much of our would-be poetry likewise begins. The great poets, the great artists, were never the devotees of this dual cult of Obscurity and Ugliness. What do the eyes of our artists *see,* what do their ears *hear,* to produce merely distortions—or contortions—of muscles, trees, ships, human faces, and audible sounds? What do our poets *feel* and *think,* who set forth their weird, strained, unhuman, chaotic thoughts and feelings in words which could never (like ancient poetry) be sung or accompanied on the harp, but require for accompaniment the thunder of the subway, the rattle of compressed-air riveters, or the crash and din of the steel stamping press? The background of much "modern" poetry, so-called, is the factory and the steel mill, not the great hall of some wealthy Mycenæan king, or the vast sun-bathed theatre of Dionysus south of the Acropolis, or the severe yet sublime Norman churches of northern Italy, or the lofty, spacious English cathedrals with their rolling tides of heavenly organ music. Some people may like it—but it can never last. "No man after drinking old wine will desire new; for he says, 'The old is better.' "[4]

It is characteristic of Van Doren that he does not offer us a definition of poetry. A German critic, or an ancient Greek philosopher, would have begun with a definition. But Van Doren is himself a poet; and though some of the poets have speculated over the secret of their art, either in poetry, like Horace and Housman, or in prose, like Sidney and Wordsworth, they have not always succeeded in telling us what it is. As a rule, nonpoets have done most to define the essence of poetry: for example, Aristotle, coming at the climax of the long Greek quest for definitions of real things, a purely scientific quest, which necessarily left out some aspects of reality that lie beyond definition. You might as well try to define music as "harmonious sound" or sculpture as "lifelike carving" or painting as "pictures done in color"! But when you hear great music you know what it is: far beyond the audible harmonies there opens up a new world of vision or apprehension, the firmament parts asunder, and peace—or heroic resolution—or new insight into the meaning of life—descends like the dove in one of the old painters' portrayals of Christ's baptism and rests upon you. It is something miraculous and supernatural; it is one with the whis-

[4] Luke 5:39; *cf.* RSV. Even the reading of some of the manuscripts, "The old is good," is strong enough!

pered melodies of the heavenly spheres as they wing on their eternal round; it is like the joyful song of the morning stars at the dawn of creation. It is *like* that: but you cannot define it.

Yet we may be able, perhaps, to say what it is *not* (as I have already suggested): it is not cacophony; it is not ugliness; it is not factory noises or factory conversation recorded in words; it is not mere pedestrian or prosy vaporings over backstairs gossip, or the filth tossed up by the underworld and paraded as examples of "realism," whether "a silk stocking full of mud" or the bowl of poisoned wine set on to crown the feast. And as near to a positive definition as we can come is perhaps this: it is thought, or feeling, which is worth recording, worth talking about, recorded in words that are beautiful as well as strong, words that are fit and appropriate, and that have in themselves a musical quality and contribute to a total effect which is musical. That is the magical effect of all true poetry. It produces "not a fourth sound, but a star." It creates an effect which includes the effect produced by other arts, as Ovid and Virgil depicted scenes whose effect is sculptural, as Homer and Milton make you think of the rolling thunder of the sea or the surging waves of the full organ. As Tennyson described Virgil's art, one discovers in it

> All the charm of all the Muses
> Often flowering in a lonely word.

We recall that there is a whole list of Latin words which Virgil simply could not use (as Professor Mackail demonstrated), for they were not musical. This much of a definition, then, we may accept. Poetry must be musical; it is the music, not of the lyre or the harp, but of words, of human language;[5] and to this end, thought or feeling must be wedded to appropriate intelligible sound—though "sound" includes more than assorted consonants and vowels, and embraces all the rich connotations and overtones of the words chosen by the poet. By this test, most of the ten great poems which Dr. Van Doren has selected are genuine poetry. I would question only the last two, "Don Juan" and "The Prelude." Byron belongs in the *New Yorker*, as a writer of clever but trifling *vers de société;* Wordsworth, sublime in spots, is too often a pedestrian, egocentric, hard-headed writer of solid Protestant prose—broken into metrical lines, but still essentially prose.

I

As the author himself points out, his book has three heroes: Homer, Dante, and Chaucer (p. xii). If he could have included Shakespeare, he would have done so; but Shakespeare requires a book to himself. "Homer,

[5] *Cf.* Thomas Fuller, *The Holy State* (1642) II, chap. 7, "The generall Artist": "Nor is he a stranger to Poetry, which is musick in words; nor to Musick, which is poetry in sound: both excellent sauce, but they have liv'd and died poore, that made them their meat."

with Shakespeare at his side, is still the sovereign poet" (p. 1). With this judgment I heartily agree! "Homer's scenes, and the incidents that fill them, are beheld as if in a long dream, or as if in memory" (p. 2). "The spirit of the Odyssey is something like that which breathes in the History of Herodotus" (p. 47). These are true and significant observations—and there is a historical reason back of the facts, to which I shall come presently. Homer was a real poet, a historical individual and not just a group or succession of balladists, or a school of "Homeridæ" who strung old ballads together to form the two epics. "The higher criticism [of Homer] is misguided, or is misunderstood, if it seems to deny the identity of a single artist who twice was capable of measuring the intensity with which a hero felt himself . . ." (p. 2). Dr. Van Doren evidently agrees with the late Professor John Scott, of Northwestern, whose vindication of the unity of Homer reversed the tide of partition theories popular in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[6] Nevertheless, it seems to me, Van Doren misses the point of the religious spirit of Homer—as Gilbert Murray does; for it was a spirit really religious and conservative, yet thoroughly open-eyed, critical, and rationalistic. We wonder how a whole race could continue for centuries to regard Homer as its Bible![7] But that is because "Bible" means, for us, the sacred history of the Hebrews, their laws, their poetry, their prophets, and their wisdom—the long record of a *Heilsgeschichte* culminating in the New Testament and then projecting onward into the long history of the church, and then on beyond that, "beyond history," and *extra flammantia mœnia mundi* to the "Jerusalem that is above" and outside all time and space. No such book as this is to be found in Homer, or in any other Greek poet, or in any other literature in the whole world. On the other hand, perhaps no ancient Greek would have thought our Bible much of a book. Yet Homer continued to nourish the souls and the imaginations of men for many generations before the rise of the Sophists, before Plato and Euripides, and before the fourth-century critics of traditional Greek religion successfully undermined the received views of the gods, satirizing their foibles and follies and insisting upon a firmer basis for public and private morals than these highly questionable examples. Even so, through the sheer charm and magic of his poetry, Homer continued to speak to men and to haunt the memory of the noblest and most intelligent of them, in their devoutest, their most exalted, their most heroic hours. Why was this? Walter Otto in his fascinating study, *Die Götter Griechenlands,* Wilhelm Nestle in his precious *Griechische Religiosität,* Martin Nilsson in vol. I of his great *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* and in his more recent *Greek Piety,* and other modern writers as well, have shown

[6] *The Unity of Homer,* Sather Classical Lectures, vol. I, 1921.

[7] *Cf.* Otto Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen,* 1935, vol. II, pp. 1-44.

how Homer suppressed the age-old "primitive" traits of Mediterranean religion—the weird black magic, the horrifying monstrosities, the stupid or brutal animal deities, the dark, abhorrent chthonic rites and deities, and human sacrifice. Traces of these survive in Homer, it is true; but only traces. The two rich streams of earlier religion, the Minoan and the original Hellenic, were combined in the Mycenæan period; the turbulent and colorful heroic age followed, and a race of men appeared, like those in the far later heroic age in Northern Europe, whose chief virtue was their valor, and whose religious faith consisted mainly in accepting life *as it is* and making the most of it, with no complaining at the bitterness of fate and no wishful thinking about a life beyond. It was this quality—this unquestioning acceptance of life with its limitations and uncertainties, and the frank acknowledgment of heroic courage as the most godlike of all human virtues—it was this quality in Homer that spoke to the inmost souls of men in generation after generation of the ancient world, and made of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* not only the "Bible" but the favorite schooltext of the Greek world, preserving them to posterity as a κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί of the whole human race.

II

"Virgil's subject is political, as Homer's was not and doubtless could not have been. The ethical emphasis is public, the slogans are institutional, the manners of the life are colored by a sort of state decorum, and the perspective through time is mainly into the future" (p. 91). Very true; but the explanation is the historical situation in which the poet found himself. He was more than a court poet, for he deeply felt, and ardently believed in, the meaning of the crisis and the solution through which not only Rome but the whole world was now passing. After the long ages of darkness and barbarism, since the first men dwelt happily under Saturn's wise reign; after endless generations of bloodshed and strife; after the long century of civil war which had all but destroyed the Roman republic; after the chaos of the revolutions—at last had come a leader whom men could trust and follow, and with him the dawn of a new era of peace and happiness. The hour was apocalyptic, like the dawn of a glorious Italian spring day after long months of cold and gloom. Every bit of religious faith a man possessed was summoned to rise up and greet this glorious prospect—the Fourth Eclogue is no *jeu d'esprit*, but the poet's very creed, setting forth his profoundest convictions about the meaning of life in his own time, his conception of history, his hope for the future. No wonder if some of the Church Fathers looked upon it as inspired, or suspected that Virgil had read the prophet Isaiah—which is not an improbable view, considering some of its phrases, and the poet's wide reading. It is true, Augus-

tus may perhaps have intended to make thorough *use* of religion in advancing his political aims. More than one of our recent historians—Deubner, for example—have explained his motives in this way; his great *sæcular* celebration, his dedications to Apollo, his centring of religious rite and usage upon the Julian house, his restoration of temples and priesthoods, even the phrases of his famous autobiographic inscription, the *Monumentum Ancyranum,* may be interpreted in this way. But it is another matter to accuse Virgil of Erastianism, as if he were an ancient Vicar of Bray, ready to tune his lyre to whatever song the political situation required. The religion of Virgil was a genuine religion, and his verse rose to heights which no timeserving laureate of a new totalitarianism could possibly have attained. And it is this profound religious faith and hope, not a mere magic of well-chosen words, which is needed to explain not only the *Æneid* and the *Eclogues* but the *Georgics* as well. Of course it is not mystical, personal, philosophical religion; it has no dogmas, it has few prayers; it is public religion—political religion, if you will; but it is genuine religion, and our understanding of Virgil is incomplete, if his religion is left out.

So with Lucretius: it was his wrestling with the problem of human life, his Epicurean repudiation of all actual *religio,* his contempt for superstition and magic and the fear of hell, his wholly negative conclusion about the gods and their concern with mundane affairs, his faith in Democritean science—this is what gave unity and integrity to his disciplined, athletic mind, and made him the poet he was.

So with Milton. Ignore his Puritan theology, his strange welding of classicism and biblicism, and the poetry is only half-explained. The creation of Eve from Adam's rib may be "butcher's meat" (p. 141), and equally sharp criticisms may be in order in certain other passages—we might also criticize Dürer's etchings in this manner; but the poet cannot be understood apart from his creed, or explained apart from his career as scholar, theologian, Latin secretary, and champion of the liberty of the press. Poets are not mere versifiers—they are first of all men. As Emerson said, over a century ago (1837), a scholar is no mere bundle of learning but "Man thinking." So the poet is man feeling, man thinking, man aspiring, man singing, man making music of words—but words that first of all have meaning for the world in which he lives, and for other men than himself.

Dante—of all poets, Dante!—can never be interpreted apart from the great ages that gave him birth: the great age of scholastic theology and philosophy behind him, the long Catholic "ages of faith," the Middle Age and the early Renaissance to which he was contemporary, the art and religion, the science and speculation of his time—and along with it his own profound, impassioned belief in the infallible truth of revealed religion,

conceived, as he conceived it, in terms of what Professor Randall has called "the Mediæval synthesis." Take all that away, and the purely "literary" appreciation of Dante is only a technical discussion of *terza rima* and the endless allusions, classical, biblical, and contemporary, that crowd his pages.

Or Spenser: "His unconvincing heroes are virtues on horseback" (p. 233). Yes—but. It is well put; and the figure is even better than the reader suspects at first—for the age of chivalry is at an end, for Spenser and for his contemporary Cervantes. And yet its virtues, the Christian virtues, were on horseback, in the saddle, armed and ready for encounter. By contrast, in our day they are afoot, or prostrate, hacked and hewn to death by the hostile forces of commercialism, scientific warfare, totalitarian politics and economics (not unknown even in the democracies!), and by the encircling "task forces" of skepticism and a materialistic view of life. The machine age is upon us—farewell to poetry, farewell to Christianity, farewell to the whole higher life of man, won through endless years of struggle up from barbarism and primeval chaos! We would like to know more about this man Spenser, who stood where the tide was turning, and who could tell us something (a little, perhaps, after his years in Ireland) of the whence and the whither of modern man. Was he only an antiquarian, a *laudator temporis acti,* sighing only for a day that was done and with no inkling of a brighter—or a darker—morrow? Or was he one who, in the midst of all his romantic, chivalrous, feudal imagery, had laid hold on truths that never die—truths we too must find, and find soon, lest *we* die?

> For of the soule the bodie forme doth take;
> For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make[8]—

that sounds like something more than stilted, formal versification. Dr. Van Doren could, I think, have told us something more about Spenser.

Finally, Chaucer! (For reasons already given, I will not discuss the last two poets in the book.) Chaucer "is discursive because he is skeptical; to the comic genius everything is partly true and he is its priest, its garrulous vicar who in a minute can find his attention turned to something else of equal interest" (p. 281). But of course Chaucer is religious—as well as skeptical. From Homer on, poets have been both skeptical and religious, often at one and the same time—and so are all men![9] Indeed, a religious man who is not skeptical is not really religious, as Emerson showed in his essay on Montaigne; he is only superstitious—like Theophrastus' character, "the superstitious man." And back of Chaucer, and surrounding him, and in front of him, and permeating him, is the religion of England—and of Europe—in his day: the prereformation Catholic

[8] *An Hymne in Honour of Beautie,* 132 f.

[9] See Gordon Keith Chalmers, "To Believe and Doubt Well," *Anglican Theological Review,* vol. XXI (January, 1949), pp. 9-14.

faith and cult of mediæval Western Christianity. Leave that out—and you cannot hope to understand Chaucer, whether skeptic or humorist, poet or storyteller, gossip or comedian: all these, but more, a hearty, stout, well-favoured English gentleman, in love with life, reverent towards God, and honest in his admiration of pure and simple goodness. It was not cleverness in spinning his long tales, told in charming, unforgettable verse, that made Dan Chaucer the poet he was: he was first of all a man, a Christian, a gentleman, and a scholar—who wrote matchless verse, and so became the first great poet of the English-speaking world. His literary virtues were secondary—but they would not have been that, or even tertiary, had he not first of all been a man, one who lived in his own time, loved it, and spoke to its very heart.

What then makes poetry "great"? Partly the skill of the poet, his mastery of technique, of metre, assonance, rhyme (if he uses it), of the overtones which certain words produce—like the finger's faint caress in one of the upper positions on the violin; partly it is his sense of melody, his intuitive avoidance of harshness, and his ability to produce "music in words," as good old Thomas Fuller maintained. But over and above and before all, the author of "great" poetry must be a man who feels deeply, thinks sincerely, and sees life so accurately that he can tell what he sees without exaggeration, obscurity, or distortion, and in language that is moving and memorable, for the beauty of the world is set in his heart. And by this very token, he must be a man of his own time, sharing a history and a faith, and setting forth what other men can recognize as the world—or "life"—as they too know it, understand it, and accept it. No mere versifier, no merely "literary" poet, no faddist or juggler of sounds, no mere candid-camera-man taking shots of the current scene can hope to qualify for this sacred office.

NATURE AND/OR GRACE

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I

NATURE and grace do not necessarily point to an ontological dualism but they do point to an experiential one; through both of the realities which these words symbolize men have felt that they knew God. The concern here will be to consider some of the classic answers to the question of how it is that men come to know God, whether by nature or by grace, in an effort to indicate a method of approach which will enable the Christian thinker more explicitly to relate the "grace" experienced in his faith to the "nature" experienced in his world. Except for a brief excursion into Calvin's thought it will not be our purpose to reconstruct any of the great systematic arguments centring on this theme; but rather to examine the point of view with which such arguments are undertaken.

The desire for synthesis can occasionally be ascribed to intellectual immaturity, that is, the inability to see a problem clearly enough to make a commitment one way or the other. But this is not the case with the problem of nature and grace. Whichever way one theologian decides there still remains for another the alternative—and who shall deny varied means of grace? The problem is perhaps ultimately not a matter of choice but of priority. The task of the Christian theologian is to indicate the direction in which the only adequate priority lies, without abrogating as of no significance that which remains secondary in his evaluation.

II

In Book 1 of the *Institutes* Calvin has dealt with natural theology, particularly in those chapters regarding man's knowledge of God. Before considering the much debated theme as to what is Calvin's real position on natural theology, let us reëxamine the essence of his argument. It contains a principle that is of primary importance for all Christian theology.

Emil Brunner indicates with wisdom, in his *Nature and Grace,* that Calvin uses "nature" to designate the original creation insofar as it is recognizable as such; it is the God-given form of all created being. Brunner writes: "Nature therefore presents no contrast to spirit or culture, but rather to what is not in accordance with creation, to what has lapsed from the order of creation, to what is arbitrary and irregular. Therefore, nature is for Calvin both a concept of being and the concept of a norm." With this clue Calvin's position will be more readily understood.

In Book 1 of the *Institutes* Calvin maintains that men have a knowl-

edge of both God and themselves. Knowledge of themselves leads men inevitably to a knowledge of God: "by our imperfections we are excited to a consideration of the perfections of God." Our knowledge of God as first manifest in "the structure of the world" and in Scripture leads us to know him as Creator. Only through piety and reverence, however, does he manifest himself in the person of Christ as Redeemer. "We lay it down," wrote Calvin, "as a position not to be controverted that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of Deity." He goes on to say that there has never been a country or family from the beginning of the world that did not have some sense of divinity in its heart. "All have by nature an innate persuasion of the Divine existence . . . nature itself permits none to forget." Concerning God's manifestation in the world Calvin declared, "Withersoever you turn your eyes, there is not an atom of the world in which you cannot behold some brilliant sparks at least of his glory . . . of his wonderful wisdom, both heaven and earth contain innumerable proofs." Even the man who is ignorant of science is not prevented from "such a survey of the workmanship of God as is more than sufficient to excite his admiration of the Divine Architect."

In these and similar sentences Calvin not only affirms that God can be known from nature but he demands that man should know and honor him in his works. We are in the "theatre" of his glory; we must know and honor him as the Lord of glory. In addition Calvin maintains that man is the most glorious of the creatures of God. The image of God is implanted in him. "He exhibits the most noble and remarkable specimen of the divine justice, wisdom, and goodness."

Any of these thoughts, if quoted out of context, could be taken as evidence that Calvin regarded natural theology as a kind of postern gate into the inner chamber. But notice how carefully each concession to natural theology has the props knocked from under it in the accompanying passages. They leave no doubt as to where Calvin stood in this debate—the full purport of which he did not anticipate. If Calvin regarded natural theology as preparatory to anything, it was as preparatory to what he really wanted to say. It was not a P.S. but a "therefore!" God's evidences are in creation *but* "it is only one in a hundred" who really cherishes that which has been born in him. Ignorance and wickedness have obscured it. Man's stupidity is so great that amid all the "brilliant sparks" of glory he is always inattentive to these obvious testimonies and so derives no advantage and no salvation from them. Thus, Calvin emphasized the availability of God to every man for the purpose of proving the guilt of every man. In spite of the fact that the Divine image was not completely annihilated and effaced in man, "yet it was so corrupted that whatever remains is but horrible deformity."

So it is that Calvin gives natural theology just enough rope so that he can hang it. For if what he tells us is true, we need other and better assistance, properly to direct us to the creator of the world. "Therefore," wrote Calvin, "God hath not unnecessarily added the light of his word to make himself known unto salvation . . . so the Scripture, collecting in our minds the otherwise confused notions of Deity, dispels the darkness, and gives us a clear vision of the true God . . . the restoration which we obtain through Christ restores us to true and perfect integrity." Thus whatever man can know independently becomes as nothing to those who know God in Christ. Christ gives us a true knowledge of God and his works. This I take to be Calvin's central thesis. Whatever concessions he makes to natural theology he utilizes to demonstrate that there can be no natural theology. In Scripture and in Christ men come to the only real knowledge of themselves, their cosmos, and their God.

III

Probably the most famous debate about Calvin's position regarding natural theology has been carried on in our day by Emil Brunner in *Natur und Gnade* and by Karl Barth in his "angry reply" *Nein!* These two brochures have recently been published in English translation under the title *Natural Theology,* to which John Baillie has supplied a valuable introduction. Barth declares that he feels free to improve upon, and make even more pointed, Calvin's rejection of natural theology: "If we really wish to maintain the Reformer's position over against that of Roman Catholicism and Neo-Protestantism, we are not in a position to-day to repeat the statements of Luther and Calvin without at the same time making them more pointed than they themselves did." Brunner, on the other hand, is more prone to follow a proof text method, utilizing 126 quotations from Calvin. Brunner's logic runs something like this: Calvin said thus and so; he was a Reformer; I am reëmphasizing an essential principle of Reformation theology. And so he can say to Barth: You tell me to go to Rome? I tell you to go to Calvin!

In his "Angry Introduction" Barth wrote: "My opinion concerning the task of our theological generation has been this: we must learn again to understand revelation as grace and grace as revelation and therefore turn away from all 'true' or 'false' *theologia naturalis* by ever making new decisions and being controverted anew." It is Brunner's contention that, "In the long run the Church can bear the rejection of *theologia naturalis* as little as its misuse. It is the task of our theological generation to find the way back to a true *theologia naturalis.*" But Brunner is careful to set this emphasis in a context whereby "Christ gives us the true *theologia naturalis,* the true knowledge of God in his works in the same way in which

he gives us a new knowledge which goes beyond all knowledge that is natural and which is in this sense supernatural."

Those of us who believe with Brunner that "It is the task of our theological generation to find the way back to a true *theologia naturalis,*" can yet agree with Barth in his insistence that such a task was foreign to the concern and situation of Calvin. But at the same time we can turn to Calvin for insights whereby natural theology is guarded from misuse.

Barth writes with genuine understanding when he says, "The Reformers remained essentially untouched by the great synthesis of St. Thomas . . . hence they did not feel themselves called upon to clarify the problem of the formal relation between reason with its interpretation of nature and history on the one hand and the absolute claims of revelation on the other." He indicates that the place of the Reformers in the history of dogma lies in a different direction. "Thus, Calvin's *Institutes* is one of the few works of the Reformers in which the problem of knowledge is raised to any extent." Therefore, it is not possible to take Calvinistic fragments and point to them as justifications for the "other task" of theology. "For," writes Barth, "in Calvin's teaching God and his law, the mystery of election, the incarnation and redemption, the Holy Spirit as divine subject, Baptism and the Lord's Supper as divine signs, justification and sanctification as divine acts, are everything." This is the theological ground upon which Calvin stands. It is fruitless to search his writings in an effort to establish some place for natural theology when the overwhelming emphasis of his thought points in the other direction. Those who agree with Brunner when he says, "In the long run the Church can bear the rejection of *theologia naturalis* as little as its misuse," must admit that Calvin does not champion their cause. But having on other grounds established the necessity of a true *theologia naturalis* we can return to Calvin for a principle by which our *theologia naturalis* remains true.

In the following composite quotation from Calvin there is a penetrating insight into the core of this problem of nature and grace:

> Cold and frivolous are the speculations of those who employ themselves in disquisitions on the essence of God, when it would be more interesting to us to become acquainted with his character, and to know what is agreeable to his nature. . . . What benefit arises from the knowledge of a God with whom we have no concern? . . . For how can you entertain a thought of God without immediately reflecting that being a creature of his formation you must, by right of creation, be subject to his authority? . . . that you are indebted to him for your life, and that all your actions should be done with reference to him? . . . The nature of pure and genuine religion consists in faith, united with a serious fear of God, comprehending a voluntary reverence, and producing legitimate worship. . . .

Writing on the "Nature and Attributes of God," Calvin said we need a description, "not of what he is in himself, but of what he is to us, that

our knowledge of him may consist rather in a lively perception, than in vain and airy speculation." In the cool grandeur of his prose Calvin here displays a profound understanding of the existential nature of this problem in its import for the human soul.

God is not an object to be contemplated but a reality that grasps, moves, and determines personal life. Apart from such a grasp any "knowledge" of God remains superficial and meaningless. We must couple that realization with Calvin's affirmation that all knowledge of God is incomplete and even distorted if it does not see God through Christ—in whom we find the ultimate criterion for all religious knowledge of God. With these two principles to guide him the Christian can make friends with "airy speculation" and natural or empirical inquiry, finding in the latter an expression of the dignity of man and the worth of his cultural and intellectual undertakings. But he will not confuse the two interdependent yet distinct functions of empirical cognition and spiritual understanding. They may complement one another and contribute to the enterprise of the other, but they remain quests of different natures. Salvation consists of the kind of knowledge about God that is an experienced relationship to God. This experienced relationship can arise in innumerable situations (we must not limit arbitrarily the area of activity of the Divine Spirit), and among them is the empirical approach to the question of the existence of God. That enterprise has transcended itself, however, when the answer is not an intellectual yes, but a knowledge demanding total commitment to the reality which is other-than-me—indeed, it is not religious knowledge until then. In such a situation grace has broken through nature; revelation has fulfilled the quest of reason. The relationship between revelation and reason is not that of versus. Whenever it is so conceived, there is a profound misunderstanding of the nature of revelation. Revelation is the self-disclosure of God. God discloses himself not in miraculous facts which break the power of reason but in events in history through which the weakness of reason is overcome by the strength of faith.

IV

We are indebted to Nels Ferré's *Faith and Reason* for a clear statement of the fact that the impact of God on human life is a total impact demanding a total response. In that work Ferré has defined religion as "our fully positive whole-response to the complete combination of what is most important and most real," and he adds, "no whole-reaction is ever right without full use of right reason." And in striking metaphor we are reminded that "in the wedding of faith and truth reason is always the best man. Without that best man there simply can be no wedding. Still . . . we must never confuse the best man with either of the wedding party."

Thus right reason and knowledge are necessary aspects of faith's total inquiry. In the age-old consideration of the relationship between nature and grace it is the privilege of our times to make further investigations along the lines Ferré indicates. Now as never before we have the critical tools which enable us to come to a closer understanding of human personality in its response and relatedness to the total environment. That kind of investigation can clear away the ancient misunderstandings between the champions of reason on the one hand, and the defenders of faith on the other. It can point to the kind of synthesis in which the best of man's reason and cognitive powers are not denied but fulfilled in what religion has meant by the revelatory situation. Reason performs a vital critical function in the apprehension of religious truth; it cannot claim to give the whole truth, but it can claim that if what it has to give is not included, or is contradicted, then truth has not been revealed. This is to be maintained when reason is transcended beyond empirical inquiry and equally of the revelation of God in the person and teaching of Jesus the Christ. The emphasis theologians should be making in our times is not that rational human endeavor is presumptuous, evidence of the arrogance of sinful man, to be totally avoided; but rather, that valid as reason is it yet points beyond itself and so can become a vehicle of grace.

Rational inquiry is directed to a knowledge of God as the ground of metaphysical explanation. Faith is directed to God as the source of saving grace. The knowledge yielded by rational inquiry is certainly knowledge. The difficulty is that, as such, it is not knowledge unto salvation. As Calvin knew, "airy speculation" never saved anybody. But rational inquiry can lead to faith. Reason and revelation are equal to the question and the reply. Man seeks and learns enough to know that there is meaning in his quest, but he cannot find until that which he seeks discloses itself to him. While the answer lies outside of man, the fact that it is given is inclusive of the fact that he asked. Human capacities and cultural history would be meaningless if this were not so. Thus will be seen in a new and expanded light Barth's insistence that there can be no knowledge of God which God himself does not impart. Such knowledge comes to a creature who is more responsible for the fact that it came than that he was merely at home when it arrived. It comes, as every welcomed guest, by invitation. And just as every guest disrupts the usual patterns of activity and reconstructs the life of an entire household; even so, in larger measure, this is true when the visitant is the Eternal. And so we can say with John Baillie, as he wrote in *Our Knowledge of God:* "Our conclusion must therefore be that such moral and spiritual knowledge as may in any one period of human history seem to have become an inherent part of human nature, and so to be an 'unaided' natural knowledge, is actually the blessed fruit

of God's personal and historical dealings with man's soul, and so in the last resort also a revealed knowledge."

Karl Barth, in his magnificent one-sidedness, has overdrawn the issue between nature and grace. There is a certain theological sophistication in his polemics which obscures the honest impact Christianity can make on the modern mind. He never explicitly acknowledges an implicit distinction. Certain of the ancient Chinese philosophers of the Taoist school differentiated between "having-no knowledge" and "having no-knowledge." To "have-no knowledge" was to be in a state of childlike innocence, to have no wisdom about the nature of the world. To "have no-knowledge" was a spiritual achievement of passing through the wisdom of the world to a knowledge of the Tao; here the wisdom of the world was as nothing. The Barthian blasts about man's presumptuous rational activity would lead us to believe that the intellectual achievements and capacities of men are mere ignorant fumblings which the man of faith will avoid. But would it not serve our purpose more adequately to point out that such things stand in danger of becoming idolatrous, and that even the best of them are as nothing in the light of the knowledge of God revealed in his Word and in Christ? Until Barth's angry pen makes clear the distinction between "having-no knowledge" and "having no-knowledge," I fear that in the opinion of the world at large he will continue to be regarded as having no knowledge.

V

The Christian church is faced with an enormous educational task. Not only must it build a firm groundwork for an adequate faith in the minds of its children; it must also make the meaning of its dogma and symbols intelligible to the mass secular mind. Taking full cognizance of that mind, the theologian must strive to make his vocabularly and meanings intelligible to it. This does not mean compromise with it. It does mean that we must not insist on our own specialized vocabularies as the only adequate vehicles of truth.

Thinking now particularly of the children, such insights as we find in F. R. Tennant's empirical approach to theism are of extreme educational usefulness. No schoolboy could follow the detailed analysis of his *Philosophical Theology* and make head or tail of it. But every child can profit from what Tennant has called "the forcibleness of the world's appeal." Contemporary educational theory regards as highly desirable the attempt to relate the child, with understanding and wonder, to his natural environment. To teach the child about his world as a world that allows itself to be thought about, to teach him mutual adaptation and creative process, to introduce him to the world of beauty, and then (as inseparable from the others) to kindle in him the beginnings of moral understanding—thus

indeed can natural theology be a vestibule that leads to mature religious awakening.

As St. Paul understood, Christian apologetics must meet a man on the ground upon which he stands before it can lead him to the ground upon which it stands. This lies at the heart of the educational problem. In our zeal to proclaim the Word of God let us not forget that faith stands beyond reason, not before it. Otherwise the modern man will have ample cause to say with Robert Burns, "What makes no sense must be nonsense." For, in the words of Nels Ferré, "Those who reject . . . all rational discourse with weight to know, are not yoke-fellows with us in the serious investigations of mankind.

The question of the relationship between nature and grace is truly a perennial theme in the history of Christian thought. Varying interpretations of the problem have been responsible for some of the major divisions and disputes within Christendom. It is apparent in some of their debates that theologians need above all an openness of mind; the kind of bigness which sees central issues and does not spend itself in feverish, neurotic, peripheral disputation. One of the major errors in the way theologians have approached this perennial theme is the constant tendency to universalize their own temperament, their own background, and their own needs with the assumption that all men will be approaching this problem in the same way and that if they do not they should. Theologians, of all men, should be humble in their claims. Modes of theology come and go; in spite of them, as often as because of them, God in a mysterious continuum makes himself known unto men. Men can and do experience the saving power of God in limitless situations. Not all men stand in the same situation, but all men are in need of salvation; so, in diverse places, they are found of God.

We are all too familiar with the Thomistic insistence that reason without faith is incapable of any effective theological activity, and also with that rationalism which places exclusive trust in the deliverances of "unaided" reason. New paths of mediation need to be explored. The Christian theologian who would make a place for natural theology will remain true to the spirit of the Reformation, avoiding the dangers of both Rome and rationalism, by approaching all claims to a knowledge of God with these questions: First, is it consonant with the ultimate criterion of the knowledge of God as we have known him in Christ? Second, is it "airy speculation" or is it an existential commitment? Third, is it inclusive of "right reason"?

Nature or grace? Grace—speaking through nature and its evidences; through man and his capacities; and through Christ, in whom we behold "the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

THE FUNCTION OF A THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

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THE READER of this page is warned, at once, that the writer makes no pretensions to be an expert in theological education. However, a rather long service in the Christian ministry, coupled with certain recent experiences encountered in the line of duty, has stimulated his thinking along some lines of practical approach to the current situation in theological education, especially as it affects the parish ministry. The result is this attempt to answer the blunt question, Why a theological seminary? The hope is that in the discussion some flash of insight may be produced that will throw real light on a situation that bothers many leaders in all the Christian groups.

A brief review of recent investigations and pronouncements on the subject in several denominations will reveal the concern felt not only by denominational leaders, by the seminaries themselves, by the present personnel of the ministry, but also by the churches which have, in the last analysis, the greatest stake in the matter. This concern also touches the business of recruiting for the ministry. A glance at some of the expressions of these concerns will form a proper introduction to the main theme of this paper.

A recent study by the Commission on the Ministry of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America claims that since 1940 the number of Protestant ministers per one hundred thousand of the population has decreased from 137 to 104. This may indicate that the spiritual temperature of the churches is declining or that the methods of recruitment are faulty. Whatever the cause, the fact is that the number of ministers is not keeping pace with the increase of the population. This poses a problem for the leaders in theological education.

During the month of May, just passed, a meeting of bishops, ministers, and laymen at the Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary, Alexandria, Virginia, brought out the fact that since 1900 the enrollment of members in the Protestant Episcopal denomination has increased by 130 per cent while the number of active ministers has grown only seven per cent. There seems to be no shortage of potential ministers in this church but there is a shortage of training facilities. The seminary at Alexandria can take not more than forty per cent of the nearly two hundred applicants for admission. The seven other seminaries of the Episcopalians are in somewhat similar case. It looks as though all of them together will just about be able to meet the annual loss caused by death, retirement, and so forth. The Episcopalians have a real problem.

The Baptist denomination is also in the picture. Hugh Hartshorne and Milton C. Froyd, acting for the Board of Education of the Northern Baptist Convention, issued a volume entitled *Theological Education in the Northern Baptist Convention* in the last quarter of 1945. This shows that thirty-eight per cent of the ministers of churches in the Northern Baptist Convention received their training in theological schools of that Convention but that only thirty-six per cent of Northern Baptist pastors had full college and seminary training (seven years), while ten per cent never went beyond high school, twenty-two per cent had Bible school only, nine per cent had only a college training, and twenty-one per cent came from seminaries not affiliated with the Northern Baptist Convention.

How far these percentages obtain for other denominations we are unable to say. But it is our considered opinion that closely similar conditions will be found in most major denominations. The condition in the splinter sects that are so ubiquitous in these days is certainly much worse. We conclude that there is a sizable vacuum in theological education.

Historically theological seminaries were founded to meet certain felt needs of the churches. In support of this statement reference is made to the beginnings of Crozer Theological Seminary in 1867. The application for a charter for that institution opens with the following statement:

> It is proposed to establish a Theological Seminary at Upland, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, under the auspices of the Baptist denomination, for the preparation of candidates for the sacred ministry by providing them with thorough instruction in biblical, theological, and other religious learning, by cultivating the moral and religious affections and habits, and by training them in the practice of the various duties which devolve upon them as preachers, pastors, and missionaries.

That statement of purpose could have been written yesterday, and not more than eighty years ago, for it clearly expresses what the seminaries need to do if they are to meet the requirements of the churches. The action of the trustees of Crozer in reaffirming this purpose at their last annual meeting indicates that these men of modern times similarly sense the needs of the churches.

If the purpose of the seminaries is to educate and train men for the parish ministry and allied service, then the function of the seminary is clearly defined.

When one listens to the variety of conditions uttered by pulpit committees as indicating the kind of men they want for their vacant pulpits, he is amazed by the resulting discord. Yet underneath the high notes of difference there is a steady and continuing chord of desire. The churches want educated and trained men—men sufficiently educated in the arts and sciences to hold their own in the steadily advancing intelligence of the population and efficiently trained to meet proper individual and community demands on the pastor. Here we turn to the views of the theological

experts as shown in the standards for accreditation adopted by the American Association of Theological Schools.

From these standards we find that a fully accredited theological school (Class A) must meet the standards. Accredited institutions styled Class B are those that "do not require for admission to candidacy for their degrees, the degree of A.B., based upon four years of work, beyond secondary education, in a college which is approved by one of the regional accrediting bodies, or the equivalent of such a degree." This emphasizes the need for a complete college course before entering a seminary.

The experts have also taken a look at the curricula of theological seminaries and have something to say on that point. The curriculum should provide "adequate instruction in the following four areas: Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Practical. The last should include homiletics, religious education, pastoral theology, liturgics, church administration, and the application of Christianity to modern social conditions." And we would add supervised field work.

The question at once arises as to how the time of the faculties and students should be allocated among the areas of proper activity. In the *Education of American Ministers,* an authoritative volume, it is stated that in fifty-seven seminaries sixty-one per cent of the time was given to courses in departments "dealing largely with the past," namely, "theology, philosophy, and church history." These are the areas contrasted with the so-called practical courses. It seems plain that this hints at the proper balance always to be maintained between the academic and practical. In general it may be said that the techniques of the practical ministry must not be submerged beneath the demands of the other three fields. Nor should the immediacies of the practical, including field work, be allowed to crowd out a proper attention to the more academic studies.

The firm conclusion of our thinking is that the function of a theological seminary is to be a professional school devoted to the education and training of men for the pastoral ministry. It is true that there are related fields into which such a seminary may go, without impairing its usefulness, if it has the resources of plant and faculty. Likewise there is a place for the seminary engaged in purely advanced study and training, but only a few are competent to do this and the field seems well covered at the present time. The craze for advanced degrees offers a temptation to theological seminaries, but it should be resisted. Some matters, like provision for the training of men who do not have college degrees and the matter of extension courses, have had to be omitted from this discussion.

The times demand that the theological seminary embrace with zeal its function as a professional school for the education and training of men for the parish ministry and allied callings. Such a seminary will not only attract students but will also take its place as a real leader in the matter of theological education.

WHEN IS PANTHEISM NOT PANTHEISM?

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I WISH TO QUALIFY the position concerning pantheism and immortality attributed to me by Dr. Edgar Sheffield Brightman in his review of *Conscious Clay* (Scribner, 1948) in the April, 1949, issue of the *Crozer Quarterly*. Perhaps also his many kind comments about the book should be qualified, but for them you can hardly expect more from me than an expression of gratitude.

What seems to me a misinterpretation of my metaphysics is indicated by the phrase "a somewhat vague idealistic pantheism." If it is either "idealistic" or "pantheism," it must be "vague," for I myself had not recognized it as such. The position is realistic, both metaphysically and epistemologically.

Much reality exists independently of its being known or experienced by any consciousness, human or divine. All reality has a material or spacio-temporal aspect as well as a mental or spiritual quality or capacity. This is a neutral monism metaphysically rather than an idealism.

> Neither spirit nor matter can exist without the other. They are simply two aspects, two characteristics or qualities of the same substance. . . . Everything at bottom is vital electricity or energy, or "vitenergy," or whatever one chooses to call the basic substance which is differentiated into positive and negative and neutral quanta or electricity—positrons, electrons, neutrons, protons built up into atoms, molecules, crystals and cells, and ultimately into worlds with human beings.[1]

The very title of the book, *Conscious Clay*, suggests a substance that is extended and tangible as well as vital and rational. This is nearer the usual meaning of realism than of idealism.

As for pantheism, this view is certainly at variance with the usual significance of that term. Professor Brightman says that "all types of pantheism agree in finding the source of religious value to lie in the nature of the whole,"[2] and "for God to include moral evil . . . would destroy distinctions between good and evil."[3] On both these scores my position is not pantheistic. The source of value is in the creative nature of the vital energy which constitutes the universe. Therefore, value originates in the human parts of the universe as well as in the whole. That is a refrain throughout the book. For example, "as the pantheists have failed to see—

[1] *Conscious Clay*, p. 16.
[2] *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 142.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

although nothing is more obvious—this divine unity does not swallow up human personalities."[4]

Evil is real both from the human and from God's point of view. It is in the universe and in God because of the nature of energy, not because God wills it. In fact, he is working to destroy evil in so far as possible.

This universal, indestructible, eternal energy, taken as undifferentiated pure energy, would be an impersonal Brahman or Buddhist "suchness," but not the Christian God. God is the universal personality consisting of the more or less unified differentiations within this energy. As a personality, "God is more than all the parts of the universe."[5] He transcends the sum of the parts as the soul of a man transcends the totality of the molecules of his body.

Professor Brightman's statement that "the literal survival of the individual beyond death is denied" is clearly the exact opposite of what is reiterated in the book. For instance, "Without denying any of these beliefs in immortality I shall describe what seems to me the most probable manner in which personality survives. Whatever else may be true about immortality, this at least seems almost inevitable: personality lives on after this body of bones and flesh and nerves has returned to dust."[6] It is *not* true that I "sweep persons aside for the 'personality-body.'" I explain at length my belief that persons *with* "personality-bodies" survive death. This is definitely not "a figurative way of expressing an immortality of influence that follows after individual mortality." On the contrary, I clearly state that the surviving personality is not only individually conscious but creatively active and purposeful in its continuing coöperation with other personalities. In fact, this survival is even physical, which certainly is less "figurative" than an intangible, unlocalizable soul that has no creative work to do in the actual world.

This faith does have "a concretely empirical basis in theory of value." The whole discussion of creativity emphasizes that very fact. The "future of value," I agree, depends on the continuance of personalities. A closer reading of the analysis of personality as such, and of the relation of human personalities to God, will, I believe, reverse Professor Brightman's observations on this point. My understanding of personality cannot, of course, be explained in terms of his extremely pluralistic, idealistic personalism. Rather, I seem to see reality as a matrix of overlapping, interdependent, free persons and other things having their being in a democratic God, all consisting of creative patterns of the eternal vital energy of the universe.

[4] *Conscious Clay*, p. 20.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

Recently I received a letter which disturbed me, or to be more exact, which carried a sentence which has persistently stayed before my eye. Since some of the noisier, if lesser, deities of the moment assure us that any impression without immediate expression is sure to lead to fearful subliminal convulsions, it is probably wiser to take no chances. The sentence in question, written on a Sunday afternoon after a return from church, was: "Do all our boys conform and sink to the level of the thinking in their pews?"

Now it would be easy to brush that word aside as inconsequential, and on two grounds. It is easy to say that the writer was ultracritical and far from representative of most of those who sit in the pews; that his criticism was really inadvertent praise since it evidenced that the preacher was not adrift, had not broken away from those to whom he must minister. It would be easy to say that, and many are; but I have the feeling that it would not be an answer. The writer may be critical—ultracritical if you will—but he is the sort of man, as his record makes very clear, who prefers, in the building of the kingdom, to be among the bearers of burdens and hewers in the mountains than to be one of those whose strength lies in sitting still. And unless my own observations are quite in error, he is far from being alone. It is easy to repeat the comfortable word, "The people are not ready for it." But the evidence, as I see it, is that many of them *are* ready; that they are not afraid to think, are not afraid of new ideas; that they are eager and able to be challenged Sunday after Sunday to reach and to weigh. A few months ago, in a meeting of ministers of different communions, that question arose. Two of the elder brethren, in commenting upon the paper that had just been read, had expressed the opinion that were such material to be presented to laymen, they would not know what it was all about. The response of their fellow ministers was immediate and noteworthy. One after another challenged that notion and expressed his deep conviction that not only would material of that sort be understood but would be welcomed. More than that, they continued, there are many outside our dwindling circles who would quickly and willingly come in were they to become convinced of the relevancy and values therein to be found. No, my friend was not to be dismissed as the voice of one crying in the wilderness. And even if he were, we are told that such are not without value and have on occasion been disregarded at folk's peril.

Nor have I found the other line of reply more solid. It is easy to talk about seminary graduates having no message, having lost contact with the simple folk in the pews—and that record has been played so long with no change of needle that it has deep grooves worn into it. In some cases

undoubtedly it is true; and it is nothing to be happy or flippant about. Every theological instructor worth his salt regrets it and bends every energy to avert it. It might, however, be remarked that even in these cases—and they are far fewer than is often admitted—one of the most important causes has often been, not the alleged contempt of liberal seminaries for the homely truths of religion and piety, but the nature of the church background from which these students have come. Awkwardness is a pretty universal characteristic of adolescence, theological as well as physical. And most fathers and mothers have learned the hard way that goodness has the longest period of adolescent and trying clumsiness. It were well if the fathers and mothers of our local Israels could remember it too.

But the difficulty as I see it goes still deeper. Through the years I have seen many graduates for whom I had had high hopes come back to the campus. And not infrequently I have felt, in the midst of that pleasure of seeing once again a former student which every teacher knows, a pang. So frequently, quite despite the greater maturity and ease and urbanity which the years have brought, I have sensed a loss, the lack of something—a spark, an urge toward the far-off summits—which I had glimpsed and prized as I had seen them in class. Good men, earnest men, essentially honest men—nearly every one of them. But that evanescent something was no longer there.

And I think that was what my friend missed in the sermon that Sunday morning. Life has a way of smoothing off rough edges; that is all to the good. But unfortunately it also has a way of smoothing cutting edges which ought to be kept sharp; that can be tragic.

In that little gem which nestles toward the back of our New Testament, and save for a few pungent words rarely receives the attention it deserves, is a haunting word: "Let your yes be yes, and your no, no." Quite aside from its textual problem and the question of its relation to another more familiar, if less sobering word, it has a peculiarly timely importance. Do we believe it? Why of course we do; it is in the Bible. Yes, indeed; but *do* we believe it? Sometimes I wonder—and I fancy my correspondent does too. Is it tactful? Is it good public relations? Is it not wiser to speak in tongues? We have a most usable modern glossolalia in which *yes* and *no* are easily transformed so as not to offend sensitive ears or fatigue senescent brains. Of course Paul said, "Unless ye utter by the tongue speech easy to be understood, how shall it be known what is spoken?" But after all many good Christians are offended by the untactful apostle whom they are sure muddied the simple gospel.

And so my friend's word still troubles me, and probably will to the end of the picture.

From Off the Campus and On

Professor Graubard was born in Poland but came to the United States as a boy and has been an American citizen for over twenty years. He holds degrees from the College of the City of New York (S.B.) and Columbia (A.M., Ph.D.). After teaching at Columbia, Clark, and Chicago he went to the University of Minnesota in 1947 as associate professor in general studies in the college of science, literature, and the arts. His especial field of research has been pigments and hormones, to the literature of which he has contributed many important articles. At the moment he is completing a study on the history of magic, witchcraft, alchemy, and astrology as the forerunners of modern science. Among his books are *Man the Slave and Master* (1938) and *Man's Food, Its Rhyme and Reason* (1942).

Dr. King has been an occasional and always welcome contributor to these pages. He is a graduate of Asbury College and of Andover Newton and holds two graduate degrees (S.T.M. and Ph.D.) from Harvard. After several years in the Methodist ministry he served as an Army chaplain (ETO) for nearly three years. Upon leaving the Army he became minister of the First Congregational Church, Waterville, Maine, and last month became dean of the chapel and associate professor of philosophy and religion at Grinnell.

Dr. Miller is professor of classics at Lincoln University, where he has been since 1924. He is a graduate of Moravian College and of Princeton Theological Seminary and holds graduate degrees from Pennsylvania (A.M.) and Erlangen (Ph.D.). During the recent war he was a chaplain in the U.S.N.R.

Dr. Grant came to Union Theological Seminary in 1938 as professor of biblical theology from the presidency of Seabury-Western. His many books, articles, and translations have made him recognized as one of America's leading New Testament experts. For many years he has been the editor of the *Anglican Theological Review*. He is one of the translators of the *Revised Standard Version* of the New Testament and is a member of the editorial board of the International Project to Establish a Critical Apparatus of the Greek New Testament.

Mr. Cope is assistant minister of the Church of the Divine Paternity in New York City. He holds the degrees of A.B. and B.D. from St. Lawrence and has completed his work in residence for a Ph.D. from Columbia-Union.

Dr. Smith will be remembered by our readers for several timely and significant articles. He is an alumnus and trustee of Crozer and is now serving as interim administator of the Seminary. He is minister *emeritus*

of the Ardmore (Pennsylvania) Baptist Church, which he served for twenty-five years. He has long been prominent in the affairs of the Northern Baptist Convention.

Dr. Shimer is professor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii. He is now serving in Paris as executive officer of the U. S. Educational Commission for France to administer the Fulbright Program. He is a former secretary of Phi Beta Kappa and editor of its distinguished journal, the *American Scholar*. He holds the orthodox trinity of degrees from Harvard and an LL.D. from George Washington.

Once again a good grist of reviews of recent books is provided. It would be easy to become arrogant about this regular feature of CROZER QUARTERLY. With books the price they are nowadays, judicious appraisals are doubly important. And so we bow gratefully to our reviewers. Dr. Aubrey is head of the department of religious thought at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Batten is dean of Crozer. Dr. Benjamin is a member of the theological faculty of Temple and registrar of the Board of Ministerial Training for the Methodists of the Philadelphia Conference. Dr. Bixler is president of Colby. Dr. Bond is professor of religion at Bucknell. Dr. Braden is professor of the history and literature of religions at Northwestern. Dr. Buckler is professor of church history at Oberlin. Professor Craig has the chair of New Testament at Yale. Dr. Cranston is dean of the School of Religion of the University of Southern California. Dr. Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer. Mr. Theodore Enslin is a free-lance writer. Dr. Ferm is professor of philosophy at the College of Wooster. Dr. Fogg is vice-provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Fries is associate professor of philosophy at Wisconsin. Professor Horton has the chair of theology at Oberlin. Dr. Howson is professor of religion at Vassar. Mr. Hubben is editor of the *Friends Intelligencer*. Dr. Irwin is assistant professor of religious education at the University of Southern California. Dr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church, Richmond. Mr. Jones is a member of the French department at Pennsylvania. Mr. Keighton is professor of preaching at Crozer. Dr. King, now retired, was formerly dean of United College, Winnipeg. Dr. May is professor of Old Testament at Oberlin. Dr. Morrison is professor of homiletics at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Shryock, formerly a member of the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, is rector of Grace Church and the Incarnation, Philadelphia. Professors Stinespring and Widgery are on the faculties of Duke—the former in Old Testament, the latter philosophy. Dr. Wright is Stone professor of philosophy *emeritus* at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Theology of the Old Testament, by Otto J. Baab, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 287, $3.50.

This is another and a worthy sign of our times, indicative of the current revival of interest in biblical theology. Otto J. Baab, professor of Old Testament interpretation at Garrett Biblical Institute, has written a useful and scholarly book. The reviewer recommends it highly, even though he finds himself not always in agreement with its conclusions. The author has previously made known his approach to this subject in his essay, "Old Testament Theology: Its Possibility and Methodology," in *The Study of the Bible Today and Tomorrow* (edited by H. R. Willoughby, University of Chicago Press, 1947). Seven theological concepts are discussed in turn; *viz.,* the meaning of God, the nature of man, the idea of sin, salvation, the kingdom of God, death and the hereafter, and the problem of evil. The style is straightforward and simple, and the presentation is orderly, with the chapters divided under subtitles. Scriptural references are many, and quotations from the Old Testament frequent and pertinent. The quotations are from the 1931 edition of Smith-Goodspeed, *The Bible, An American Translation,* which the author prefers to the later editions in which the translation of the Old Testament has been revised by T. J. Meek. This is one of the points where the reviewer disagrees.

In each chapter of the book there is much important material which repays reading and study. Some of the places where the reviewer takes exception may be noticed without detracting from its general excellence. In contrasting the God of Israel with the Canaanite gods Professor Baab falls into what the reviewer thinks the error of reckoning these gods as merely "baals." The Canaanites would have considered Baal of Tyre, of Hazor, of Peor, or of Hermon not as different deities or local gods, but as particular manifestations of the same Baal, a cosmic deity in a complex pantheon. Baal is not "the name of numerous gods of fertility widely worshipped in Palestine before the Hebrews arrived" (see the Ugaritic texts), although the term "baals" (*beālîm*) is used by the Old Testament writers as a designation of Canaanite deities in general. The Canaanite gods, though certainly largely nature deities, were, after all, something more than "mere projections of the fertility principle and therefore as impersonal beings possessing little or no self-direction or individuality." One reference in the excellent discussion of the unity of God seemed strange to the reader; *e.g.,* "The Redeemer is the Holy *One* (italics Baab's) of Israel (Isa. 41:14)," for the Hebrew is only *qdwš yśr'l,* and the phrase hardly an allusion to the unity or oneness of God.

The description of the biblical picture of the nature of man in relation to his group, as a creature, as a thinking, ethical, and free being, and as a religious person is given with insight. One might here, as elsewhere, wish for greater discrimination of differences of opinion among various Hebrew authors. The viewpoint of P differs from J, and that of Isa. 40:6-8 from Psalm 8, and although Eccelesiastes may have something in common with P, the differences are instructive. There is, of course, considerable controversy over the meaning of "image" and "likeness" used by P to describe man created in the "image of God," but the reviewer doubts that Gen. 1:26, 27 refers to more than the form and appearance of man, or that, as the author tentatively suggests (see also Köhler), it means partaking of the divine nature with

34 345

respect to rule over other living things. Psalm 8 and Gen. 3:5, 2 show how man and God are alike, but not the biblical writer's phrase "image of God."

Among the categories of sin effectively described (social sin, eti sin, spiritual sin, personal sin) the reviewer had difficulty comprehe personal sin, described as neither social, ethical, cultic, nor religious in idolatrous," and in the perpetration of which the individual is cons outstanding evil act, but is distressed by his estrangement from God. Ps Isaiah's sense of guilt (Isa. 6) are given as examples. He agrees with ...essor Baab's view that the locus of sin is the mind and will of man, which is corrupted by human pride and ignorance, not in the physical nature of man. The occasion for sin is "man's dilemma of godlikeness and creatureliness." The discussion includes an illuminating presentation of the meaning of various Hebrew words for sin. In the chapter on salvation the term *hesed* is treated under the subtitle of God's love and grace, and it is declared to come close to Paul's use of *charis* (grace). Its meaning of "faithfulness" or "loyalty" to the covenant is not sufficiently stressed, and there are those who believe this to be a primary meaning (*cf.* Glueck, Snaith, Wright, etc.); it is no accident that twenty-three times it is associated with *'mt* and *'mwnh*. One would like to know the evidence that blood covenants, wherein the god of the tribe became a member of the tribe through ties of blood, existed by the hundreds in the ancient world of the Hebrews. The author believes the Old Testament depicts salvation preceeding from God, but that it does not preclude human participation and response, for man, a free, ethical person, must repent, and salvation has no meaning apart from such participation. This is usually true, but we might note that it is not the view of Second Isaiah.

A number of significant aspects of the kingdom of God are discussed by the author. He interprets the term somewhat broadly, noting that the idea of the kingdom was always present in Hebrew thought; so in the story of Eden we have "the kingdom already full grown," and it is the biblical view that the kingdom of God also appeared in history at the time of the early patriarchs and the Exodus, while the political kingdom of Israel was always thought to be God's kingdom. In the discussion of the eschatological aspects of the kingdom, we might wish for a description of the ideas of theocratic eschatology (*cf.* Second Isaiah, Ezekiel, Malachi, Daniel) as over against messianic eschatology. Attention might have been given to the "realized theocratic eschatology" of the P code with its "congregation of Yahweh" and to Ezekiel's theocratic society (chapp. 40 ff.). It is dubious that the son of man in Dan. 7 is a being of supernatural origin, but rather he is the personification of the Jewish saints (*cf.* vss. 14, 18). The discussion of death and the hereafter avoids the errors of many authors who find allusions to resurrection from Sheol in the Psalms, and keeps clear the distinction between immortality and resurrection. The reviewer doubts, however, that a common attitude toward death was indifference; note the emphasis laid on lamentation rites and proper burial. The story of the blessing of Jacob and Esau is certainly no evidence for such indifference.

The final chapter discusses the unity and validity of Old Testament theology. The author believes "there is but one theology of the Old Testament, after secondary and incidental ideas have been properly subordinated." This unity is explained in part through historical continuity, in which there was change but not loss of identity, the writers always conscious of the continuing community. He appeals also to the principle of "canonical unity," *e.g.*, the result of the process and experiences of canonization whereby the literature was consciously or unconsciously subjected to testing to meet personal and social needs of the group. He thinks that even bold

alterations of the text by late writers are not theologically contradictory to the original content, the difference being one of emphasis, and only seldom are the editor's conceptions of the ideas of Jewish religion radically different from that of his source, but rather make sharply explicit what is already in the sources. This depends in part on what one thinks is the original content, or on whether one defines the central ideas of Jewish religion in such a way as to exclude the differences. A third source of unity is the religious experience of the continuing community, as, for instance, the great festivals which were occasions for exalting and transmitting the great priciples of Jewish religious faith. One suspects that Professor Baab has selected as the "one theology" of the Old Testament that which to him has permanent validity, but the reviewer would rather say that there is a unity amid the diversity, and would hesitate to speak of "one theology" in the Old Testament. And certain aspects of Old Testament theology, which are certainly not incidental, may be rejected by the Christian theologian. So, for example, much in the Old Testament conception of the relation of God to war. So also the conception of a future Jewish world state and political Messiah. From the Christian standpoint, the fellowship which is the church supplants Israel as the inheritor of the Old Testament promises, and replaces Israel as the medium of the world's salvation through its head, Jesus the Christ. This may sound presumptuous to non-Christians, but is no more so than the claims for Israel in Old Testament eschatological thought. "The theology" of Isaiah 60 cannot be ours, despite much of true religious insight which is in the chapter.

Professor Baab insists that, as far as New Testament religious thoughts are concerned, these came to birth and mature expression in the literature of Israel, with the possible exception of ideas derived from hellenistic sources, and that the fundamental structure of the religious ideology of the New Testament is found in the Old Testament. If this is true, it is not all the truth, for the fundamental structure of the religious ideology of the New Testament is certainly not that of the Old Testament, and the salvation of mankind today and tomorrow is not to be found in the Old Testament, not even in Professor Baab's "one theology," but in *biblical* theology which has as its centre or focus the figure of Jesus. This despite what Christians have so often done in the name of Jesus. To say that the New Testament adds nothing to the idea of God not already present in the literature of Israel is not the entire story, as perhaps Professor Baab would agree, and while the view of man held by Jesus may be consonant with certain aspects of Old Testament theology, it is hardly normative for the Old Testament. Certainly the New Testament conception of Jesus as the Messiah differs widely from the more normative Old Testament view of the king of the line of David, despite what at times they may have in common.

Professor Baab's book stresses points of agreement and unity; this review deals largely with disagreements, and does not indicate adequately the reviewer's deep appreciation for the book. It is a volume of import for biblical scholars, ministers, and laymen. For those who would do further study, a short bibliography is appended, and there is a useful index of biblical passages and subjects.

HERBERT G. MAY

Social Psychology, by Wayland F. Vaughan, New York, Odyssey Press, ©1948, pp. xviii, 956, $5.

This impressive textbook of upwards of a thousand pages, and over a third of a million words, is a product of the experience the author has gained in some twenty years of teaching social psychology at Boston University. His dedication of the book to his five children, "who have taught me more social psychology then I ever could

have learned through books," is indicative of the humaneness and absence of pedantry that is characteristic of the entire work. The mark of the mature social scientist and experienced teacher is evident throughout.

The author is not primarily a philosopher interested in system-building; nor is he primarily the scientist rigorously submitting each item of evidence to the most exacting criticism and couching his conclusions wherever possible in mathematical formulations. Rather is he the chairman of a forum, opening up the successive topics of the book with brief analyses and then following them with the testimony of various writers. Together they comprise as miscellaneous and democratic a grouping as one might find anywhere. If anyone has published anything, or given an address that has been reported through the press, which is significant for the subject under consideration, his contribution may be called upon. The contribution may be a generalization based on exact observation or statistical research, a superior intuition, or an item of specialized information. The chairman of the forum calls on the contributors in such a way as to develop understanding of the theme on the part of the reader, and supplements their contributions with observations of his own. The result of this approach is a common-sense discussion of the major aspects of social behavior in our time by those who are in a position to contribute to our understanding. There is none of the false sense of finality, the shutting out or depreciation of opposing points of view, that is the almost inevitable concomitant of system-building. There is none of the rigidity and formalism, the aridity that so often characterizes the work of the social scientist obsessed with "objective" measurable data. One can readily understand why the course, out of which the textbook has been developed, has been so popular with the students.

The author's break with the traditional academic code of the social scientist is deliberate. According to that code a social scientist must present his data with an objective detachment from his own convictions. At most, he may be permitted the luxury of a pious appeal for social participation as a supplement to the scientific treatment of the subject. The author, on the contrary, boldly asserts on p. 1, "We shall *describe* social behavior—and *evaluate* it." He strives for objectivity of description and analysis; but he has a stake in the society in which his life is cast, and the expression of his concern is not to be relegated to an appendix. The aim of social psychology, as he sees it, is to uncover the facts and discover the laws of social behavior so that we may live together with greater mutual satisfaction. In keeping with this he considers values as legitimate objects of scientific study and even devotes a chapter to "Values and the Art of Living."

The effort of the author to do justice to values is salutary, but not without its own shortcomings. While the "purely objective" approach leads inevitably to the slighting of such peculiarly subjective data as attitudes and meanings, the valuational approach leads just as inevitably to the slighting of data that do not support the dominant trend of one's values. Perception is, by its very nature, selective in the direction of one's dominant interest. The attempt to discover the social implications of a complex situation inevitably predisposes the investigator to a sharper awareness of facts that conform to the values he brings to the situation.

Some of the bias of the author is personal. As far as the reviewer can appraise it, his social philosophy approximates Rooseveltianism *at its best*, with its wide humanitarianism and its concern for the lot of the common man. Some of the bias is the result of the spirit of the times. The researches of a period, by and large, reflect the preoccupations of men's minds during the period. As one reads the various chapters, one becomes aware, at times, of aspects of subjects which have taken on new significance in the brief time since the book was written. The time lag, inci-

dentally, is increased by the fact that the book is an organized treatment of studies which had to be made, then organized, then published, before they were available to the author. The original studies, in most cases, reflect the preoccupations and attitudes of the 1930's rather than '40's, even though the author was able to insert a final footnote embodying a statement made by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on February 15, 1948. Two illustrations of the changed situation will suffice. His treatment of public opinion polls is curiously out-of-date in the light of the presidential election forecasts of November, 1948. His treatment of "shortsighted egocentrism" is marked by severe criticism of the social philosophies of the legal and medical professions, but omits reference to the practices of labor unions. In the light of the major rôle that organized labor is now playing in American life, no treatment of "shortsighted egocentrism" as a social phenomenon is fair or balanced which does not include it in its purview. In justice to the author it should be stated that he gives every evidence of keeping up to date in his scholarship and that one may reasonably assume that he is constantly revising and supplementing his teaching as it is recorded in this book.

The comprehensive, almost encyclopædic, character of this work is difficult to convey without recourse to a listing of its contents. The table of contents comprises nine and a half pages. This is perfectly understandable when one realizes that it is an effort to treat the psychological motivations involved in all the complexities of social behavior. Far more important than its comprehensiveness, however, is its pervading mood of optimism and its feeling for direction in the social process. Too often the study of society can create a paralyzing sense of futility in the presence of the magnitude of the unsolved problems of human existence. In this work the student's will to participate intelligently in the manifold aspects of social life is definitely strengthened.

The author may be pardoned if he handles some topics better than others. His treatment of prejudice is so complete, so searching, and so balanced that it is indispensable reading for any one who undertakes to deal with prejudice or intergroup relations. His treatment of the family is comparable in its thoroughness and wisdom. His treatment of the church, on the other hand, is not so helpful. Its general effect is more negative than positive. This is partly due to the actual waning of the prestige of the church as an institution in our modern society. It is also due to the author's lack of adequate scholarship in the religious field. At this point his sociological equipment fails him. Having said this, it remains true that this book can be profitably added to any minister's library as a permanent possession which he can use to advantage whenever his thinking touches the way people live together in contemporary America.

J. HOWARD HOWSON

Christianity and Civilisation: Foundations, by Emil Brunner, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xi, 172, $2.50.

In this first series of his Gifford Lectures, Emil Brunner speaks with simplicity and clarity upon a profound and moving theme: the Christian basis of Western humanistic culture, and the need of a return to biblical Christianity if humanism is to be rescued from destruction.

Admitting that there have been high civilizations on other than Christian bases, and that early Christianity showed little interest in the problem of civilization, he is nevertheless convinced that the contribution of Christianity to Western civilization has been of crucial importance, and that the decline of faith in Christianity is the major cause of the "decline of the West." Civilizations are determined, he says, by

three factors: national environment, "physical and spiritual equipment of men within a given area," and "presuppositions of a religious and ethical nature which, not in themselves cultural, we might call the culture-transcendent presuppositions of every culture" (pp. 10, 11). In this volume, he undertakes to examine the religious and ethical presuppositions of Western culture, which used to be Christian, but which have gradually been transformed during the modern era, with disastrous results.

While the whole treatment is theological, Lectures II-V deal with aspects of Christian faith which overlap with metaphysics and epistemology: being and truth, time and meaning. The next four lectures (VI-IX) deal with the ethical bases of humanistic culture: man in the universe, personality, justice, and freedom. The last lecture takes up the problem of the sources of cultural creativity, and forms a transition to the concrete issues arising in different areas of civilized life, to which the next series is to be devoted. On each of these topics, Brunner shows how biblical teaching was combined with fundamentally incompatible Græco-Roman ideas to form the uneasy synthesis on which mediæval Catholic culture was based; how the synthesis broke up in modern times, and the stages by which a genuinely anti-Christian ideology came to prevail, with destructive consequences that must now be overcome.

For the Bible, there are two kinds of being: the noncontingent being of the Creator and the contingent being of the creation. This conception was inconsistently combined in Catholic thought with the Neoplatonic notion of a great chain of being, ranging from the divine One to the material many. The inconsistency was revealed in modern times when the philosophic conception was divorced from the biblical, and a duel then began between the idealistic and naturalistic trends in philosophy—usually to the disadvantage of idealism. Modern physics, Brunner intimates, have made it "possible again to hold fast the Biblical idea of God without getting into conflict with natural law" (p. 24). Similarly, the Christian understanding of *truth*, *time*, and *meaning* provides a solution for conflicts which the modern mind has found insoluble: the subject-object dilemma in epistemology, the hopes and disillusionments of progress, and the alternation of otherworldliness and this-worldliness in the search for meaning. What has to be done in many instances is to take such a *semi*-Christian idea as the idea of progress (impossible without the biblical hope), and purge it of anti-Christian illusions which destroy its validity.

In the second half of the book, the same method is applied to the ethical bases of humanism. Man and nature, mortally opposed in modern thought (with man the sure loser), cannot be rightly ordered by reverting to any outworn anthropocentrism; but Christian "theanthropocentrism" (p. 90), believing that God created man in his image and realized this image in Christ, is the foundation of a humanism which no new facts in astronomy or biology, no disasters, either natural or historical, can uproot. Christian personalism can resist the pressure of collectivism as modern individualism cannot. Christian social ethics, combining the elements of equality and unlikeness in the concept of a body with many members, can beat off the totalitarian menace and lay the foundations of a good society as modern egalitarianism cannot. Finally, while the modern emphasis on man's independent powers exhausts his cultural creativity and rends the fabric of his culture into mutually unrelated parts, a restoration of biblical dependence on the Creator might restore creative inspiration and unify the torn pieces of our disorganized society. The book ends with these impressive words: "Humanity therefore is facing in our time, as at no time before, this alternative: *either* to continue along this road of the modern age . . . which leads to the total effacement of anything truly human and perhaps even to its complete annihilation; *or* to go back to the source of justice, truth and

love, which is the God of justice, truth and love in whom only lies the power of salvation" (p. 158).

Whatever may be true of Barth (whom Maritain in his *True Humanism* has accused of trying to cure the ills of modern humanistic culture by turning it upside down) it is clear from this volume that Brunner is no antihumanist, indifferent to science, art, and everything outside the Bible. He is a Christian humanist, convinced that biblical revelation is the sole basis on which the sciences and arts can be ordered and cultivated. His theology, as he has lately told us, is a "missionary theology." His purpose is not simply to combat the modern age, but to convert and heal it.

WALTER MARSHALL HORTON

Protestantism Faces Its Educational Task Together, by William Clayton Bower and Percy Roy Hayward, Appleton (Wisc.), C. C. Nelson, ©1949, pp. xi, 292, $3.25.

Protestantism Faces Its Educational Task Together is the story of the International Council of Religious Education written by men closely associated with its historical development and therefore well qualified to write about it. Rooted in the cumulative efforts of the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations and the International Sunday School Association, both of which were products of early nineteenth-century local movements, the International Council of Religious Education came into being in 1922. The merger not only gave respectability to erstwhile contending Christian bodies but met both a practical and philosophical need. The Sunday school, historically a lay movement, had now become a major aspect of ecclesiastical policy and program and required a professional leadership to give direction in keeping with a critical philosophy and psychology of education. The story told by Bower and Hayward is this one of building a staff of trained educators and setting them about the task of forming an interdenominational and international organization, laying theoretical foundations to guide the teaching-learning process, reconstructing the traditional Sunday curriculum and extending it to include weekday and vacation programs, developing curriculum materials for all ages, instituting leadership training, and conducting a program of research, field work, and public relations. A chapter is devoted to each of the above functions. Other chapters treat experimental work with visual and radio education, emergency work during and following the war years, and the revision of the American Standard Bible. The format is complete with biographical sketches and photographs.

The volume contains a wealth of historical data of importance to the student of religious education. The reviewer gained the impression early in his reading, however, that the authors were so affectionately related to the Council that no event or personality in its history could rightly be omitted. Even the dates of the staff resignations were apparently thought important. But despite the minutiæ of detail and seriatim reporting, the authors have achieved an integrative and interpretive quality of historical writing. By means of prologue and overview, they have succeeded in conveying their conviction that the Council has given expression to a divine wholistic tendency, "a holy urge that makes all things one." Their emphasis is not upon an extensive program of religious education but upon a noble adventure in coöperation. Readers will no doubt agree that through the consecrated labors of countless men and women the Sunday-school movement thus directed has played a major rôle in initiating the "Protestant thrust towards unity."

Chapter III dealing with underlying philosophy is especially interesting to the student of religious education. Important to note is the trend toward a more pronounced theological foundation for religious education. The Council was initially

committed to the scientific and philosophic approach of liberalism and the experimentalism of the progressive movement in education. Its educational objectives were stated by and large in terms of the moral and spiritual reconstruction of personal and social experience. During the years of depression, war, and the rise of neo-orthodoxy, the Council has gradually modified its orientation in the direction of theological realism with educational emphasis upon historic creeds, evangelism, churchmanship, and ecumenicity. Religious experimentalism, neither in theory nor practice, disavowed the functional use of the Bible and the Christian heritage, or the importance of the religious cultus. Nor does the present position deny the essential experiential nature of learning and the concept of Christian maturity by process. It is a matter of emphasis. So the Council's 1947 report on *Theological and Educational Foundations* states its intent to present a balanced point of view, a synthesis. The authors, commenting upon this report, recognize that genuine synthesis has not been achieved, that two positions representing two groups within the Council's constituency have been set down side by side. Functioning democratically, however, the Council has been fit to implement through its literature the call of the majority for more and sounder theology. The authors hasten to give assurance that this renewed interest in doctrine is not to be interpreted as a return to education by indoctrination. They also point to this action as an historic willingness on part of the Council "to re-examine and reconstruct its basic assumptions" to meet change and concomitant needs and to maintain a coöperative spirit that rises above ideological differences.

It is generally acknowledged that religious education of the early progressive tradition was preoccupied with methodology to the neglect of theological undergirding and historical continuity. The danger of the new emphasis is that education will become psychologically and methodologically retarded. It is one thing to insist that persons shall be confronted with the revealed Word if education is to be Christian. It is a more difficult thing and the test of religious education to meet the conditions under which the Word can be heard, understood, and heeded. That is to say, religious education that issues in moral and spiritual growth involves more than an intellectual encounter with a body of historical data however traditionally precious and essential to religious literacy, even when the heritage is particularly relevant to contemporary experience. It must enlist the whole personality in learning and, first and foremost, at the point of felt need in making personal and social adjustment. This means that practices of a functional education must come to terms with such psychological concepts as the phenomenal self, ego-involvement, need reduction, level of aspiration, typological differences, social climate, emotional acceptance, and others that are accruing to general learning theory as a result of science's cross-disciplinary approach to the study of personality and behavior. It is therefore disturbing to note that nowhere in the volume under review is there any indication that, while theological debate went on during the past decade, the Council sought, with equal interest, to sift the data of this recent research, especially in the psychological fields, for further insight into the dynamic and wholistic nature of learning and personality development as indicated by the above concepts, and the implications for principle and practice in religious education. The clinical and therapeutic psychologies, for example, have much to offer religious leaders in taking both a normative and remedial approach to learning and religious maturity. Group dynamics is another developing field which has a contribution to make to method in the churches. It is not desirable that the church shall become a clinic or a social group work agency; it is desirable and necessary for organized religion to assume a mental hygiene and group work approach to persons. These offer new techniques by which leadership may meet the conditions

under which the divine resources are made available and appropriated for religious growth and social motivation. Of course, the results of these disciplines may have some bearing upon the theological presuppositions of religious education. In any case, let the International Council of Religious Education foster such exploration during the immediate years of its second twenty-five-year period if it is to continue to pioneer and to represent the whole of its constituency.

Certainly the book belongs on the bibliography of every professional teacher of religious education.

PAUL B. IRWIN

The Meaning of Christ for Paul, by Elias Andrews, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 266, $3.

This is a very difficult book to appraise. It would be possible to focus one's attention upon many important emphases and the evidence of solid scholarship and to write nothing but praise. On the other hand, there are other insistences—often outgrowths or expansions of views in themselves both important and in my judgment fundamentally correct—which appear to me both unwarranted and actually perverse. Were one to centre his attention upon them, the verdict would be distinctly unfavorable. Again there is a perfectly obvious familiarity with the long line of biblical scholarship. Actually, if my count was correct, there are no less than 837 footnotes. Practically every statement in the volume is documented and/or buttressed by the work of some earlier scholar. Surely here is a book which will not be charged with plagiarism. At times this seems a bit forced or term-paperlike, for not infrequently the statement made was no more due to the original insight of the author cited than to Professor Andrews himself. Because in an expansive moment Professor von und zu Düsenberg once remarked, "Grass is usually green," this does not give him proprietary or copyright rights to that profound insight. And then there is a deal of repetition. This is in part due to the layout of the volume, in part—probably because he is a teacher and hence under few illusions—to his constant tripartite discussion of each subject in terms of a pretty full "What we are going to see on a later page"; an even fuller "What we now must view in detail"; and a by no means apocapated "What we have already seen on an earlier page."

Probably different critics will tally up these various items to reach different grand totals. Very probably some of the figures which appear to me properly to have a minus sign prefixed will seem to others positive integers. It is a volume which I have read with interest and profit. It is a wholesome and solid addition to the Pauline literature.

Professor Andrews' fundamental insistence is twofold: 1. Paul was not properly a theologian but a devout Christian whose doctrines and Christianity came from his heart, as a consequence of a profound religious experience, not from his brain, as a consequence of his versatility in weaving together or—to use the language of learning—syncretizing materials from the greater Græco-Roman world. External sources may help at times to illumine Paul's thought; they cannot account for it. The actual source was "the centralities of Paul's own religious faith." 2. The view, popular in many circles, that Paul broke away from the main stream of early Christianity and diverted its channel into an entirely different course is totally in error.

Now there is a deal to be said in support of both these contentions. With regard to the first, as I have paraphrased it, I find myself in almost total agreement, and have so argued for many years. I too would agree wholeheartedly that Paul's indebtedness to Judaism was all-important, that its influence had far

more definitive an effect than the writings of many scholars would suggest. It is as this fundamentally sound assumption is developed and exaggerated that I incline to repeated *caveats*. And the second contention—actually indissolubly intertwined with the first—has, at least superficially, much to be said for it. The all too common talk that Paul perverted the original limpid stream of the pure gospel and made of it a polluted river which modern theological engineers must clean up —as their brothers are trying to do with the Schuylkill—appears to me not merely wrong but wrongheaded. Of course Paul did not try to turn early Christianity into a pagan cult, a mystery religion; did not try to make it a syncretistic amalgam or new religion. But that Paul merely amplified and made more fruitful the same notions which Jesus and his fishermen friends had held, that his Christology was essentially the same as theirs (including that of Jesus himself), that he was profoundly acquainted, perhaps personally, with the Jesus of history, and that all the similarities between the Pauline letters and the later gospels are to be seen as due to the fidelity of the latter to the earlier facts of history and to the dependence of the former upon the unbroken tradition—all that seems to me far less likely.

The real weakness of Professor Andrews' clear-cut position, as I see it, lies in the fact that he fails to realize, or at least to consider adequately, the give-and-take between Paul and his churches—in a word, the influence of the pew upon the pulpit. I am as ready as Professor Andrews to scout the idea of Paul's deliberate borrowing from what would have seemed to him pagan and detestable wells of stagnation, but—— He lived in that world and to be understood he had to speak the language of men. In trying to make his position clear, Paul could scarcely fail again and again to *seem* to draw resemblances and to present the Christian gospel in terms of concepts and forms familiar to his hearers. Thus again and again his hearers must have *thought* that he meant something quite different from what he had undoubtedly said and meant. And to me there can be no question but what, as the years went by, Paul was as much changed as were they. Even in the first century Christian missionaries did not live in a vacuum, and no devoted missionary who really cares for those to whom he ministers has ever lived who was not affected in his own outlook. One of the inevitable laws of life is that the winner always loses. Thus while I wholly agree that Paul did not attempt to turn the Christian gospel into a mystery religion, I am far from sharing Professor Andrews' view that it is unwise and unwarranted to use such a term as "Christ-cult" for what Christianity, in no small part due to Paul's magnificent work, speedily became. And I am as confident as Professor Andrews apparently is skeptical that had Jesus attended a church service in Corinth—say in the sixth decade—he would have been utterly amazed and dumfounded.

To generalize and oversimplify the matter, perhaps unwarrantedly, and to bring this review to a close: I am inclined to say that in my judgment Professor Andrews' basic views of Paul and of his outlook are solid and warranted and that many of his interpretations of confessedly difficult words of the great apostle to the gentiles are illuminating and profoundly right; but when it comes to the origin of Paul's Christology, when it comes to an analysis of the gospels and a reconstruction of their central figure, I find myself hopelessly on the other side of the historical fence. (Some students will undoubtedly see this last confession as the surest guaranty of Professor Andrews' position—as it very well may be.)

And I think that I can see why Professor Andrews falls into what seems to me a pitfall. Though he never champions it in so many words, and though he shows a wholesome restraint, Professor Andrews is perilously close to, if not

actually a part of, that pseudomodern type of thinking which delights in talking about the "unity of the Scriptures," of seeing basic agreements in what would appear fundamental contradictions. Evolution is a profoundly correct evaluation and description of life as we have come to know it, and only the mentally blind, it would seem to me, can deny it; but evolution is far from being Couéism; and it is far from being a smooth ride up a beautifully graded modern superhighway. At no period in the history known to me can we see this constant and enriching harmony and unity which is now being stressed in certain circles. There is a deal to be seen in Christianity—even early Christianity; yes, even the Pauline brand! —that did not flow from the Galilean lake. And of that fact, though I cannot conceive myself minimizing the importance of what did so refreshingly gush forth from that limpid source, I am profoundly glad.

Professor Andrews has written a good book. It will not be the last on the subject. I am sure that he will agree with me that this is the case, and he would probably be the first to add "and better ones."

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Science, Faith and Society, by Michael Polanyi, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 80, $1.

This is a good book for a minister to have if he is looking for a fresh interpretation of the relation between modern scientific method and that total outlook on life called religion or philosophy. Polanyi's book is difficult in spots since he writes as a professional scientist; but, on the whole, it is eminently readable and highly instructive. In a day when there is so much undisciplined talk about the "truths of science" as over against the "leap-in-the-dark" attitude of the religious person or the "speculations" of a philosopher this book will serve as a corrective.

There are three brief lectures which include a discussion of scientific method, scientific conscience, freedom and the whole problem of the relation of established scientific opinion and innovations.

The scientific mind, Polanyi insists, must go through a long period of apprenticeship in the traditions of the sciences. Techniques must be learned; so also organizational methods, vocabulary, and the total framework of the commonly accepted modes and conclusions of fellow scientists. There is no short-cut road here. If the scientist wishes to pioneer, he must go still further. Most of the greater scientists have lived and worked under masters in their field. There they catch that something *more* which is of the essence in the search for new truth. That *more* comes by way of scientific intuition—the ability to make good guesses. The technique of this intuitive response is not unlike that of the religious mystic who subjects himself to self-discipline, relaxation, and receptivity. The scientific method is more than merely looking at facts or data and then inducing conclusions. It is seeing new relationships, the little nuances of difference, and projecting theories to fashion new patterns of explanation. The true scientist, in other words, is not merely a person who talks and handles facts; he is the philosopher with imagination, the theorist, the mind rich in hypotheses. Every "science" has its underlying pattern; the pattern is the interpretation of the real; the pattern is more than all the facts; it is their meaning, their relationships. The world of reality is something more which only a synoptic mind (*Gestalt* mind) can apprehend. The senses are much too poor to disclose what is there and real. The scientific mind is not merely empirical; it is a mind of faith like that of the philosopher who launches out with his interpretations. It is as much theoretical as it is practical. The greatest revolutions in "science" occur before the facts confirm the theory. Facts are meaningless without their interpretation. Many

of these interpretive frameworks have lasted through the centuries (*e.g.*, Newtonian physics). Others take their place when they offer better syntheses. It is a never-ending process. A wave theory of light may explain as helpfully the same facts as the quantum theory. Some pattern is needed. Either may be right or wrong or they may both be partially right or wrong, depending upon whatever perspective may obtain and the limitation of both data and vision.

If anyone thinks that "science" rests upon "facts" and philosophies and religions on "faith," let him know from this book that he is speaking as one who is an amateur in his understanding of modern empirical method. The sciences are shot through with faith patterns. True, there is a definite commitment to utter honesty among true scientists which some philosophers or religious people may lack. True, there is a spirit of fairness with the views of others and openmindedness toward other scientists who differ—a virtue which many religiously committed people may have lost. The ideals of the scientists are ofttimes higher than platform ethicists. But undergirding both the scientist and religious and philosophical thinkers is sheer faith, heroic and honest faith to come to grips with what is real. It is simply *not* true to say (as it has been said) that "science" is what you know and religion is what you don't. The framework of some hypothesis underlies the whole quest for and conclusions about truth—be it scientific or any other field of search.

There is much more in this little volume to set right the undisciplined false antithesis between "science" on the one hand and "religion" and philosophy on the other. There are no rules for scientific imagination, even as there are no rules for religious or philosophical insight. You are not born with such equipment. You master it by discipline and long brooding. Discovery comes of cultivated imagination. Many are called, but few chosen.

VERGILIUS FERM

The Psalms, by Elmer A. Leslie, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 448, $5.

Publication of such an extensive volume on the psalms is a notable event in the progress of biblical studies in this country. With most prewar books out of print, it takes its place immediately as probably the best single volume available in this field today. With dual tables of contents, dual indexes, and an elaborate bibliography, the book is especially useful for reference. The psalms are not treated in their numerical order, but are rearranged according to twenty-seven major subject groupings such as Hymns of Pilgrimage, Hymns of Great Individuals, New Year Songs, Hymns of National Thanksgiving, Prophetic Liturgies, Prayers of the Sick, etc. These groupings aid the reader to become acquainted with the various psalm families. At the same time, one is kept aware of the diverse nature of the individual psalms, especially with regard to authorship, subject matter, date, etc. A new translation is given, with extensive comments and interpretation, preceding each stanza, to serve as a guide in one's reading. Attractive titles are supplied to each psalm also. For instance, Psalm 29 is called "The Hymn of the Seven Thunders."

To every psalm there are two stories. One concerns the psalm's origin. For instance, the psalm in 24:7-10 had its beginnings presumably at the gates of the ancient citadel of Shiloh when the victorious GIs of early days returned from battle at night with the ark of the Lord and called for the gatekeeper to open the gates. He in turn addressed them, asking in a routine manner as to who was there, and expressing his impatience at their impatience. Another psalm (24:1-6) grew up spontaneously centuries later among a band of pilgrims going to Jerusalem. They were singing a pilgrim chorus, but, upon nearing the foot of Mount Zion, the leader

interrupted their song, questioning their right to ascend the hill. They in turn made appropriate reply. This is not the side which Leslie has developed. He has largely confined himself to the second story, how this composite psalm was used in Solomon's temple, and the second temple, by the worshipers of later centuries. He treats it as a psalm of "The Entrance of the King of Glory," and he outlines the supposed actions of priests, precentor, choirs, and worshipers at each stage in the psalm as it was supposedly used on the new year's celebration. This treatment of Psalm 24 is typical. He speaks as if most of the psalms were temple centred, and as if one or more of the worshipers had an important part in creating them. One cannot expect everything in one book; Leslie tends, it seems to me, to minimize the fact that most of the psalms had their locale of origin out in nature or in the midst of the daily lives of the people. Only later were they brought into the temple and adapted to its unique usages. Inasmuch as the author is chiefly attracted to this latter story, his book might have been called "How the Psalms were used in the Temple Services."

Leslie has drawn deeply from three European masters of the psalm literature, Professors Gunkel, Mowinckel, and Hans Schmidt. Help from these scholars, plus the author's own researches into pre-Hebrew origins in his *Old Testament Religion, in Light of its Canaanite Background,* has enabled him to present the psalms against the background of the general primitive psalmody in the Middle East. Great stress is placed upon the new year, the enthronement, and the rituals attendant thereto. A strong point in the presentation lies in pointing out the remote mythological backgrounds and cosmology, where such underlie the thought. For instance, Psalm 93 is called "The Lord's Combat with the Floods of Chaos," and Leslie discovers for us an old Near Eastern story of how at the "primeval creation" the "chaotic forces of the deep" were defeated.

Inasmuch as the liturgical aspects of the psalms, and their place in worship, is stressed in this presentation, it should be a book that will be especially useful to the minister. Professor Leslie has immersed himself for years in the spirit of the psalms, thereby earning the right to be a good interpreter. Deeply interested in public worship and private devotion, and in the religious experiences contained in the psalms, he has rediscovered this devotional treasury of the past, and he offers us much assistance toward making our worship more effective. It is amazing how most of us are aware of such a small part of the resources for religion contained in the Psalter. This book should do much toward acquainting us more intimately with those rich spiritual values.

R. E. WOLFE

The Critical Theology of Theodore Parker, by John Edward Dirks, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. ix, 173, $2.25.

What is New England transcendentalism? A dubious term this, judged by writers on the subject, including a long line of historians. Dirks knows this and offers to characterize the school of thought generally as follows: belief in man's spiritual mastery over nature, this a transcendent sovereignty of spirit; a kind of mystical union of spirit with nature issuing in a philosophy of spiritual monism; self-reliance in opposition to organizations and institutions with private reason by itself fully capable of intuitive understanding of the world and God; emancipation from the constrictions of convention and secondhand discoveries of truth; cosmopolitan in spirit and oracular in style; proudly literary in emphasis and strongly poetic in expression. The movement belonged to the river course of the Enlightenment as a tributary with its emphasis upon the power of reason and a rugged secular moralism. Strong in sentimental romanticism (from post-Kantian romanticists), it bore also

the marks of Scottish realism with its emphasis upon the spirit's ability to deal directly with physical nature. And eclectic, too, under the spell of French eclecticism. Thus a kind of hodgepodge which makes it understandably dubious and hard to identify or classify. It was a kind of faith rather than a clean-cut school of philosophy.

The theologian Parker (1810-1860) is the subject of this study in terms of the cultural climate of New England transcendentalism—a transitional figure who enjoyed his freedom but remained uncomfortable in the midst of the wilder expressions of enthusiasm. A great preacher he was. But writers have not sufficiently understood him as the critical theologian which, too, he was—and which is the burden of this scholarly volume. We are told that he was the greatest scholar of his generation of New England ministers; that he possessed the richest private library in Boston. Dirks calls him a "prophet of historical criticism in the New World."

Emerson and Parker were contemporary giants of this time and they shared and criticized each other's views. But Emerson was too vague and romanticizing and emotional for Parker's more critically exacting mind. While sharing with other transcendentalists many of their views, Parker did not, as did Emerson and others, elect to stand outside the pale of ecclesiastical tradition or establish some "secular pulpit" or even resign the ministry but rather to make reform from within. Parker was one of the first among American theologians to follow through with vigor the scientific and critical approach to the Scriptures. Others went part way. Liberalism there was, but it was milk and water. His was sterner. He followed German scholarship through the Old Testament and then on to the New. He concluded "horrible conclusions," horrible for his age. He was convinced that institutional Christianity contained much chaff even in holy doctrines. Infallibility of Scriptures and bibliolatry could go. He was more radical than Universalists, orthodox Unitarians, certainly more than Hopkinsian Calvinists and other New England theologians. He was less creative and independent a thinker. Among his contemporaries he was respected although not condoned. His small parish hardly could realize the import of his new theology.

Miracles he came to reject as proving nothing of religious value. All religions have their miracles. Christianity is here not unique. In the midst of theological controversy (unlike Emerson) he was willing to stand in the middle (although Emerson was surely no coward but rather too blue-blooded!). He argued as one who could think philosophically. In fact, it was a religious philosophy that formed his court of appeal. More fundamental to the question of belief in any doctrine was the question of the value of religion itself or why men ever came to be religious. The divinity of Jesus he held was not to be found in any proof text or self-admission; it was rather, if at all, a corollary to something more fundamental. He sought universals amidst particulars. Reason and understanding (in a revised Kantian sense) he held to be basic in coming to theological terms with religion and Christianity. He called his view a "spiritual philosophy." It was his own version of transcendentalism—a far cry from that of Emerson. At the same time, he believed himself to be an apologist for essential Christianity.

Parker was not a rationalist in the bad sense. Besides reason he emphasized the piety of conscience, of right, of love, of feeling—all to be united in religious expression. He advocated a "manly religion"—a synthesis of the whole man, reason and the several pieties. He was objective in his philosophy of religion, much more objective than Emerson's appeal to private religious insights. He believed in progress, in man's gradual appreciation of maturer values. Religious history, he thought, shows this—and he was a student, too, of a philosophy of history. History teaches lessons. So also all religions.

Natural religion, Parker would have said, is the basis of all revealed religion, that is, the two are not so antithetical as they have been made out to be. There is but one true religion: the love of the perfect God and the love of man's perfectibility. No one theology can cover this "universal."

Dirks has given us an important study of an important theologian. Parker would be immensely unpopular today. But his day may still be dawning when our current pessimisms cease to make us so sick and tired of ourselves and our world and when we begin again to measure ourselves as we really are: creative partners in an essentially glorious universe presided over by an immanent Spirit which continues to work out its program of creative perfection.

VERGILIUS FERM

Youth Asks about Religion, by Jack Finegan, New York, Association Press, 1949, pp. 192, $2.

The Reverend Jack Finegan, professor of Old Testament and New Testament literature and interpretation at the Pacific School of Religion, has written this book in the form of answers to questions which young people ask about religion. These questions have been asked Professor Finegan by students in his classes, in church groups, at summer conferences, and in private conferences. There are one hundred questions, organized under these topics: The Spirit of the Quest, Exploring the Universe, Understanding Evolution and History, God, Jesus Christ, the Bible, the Church, the Other Religions, Philosophies of Religion, Prayer and Worship, Religious Living, and Immortality. From five to fourteen questions appear under each heading.

The questions asked by these young people represent a wide range of interests and understandings. It is reasonable to suppose that they have been carefully selected from a much larger body of questions gathered from many sources. The distribution was evidently made by the author to portray the wide sweep of questions asked. It would be interesting to know what questions or what kinds of questions Dr. Finegan's young people have asked most frequently.

The method used in this book makes for directness and interest. Many of these questions have been asked by students in the reviewer's college classes in much the same form as they appear here. It seems that many of the questions, however, have been restated from the point of view of the mature scholar. The answers are direct but cannot be in any sense thorough. Some of them assume information or experiences which few college students have.

There are many uses for this book. It can be put into the hands of one who has some definite personal problems about religion. Here he will find help both in formulating the problem and in developing the outlines of an answer. He will need further help and more information, if he wants to give the problem adequate study. The book lists at the close of each major problem area a number of up-to-date and usable books which will provide additional data. The uninstructed, however, should have careful guidance. The book can be used by a group of young people who desire to make a study of a modern thoughtful approach to religion under the leadership of a mature student. It will also be of help to the Sunday-school teacher or other types of leaders whose own studies have not provided the wide range of data or experience upon which they can draw to answer these persistent questions.

While the reviewer finds himself in considerable agreement with the answers provided by Dr. Finegan, it would be strange if there were not many questions which would be treated differently. For instance, in the chapter about God, it probably would not satisfy many serious-minded college students to be told not to try to discover or make a definition of God. Many wise men have tried to make such

definitions, as Dr. Finegan points out. We shall continue trying, even though we know that no really satisfactory definition can be made. If it could be made, the maker would be God! But it does not satisfy the earnest student to suggest that he not try to make as adequate statement about he nature of God as he can (pp. 50-51).

The answer to the question, "Who founded monotheism?" (p. 53), leads to further discussion. There seems to me to be no reason today to make the dogmatic statement that Moses was the father of monotheism. Indeed it appears to be a rather faint monotheism—so faint as to be better called something else—for which Moses was responsible. Some have called it henotheism, the worship of one great national God but the recognition of other gods. Even the first commandment seems to leave something to be desired as a clear-cut monotheistic statement. This doubt does seem to be in Professor Finegan's mind as is suggested by the reference to the Egyptian emperor, Akhnaton, near-contemporary of Moses in Egypt. Akhnaton's expression of monotheism seems to be rather positive. But why bring him into the answer unless one goes on to explain in more detail the nature of the problem and the difficulty in determining whether Moses got his idea of God from Akhnaton or that Akhnaton went on to develop a type of monotheism which was more definite and clear-cut than was that of Moses. This is a problem for scholars to work on, of course; but college students and other youth want to know where this great idea comes from and they deserve a thoroughgoing answer rather than a more or less dogmatic statement.

The preceding paragraph will serve to show how religious leaders and teachers will differ in the use of Professor Finegan's book. That all of us will find it helpful and stimulating is undoubtedly true. I think it should be used under the guidance of careful and well-equipped leaders. Each one of us will vary or amplify the answers as we face specific situations. No doubt this is what the author intended.

CHARLES M. BOND

The Holy Imperative, by Winston L. King, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 224, $2.50.

The emancipation of morality from religion, and more specifically from the Christian faith, is one of the most serious problems in the quest for reorienting our generation's thinking. That there is a tension between ethics and religion may serve as a corrective to religion, but the "mother-daughter relationship" between the two, of which the author speaks, is historically and organically as important as the emotional and moral components are that coexist in religion. Religion's sense of awe and mystery on the one side and a rational morality on the other may have to live together in tension. But their separation means the death of either, while their tension is a productive condition. The religious perception of moral ideals gives them a sense of conviction and makes them a living dimension of life; it supplies, in part, emotion and energies for our interpersonal relationships and therefore is continuously productive and effective as part of life's ordered processes. Religion includes fellowship with God and man as a spirit of life rather than an abstract set of moral principles. God's complete goodness and love owns the quality of a loving fellowship and creates it on the human level. "Christianity has always majored in community expression"; it believes in a personalistic apprehension of the divine and the consequent emphasis upon human personalism as stressed by Jesus. This personal relationship to God was the core of his teaching and evokes the strongest ethical responses in man. Man becomes a centre of worth and significance and

attains a place in a metaphysical order of all being. But this enlargement of man is at the same time a diminution. The Christian ethic of human relationship attempts unceasingly to make all human relationships fully personal and coresponsible, by giving them a sense of humility, appreciation, and forgiveness. But personal relationship with God and man has always a social significance. Man's love for God is to be expressed in his love for God's other children. Catholicism has achieved this communal quality of life on the organizational rather than the individual level and the church usually functions as a unit in religious and social issues, whereas Protestantism is individualistic, within the framework of Christian doctrine and life. Protestants have, then, as a rule become more socially conscious. Yet, in their attempt to include the world in their church, the church has frequently become part of the world. This dilemma calls for experimentation in communities of Christian social adventure, in small fellowship groups to be followed by increasingly larger groups. The superiority of Christian morality over nonreligious ethical disciplines lies in the motivation it supplies to the moral life and in the context it gives to ethics. It is all-inclusive, gives man the power to practice his moral ideals, and enlarges his social vision and community existence. The unique Christian contributions to ethics are forgiveness and universalization of human fellowship. Christ's words, "What do ye more than others?" are a constant judgment and challenge.

This brief and necessarily sketchy outline of the book cannot attempt to give more than a large design of thought which the author presents. There is a great wealth of concrete references to philosophical, theological, and practical issues woven skillfully into the text. Humanism, rationalism, existentialism, pacifism, the social experiments of extremists' sects, Karl Barth's point of view, and many other pertinent illustrations are well used to support the author's thesis that only a faith-supported and -generated morality is lasting, creative, and dynamic. This is, in many regards, a scholarly book in the best sense, but its vitalizing and energizing purpose and its persuasive and excellent style raise it above the level of an intelligent theoretical debate. The college teacher will find it as useful a handbook and guide as the educated layman who is looking for a well-informed and clear thinker who separates vague notions from logical argumentation and will support him with the warm sense of a firm conviction in these days of confusion.

WILLIAM HUBBEN

The Political Community, by Sebastian de Grazia, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1948, pp. xx, 258, $4.

This book appeals to the religious reader for two reasons: first, it affords another example, all too rare, of the fact that a person can be a profound scholar in a large number of fields, including religion, and, secondly, from a new angle it reminds the professed religionist that he has a particular social responsibility which almost no one else can perform, and that therefore he should set to work to accomplish it.

The author, a political scientist on the faculty of the University of Chicago, draws freely upon a wealth of substantial literature covering social science in the widest sense, particularly sociology, government, psychology, and religion. He implements his study with fifty pages of notes, which are placed conveniently at the end of the volume and supply fascinating reading.

One's initial impression that the work will prove legalistic and dry because of its technical use of the term *anomie* is soon dispelled. The technicality, like faith, hope, and love, lasts on, but like those virtues, the more one sees of it the better

he likes it. The English word *anomy*, lawlessness, is dismissed as obsolete. Mr. de Grazia's spelling is *anomie*. He uses this, as did the French sociologist Durkheim in 1897, to designate a sense of purposelessness, drifting, mental confusion, and frustration—the world weariness which has come to grip so many average men and women in the twentieth century. If *anomie* becomes much more general, men will cease to care and strive, and civilization will disintegrate. The author believes that such a disaster can be averted by positive action, through the discovery and application of a new or reinterpreted faith.

Anomie results from insecurity. Mr. de Grazia studies insecurity among the young, as infants, and adolescents, and when they break home ties and set out to seek their fortunes. They are shocked when they realize that their parents are not all powerful, that they make mistakes and fail their offspring in both normal and critical times. Herein rests a major analogy: the state as a community is like a large family. Of old its people idealized its ruler or rulers, whether men or gods. Then they found that their rulers, like children's parents, failed them. This disillusionment has been increased by events of recent decades in the political realm. Furthermore, the leaders of industrialized democracy have not saved workers from monotony or from the defeatism which envisions no chance of their freeing themselves from the machine and making themselves managers. They become victims of depressions and unemployment. A harsh Protestant ethic stemming from Luther and Calvin, according to the familiar Weber-Tawney pattern, came to glorify and bless the competitive individualism of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill until *anomie* raged among the people like a plague. Dictators appealed to such discouraged persons, especially when they were the victims of power politics, but the popular effort to transcend *anomie* by devotion to dazzling leaders yielded to deeper despair when these figures fell from their pedestals. War for a glowing moment appears to afford an objective for sacrifice and unselfish life or death, but its humble hero sinks again when the hollowness of war is revealed or its comradeship yields to the grasping competition of peacetime economy even in democratic lands. Truly modern man seems exploited by a system of simple and acute *anomie*.

Were the book to say only this, it might be assigned to the already too ample literature of despair. But crowded into its measured argument, often by suggestion rather than didactic insistence, is the assumption that man can and should assert himself and find solid ground for confidence and faith. He must dispel his *anomie* as the waker dismisses the nightmare. He must master himself and his time through poised mental and spiritual outlook. In the social realm he will regard himself as a member of a brotherly fellowship in which the people rule according to the dictates of moral law. Then ensues the climax: "The theologian is right. Why not admit it? More than anything else, the world needs love." Without love a person cannot be well-born or grow; he will wander as in a maze. Justice can remove the competitive urge which in modern democracies has thwarted love. Through the coöperative ethic humanity can regain a sense of community, and dignity will again develop the individual. On this note the author leaves off; there the religious rebuilder may begin.

EARL CRANSTON

The New Science of Giambattista Vico, translated (from the third edition, 1744) by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1948, pp. xv, 398, $5.

It is impossible for me to find terms adequate to compliment Drs. Bergin and Fisch and the Cornell Press on this publication. Though I doubt that Vico had

as great an influence as the translators suggest, it was at least so important as to make it truly amazing that two hundred years have passed before this, the first complete English translation of *The New Science*. Only the section on Homer was previously published in English by H. N. Coleridge. Drs. Bergin and Fisch have also published a translation of *The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico* (Cornell Press, 1944). Their critical historical study of a hundred pages in that volume is a valuable introduction to the study of *The New Science*. In the publisher's advertisement of the translation, it is stated that Vico "must be regarded as the first to have thought of history in materialistic terms." This use of the term "materialistic" is misleading. Croce, in his *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico* (Eng. transl., London, 1913, p. 142), wrote : "We find here and there a theologian Vico, an agnostic Vico, or even a fanciful Vico composing cosmological and physical romances: but look where we will we shall never find a materialistic Vico." Though in my view Croce's exposition is colored by his own philosophy, his above contention is as sound as it is definite. Nothing in the translators' critical study (in the earlier volume) justifies the use of the term "materialistic." What may rightly be maintained is that Vico was a pioneer of an empirical method in the study of history analogous with the empirical study of nature as advocated by Bacon. He insisted that the facts of history should be considered in terms of their own times and conditions and not in those of rationalistic philosophy. He sought similarities and continuities in the histories of peoples, not as due to imitation and transmission, but as arising from the inherent nature of men at different stages. He considered history to justify the idea—ascribed to the Egyptians—of three stages: the age of the gods, the age of the heroes, and the age of men. There are cultural cycles and lapses into barbarism. However, Vico frequently referred to "an ideal eternal history . . . whose course is run in time by the histories of all nations," but nowhere did he give any clear conception of what he meant by this "ideal eternal history," or any adequate justification for his introduction of the conception. Ignoring this conception, his reiterated statement that history is made by man might lead some to suppose that his view, in modern terminology, was solely and purely humanistic. Yet he explicitly pointed to something more—using expressions similar to some of Kant's, who may in this have been influenced by Vico. In a paragraph in his conclusion, he says (italics ours) : "It is true that men have made this world of nations . . . but this world without doubt has issued from *a mind* often diverse, at times quite contrary, and *always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves*. . ." p. 382). That Vico pointed to the study of Providence in the immanent natural processes of human history must not be taken to imply that for him Providence was nothing other than those processes. That Providence was for him "a mind" seems also implicated in his contention that history cannot be described in the deterministic terms of Stoicism or in those of chance of Epicureanism. Men in history obviously have some freedom, but it is exercised within an order due to Providence as "a mind." For the modern thinker there are difficulties in what may be called Vico's theological references, but they should not be dismissed as merely dicta to save himself from ecclestiastical persecution. In contrast with the natural theology based on a consideration of physical nature, he pointed to a "rational civic theology of divine providence" in history. But, surely, such an attitude was not as novel as Vico himself appears to have thought it. The linguistic style of the translation is excellent. It remains only to recommend the volume wholeheartedly to scholars and libraries.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Corpus of Ancient Near Eastern Seals in North American Collections: Vol. I, The Collection of the Pierpont Morgan Library, edited by Edith Porada, New York, Pantheon, ©1948, pp. xxvii, 187, xiv, plates 176, $15.

This is an elaborate publication which, while of little interest to the nonspecialist, is destined to become one of the widely used tools for scholars in the field of the history of religions. It is the first volume (actually one volume of text and one of plates) of a project to publish a corpus of ancient Near Eastern seals in the North American collections. Upon the engraved seals and their impressions left on wet clay are contained scenes from ancient Near Eastern life and mythology which are of primary importance for the historian of religion. Here are 1,157 seals catalogued, described, and reproduced in superb photographs. Less than half of this collection had been published before. The Morgan collection is the largest in America; besides, it is of major importance because it has representative examples of the many types of cylinders found in the ancient Near East. According to present plans, four additional volumes of the *Corpus* are planned. When this work is completed, students of the culture of the ancient Near East will have ready at hand an extremely valuable guide. The project is being carried forward under the direction of a group of competent scholars. It is composed of A. Goetze, H. Frankfort, F. J. Stephens, B. Buchanan, A. L. Oppenheim, and Edith Porada.

In view of the primary purpose of presenting scientifically the material, considerations of the æsthetic and sociological significance of the seals have been excluded. This means that the volumes will be of service only to that relatively small group of scholars equipped with sufficient command of the primary sources to enable them to draw tenable conclusions. For those interested in a general introduction to the subject of cylinder seals there is a popular booklet by Edith Porada, *Mesopotamian Art in Cylinder Seals of the Pierpont Morgan Library* (New York, 1947). Here one will find answered most of his questions with regard to the technique of seal engraving, the practical use of the cylinder seals, and the main stages of development. Certainly Dr. Porada is the person in this country best qualified to speak about ancient Near Eastern seals.

Illustrative of the light which this publication may throw upon biblical backgrounds is the new material from the Morgan collection numbered 476-506. Of this group of thirty-one Old Babylonian seals only seven had been published previously. Three of these newly published impressions make it seem likely that the female figure on these seals, so like that found in Palestine and elsewhere as figurines, is a deity. Heretofore we have had no clear evidence that the nude figure was intended to represent a goddess; in fact, the goddess is elsewhere shown clothed. It may well be that this newly published evidence will solve one of the perplexing problems of Palestinian archæology and thus shed considerable light on the culture of the Canaanites.

The work is beautifully, even lavishly, printed. Dr. Porada has given much thought to making the volumes usable for scholars. A map of the ancient Near East has been folded into the front; a table of relative chronology of the principal styles of cylinder seal engravings has been placed at the back of the volume. The Sumerian and Akkadian inscriptions have been edited by A. Leo Oppenheim. Concordances have been compiled of the numbers of seals previously published by Ward with the numbers assigned in the present work. The careful work done with regard to the spelling of names, the working out of a chronology based on the present state of our knowledge, and the logical organization of the material—all these are matters

for which the users of the volume will heartily thank Dr. Porada and her collaborator, Mr. Buchanan.

For the serious student of the ancient Near East this is one of the most important books of the decade. JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The English New Testament: From Tyndale to the Revised Standard Version, by Luther A. Weigle, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 158, $2.

This is the story of "some of the difficulties involved in the effort to translate the New Testament into English" by the chairman of the revision committee that produced the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament.

Dr. Weigle opens his work with a brief description of the English versions of the Bible, beginning with Wycliffe. He follows with a discussion of "The Church and the English Vernacular," his verdict being that "The King James Bible owes most to Tyndale, and its next debt is to Geneva; but next to the contribution of Geneva is that of the Rhemish version, from which the King James translators accepted many words and turns of expression that were of Latin origin."

Having stated the debt of the English Bible to William Tyndale, Dr. Weigle devotes a most interesting chapter to "Tyndale and the King James Version." He here makes mention of the famous dispute between More and Tyndale over the change from "charity to love" in the translation of *agapē.* In an essay, Foakes Jackson once put himself on the side of More by remarking, with respect to I Cor. 13, that today we think of a "charitable man" as one who takes a broad liberal view of others, kind to all and free from petty faults. A loving man, on the other hand, suggests someone who is sentimental, not practical and self-disciplined. The translation "love" must be retained—Dr. Weigle is right in that—but Foakes Jackson's observation illustrates the fact that it is not really adequate. Our English tongue lacks a word for "love" with the proper nuance.

The next chapter is entitled, "The King James Version in Three Centuries." The story detailed here of the American Standard Version of 1901 is not the same as related to his class years ago by an eminent American scholar who had lived through the period of the issuance of the English and American Revised Versions and in close touch with events. According to his account, if the memory of the reviewer serves him rightly, the American committee was moribund and a younger scholar took it largely upon himself to push forward the project of the Standard American Edition. He it was who was responsible for the introduction of the hybrid "Jehovah" which mars the Old Testament text of that edition and for other unnecessary, if not incorrect, changes in reading. Nevertheless, this chapter contains much fine material, as also the final two chapters, "The Revised Standard Version of the New Testament" and "The Use of the New Testament in Worship."

This is a valuable little book, well written and readable, and it serves its purpose well. Whether it will achieve the aim of its writing, to convince its readers that the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament is worthy to supplant the King James Version in public worship, remains to be seen. The reviewer has felt that the conditions laid down for the translators, as outlined in the "act of authorization," that the revision of the American Standard Version should embody the best results of modern scholarship, but at the same time keep close to the King James Version, militated against a final and satisfactory version for our day. He has yet to be convinced that that final version has been reached in the Revised Standard Version, valuable though it is and representing much careful and painstaking work.

GEORGE B. KING

Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism, by Louis M. Epstein, New York, Bloch, 1948, pp. x, 251, $3.50.

This book is a sequel to the author's *Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud* (Harvard University Press, 1942). The earlier work deals much with law, whereas the present volume draws more on custom in portraying the regulations of relations between the sexes among Jews from antiquity to the present time.

A preliminary sketch of the subject concludes that on the whole Jews have "maintained an admirable record of purity and refinement in sexual conduct," at least until very recent times, when the acids of modernity have begun to have their effect. The earlier strictness and the recent loosening of the barriers appear in discussions of such subjects as modesty in dress, ornaments and cosmetics, segregation, seclusion, song and dance, flirtation, and chaperonage. Sometimes the author seems to approve of "emancipation": *e.g.*, "the Jew is at peace with himself under the modern concept of the equality of the sexes" (p. 75). At other times he appears a bit alarmed and disapproving: *e.g.*, "The modern bathing suit has certainly exposed too much of the woman's body. . . . But fashion seems to be mightier than tradition, good style more appealing than good taste (p. 36). Mostly he records without comment.

The latter part of the book is occupied with the more serious and more specifically sexual matters such as perversions, masturbation, harlotry, rape, seduction, adultery, and "command of jealousy," *i.e.*, an official warning by a husband to his suspected wife, which if not heeded led to trial of the wife by ordeal, at least in the earlier periods of Jewish history.

The author announces in the preface that the present volume is intended to deal with sex conduct outside of marriage, in contrast with his earlier work. However, in the last two sections (adultery and "command of jealousy"), he again goes over into the field of marital relations. Perhaps this procedure is justifiable, since the subjects were not fully treated in the former volume. It may be granted also that a certain piquancy is thus added to the present work.

As already intimated, the author does not seek to prove any particular thesis, but only to record as a historian. He has done his work well. Particularly good is his use of rabbinic sources—a feature that will commend itself to non-Jewish readers who cannot avail themselves of these sources. But he by no means confines himself to these sources; his reading is much wider, including biblical and apocryphal material, the old Mesopotamian law codes, and more recent Jewish and non-Jewish literature.

In conclusion, one may wonder why the word *polygamy* instead of *polygyny* is used for plurality of wives in contrast to *polyandry*, plurality of husbands (p. 194), but this is a slight objection; the book as a whole is well done, and deserves serious consideration.

W. F. STINESPRING

Arnobius of Sicca: The Case Against the Pagans, translated by George E. McCracken (Volume 1), Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1949, pp. 372, $3.50.

Earlier reviews in these pages of volumes in the series, *Ancient Christian Writers*, have with uniform regularity emphasized their value and scholarship. The present work (the seventh in the series) is a worthy successor to the volumes which have already appeared. When we have the second and concluding volume of Arnobius, it may be safely hazarded that we shall have the fullest and most exhaustive treatment which this eccentric figure from the past has ever received or will in the future. The present volume is far more than a translation. In addition to the translation

of the first three of Arnobius' seven books, it has a fifty-seven page introduction and 142 pages of notes. The *hic iacet* of every writer who has ever concerned himself with Arnobius is here to be found; and in addition a vast amount of information which may throw light on obscurities in the text is furnished. Despite the amount of work done on Arnobius, there have been few translations made. Bryce and Campbell made an English translation for the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* (1871) which was reprinted fifteen years later as Vol. 6 of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*. There are two German translations—von Besnard's (1842) and Alleker's (1858)—and one Dutch—Oudann's (1677). All are completely outmoded. Thus there is a real place for this fresh, accurate, and understanding version.

While this is definitely a volume which the student of patristics will prize, it is to be hoped that it will have a far wider reading. Ignorance of the views and notions of the fathers—both Greek and Latin—is one of the most conspicuous weaknesses not only of the clergy but of their teachers. Just because we no longer share wholeheartedly the views of our predecessors is no excuse for our lamentable ignorance of them.

Arnobius is a most interesting figure. Little is known of him save as it can be educed from what he wrote. It is highly probable that he was a teacher of Lactantius —but neither mentions the other. Much ink has been spilled in trying to account for this strange silence. McCracken's suggestion at this point is eminently sensible. Arnobius was a teacher of rhetoric, apparently converted to Christianity shortly before he wrote his *magnum opus* (± A.D. 300). Why he wrote the present work is far from clear. It is clearly intended for pagans. McCracken properly remarks that *adversus* means "towards" as well as "against." That it is intended to convert them to Christianity is far from sure. Surely none save those already on the brink would likely be persuaded by his arguments. And it is clear that he does not expect his work to be pondered by Christians. Very possibly it is but one more of the productions of enthusiastic converts: "Whereas I was blind, now I see." Presumably he thought he was expressing orthodox Christian views. The utter absence of what most Christians of his day and ours would consider fundamental Christian doctrine is everywhere evident. It is possible that the reason for this silence is that Arnobius felt it not apposite to his task; it is equally probable, however, that it is due to the fact that he had not climbed far up the ladder of Christian theology. Certainly his highly interesting discussion in Book II of the mortality of the soul, his insistence that the notion that the soul hurries to the body freighted with divine knowledge is not only ridiculous but positively immoral, and the amazingly fresh "controlled experiment" which he outlines to prove his contention must have been as highly unorthodox in his day as they are in ours. But there is no indication that he was aware of it.

Again, his refutation in Book I of the pagan charge that Christians have brought the present calamities upon mankind and the brittle method he employs in Book III of showing the absurdity of the pagan views about the many gods suggest to me that his writing is far more a rhetorical exercise for his own satisfaction (and, of course, for the annoyance of his opponents) than due to any flaming missionary ardor. Surely there is no evidence of yearning o'er the blind for whom Christ died. On the contrary he obviously felt they were benighted fools and quite placidly told them so. McCracken is well within the facts when he styles him "a pedantic professor of rhetoric who uses all the tricks of his trade, and sows constantly with the sack, rarely with the hand" (p. 23). It is definitely a work written *in vacuo* and with no expectation of "questions to the writer." Many of his castigations are clever,

but they leave him entirely vulnerable to equally pointed questions had anyone been interested to raise them. It is all a part of an old technique: "Give up belief in your foolish mythology and accept ours"—only there is no evidence that Arnobius cared two hoots whether they did or not.

While these pages from the past are not of a nature to rival the *Imitatio Christi* as a *vade mecum* of Christian devotion, they may still be read and pondered with profit as well as with interest.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Early Methodist People, by Leslie F. Church, New York, Philosophical Library, 1949, pp. viii, 286, $4.75.

Present interest in the popular trend has invested the phrase "the people" with almost magic import. It was inevitable, since Methodism arose as a popular movement, that someone should seek "to rediscover the first Methodist people." From his masterful study of Abraham Lincoln, Carl Sandburg turns to the people whose ideal of government Lincoln defined. Sandburg sings their songs, and in *The People, Yes* sets down their homespun wisdom. Of the Wesleys and the first traveling preachers many have written. This book turns to the ordinary men and women who were the rank and file of the first two generations of Methodists, without whom Methodism would have been impossible.

Dr. Church's distinguished career and warm Methodist interest are both assets and liabilities for his task. His services as connectional editor of the Methodist Church in England, one time president of the Methodist Conference, tutor in pastoral theology and church history in the University of London, and writer of a number of books on Methodist topics, well qualify him for this history. Seeking beyond the well-known sources, he has done patient research in numerous diaries, intimate journals, and memoirs of early Methodists. The result is a volume annotated carefully enough to satisfy the demands of exact scholarship and one that furnishes materials beyond the much-quoted Wesley journals and letters. The volume appends an excellent bibliography. If, because of background and interest, the writer sees the subject too sympathetically, we can accept it as a virtue in this instance. A cold-fish handshake with people so warm and human as these early Methodists would not advantage the history or be other than intolerable intellectualism.

The underlying thesis of the book is stated in an instance from Baron von Hügel cited in the epilogue and summary. A young American, believing religion to be an illusion, is advised by Dr. James Martineau to make the experiment of living first for six months among "simple, slow-minded, narrow, even superstitious peasants," practising a traditional faith. He was then to live among nonreligious intellectuals. He found that the simple folk faced "the dread and unescapable realities of life" with inwardness and happy triumph. The conclusion is reached, if not actually stated, that religion, to be known at its best and its most demonstrated influence on life and society, must be observed among the common people. We cannot here comment on this generality other than to say that it underlies this book.

Dr. Church starts with the ideal Methodist as conceived in "The Character of a Methodist," one of the early Wesley pamphlets. The ideal John Wesley set before his followers was that of a life that had entered upon an extraordinary spiritual experience, similar to his own, and then followed on to exhibit in conduct and life the distinguishing marks of a Christian. The people of whom the book treats never attained in the main this idyllic life. Men like "Sammy" Hick, the blacksmith of Aberford, added much that was human and the salt of native wit and humor.

Succeeding chapters follow and support the argument. "The Homeless and Their

Chapel Building" is the story of the heroic struggles of those facing the tyranny of the Conventicle Act. Chapels were soon built and with a great deal of individuality, quite often contrary to Wesley's idea, which was of an octagon-shaped building. In "Their Spiritual Experience" Dr. Church argues against those who regard the Wesleys' experience as one peculiar to them alone or at most to a very few. The chapter becomes a series of case histories of conversion with the writer pointing out the factors common to the experience of these Methodist converts. The well-known story of the bands and classes is related in the chapter on "Fellowship." Wesley's rules are defended. The rule concerning card playing, dancing, and theatregoing, of perennial interest to non-Methodists, and much in abeyance among Methodists today, is treated in the discussion of "Personal Conduct." The book rounds out its chapters with a discussion of marriage, family life, and child training among these people.

A reviewer would be captious indeed to cite extended criticism of so excellent a survey. As a historian, the writer handles his material with capability and interest. He does become the preacher as his chapters in their outline and argument show. The book is not mere citation with exegesis and commentary on these diaries and journals, but rather, topical with some homiletics and apologetics in its treatment. John Wesley's rule against mirth is defended (p. 10). His "Rules of the Society" are cited and explained in the light of practices of the day. If Wesley's home life was other than ideal, it hardly advantages Methodism to labor the point of the many other normal and happy marriages and homes of the early Methodists. Nor does it serve to defend the pedagogy and teaching of children among Methodists of the century. Those who share with Dr. Church admiration for John Wesley as a spiritual great will still feel that one can protest too much his perfect excellence.

Methodist disciplines have held from early times that "the only infallible proof of any genuine church of Christ is its ability to seek and save the lost, to disseminate the Pentecostal spirit and life, to spread scriptural holiness over all lands, and to reform all continents by the gospel of Christ." This book will furnish much detail to those who require proof that this was indeed early Methodism's ideal and hope. The book will further serve to introduce the promised later volume on the people's first ventures in social service and their results in the social, political, and economic life of the nineteenth century.

CHARLES D. BENJAMIN

An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 136, $3.75.

This is not a new book. It appeared in 1934, being the republication, with some revision, of a series of articles which had appeared in Japan in a magazine, *New East,* during World War I. The author had already (1927) published his first series of *Zen Essays* based upon these articles, but written in much less popular fashion than what appears here. It was his conviction that a more elementary introductory work was needed, that led to the issuance of this *Introduction.* Anyone who has read his *Zen Essays* as a first attempt to comprehend Zen will applaud his judgment, and, after reading this, perhaps wonder if a still more elementary edition ought not to appear.

The author is the world's greatest authority on Zen, and has written much concerning it, only a part of which has appeared in English translation. The fact that none of his books remained in print in England in 1946, led the Buddhist Society of London to undertake the publication of the complete works of Dr. Suzuki in English—not only those already in English, but also the translation of those

which have not before been available in English. This is no mean publishing venture and will require a number of years for its completion. The volume under review is among the first three to appear, the very first to be published in the United States.

Zen Buddhism is one of the most difficult to understand of any of the many sects of the Buddhist faith, yet it attracts a large following. Not a few Westerners have been drawn to it. What is Zen? This the author tries here to make clear, but confesses that Zen cannot, in the last analysis, be explained. It must be experienced to be known. It insists always upon inner spiritual experience. In Zen, says Suzuki, the "spirit of Buddhism has left its highly metaphysical superstructure in order to become a practical discipline of life." It spurns logic and logical analysis. "There are in Zen no sacred books or dogmatic tenets, nor are there any symbolic formulæ through which an access might be gained into the signification of Zen." "Zen teaches nothing, whatever teachings there are come out of one's own mind, we teach ourselves, Zen merely points the way."

Is Zen a religion? The author answers "No," in the ordinary sense of the word; for "Zen has no god to worship, no ceremonial rites to observe, no future abode to which the dead are destined, and last of all, Zen has no soul whose welfare is to be looked after by somebody else and whose immortality is of intense concern with some people. Zen is free from all these dogmatic and 'religious' encumbrances." "Zen is emphatically against all religious conventionalism." However, its irreligion is only apparent. "Zen just feels fire warm and ice cold, because when it freezes we shiver and welcome fire. The feeling is all in all." "Zen defies all concept making." "When you think you have caught a glimpse of it, it is no longer there." But "When Zen is thoroughly understood, absolute peace of mind is attained, and a man lives as he ought to live. What more may he hope?"

These scattered excerpts from the chapter explaining Zen surely bear out the earlier statement as to the difficulty in understanding it. The author suspects that on the basis of his declaration Zen may be thought to be utterly nihilistic, and he is at great pains to indicate, on the contrary, that it is very affirmative—indeed a higher affirmation when really understood. Personally, his explanations fail to make the affirmative element clear. Let the reader see if the concluding statement, which he says absolutely affirms the truth of Zen, seems helpful. A pupil asked: "What is the fundamental principle of Buddhism?" "Wait," said the master, "when there is no one around I will tell you." After a while the pupil repeated the question, saying, "There is no one around now, pray enlighten me." Coming down from his chair, the master took the anxious inquirer into the bamboo grove, but said nothing. When later pressed for a reply the master said, "How high these bamboos are! and how short those over there!" Do you get it? That's all!

The object of Zen discipline is the acquiring of a new viewpoint for looking into the essence of things. The acquiring of this new viewpoint is called *Satori*. "It is the sudden flashing into consciousness of a new truth hitherto undreamed of." A chief element in the discipline leading to *Satori* is the *Koan*. A beginner is given a *Koan* as a start toward Zen experience. A typical *Koan* is this: When a great Zen master was asked what Zen was, he replied, "When your mind is not dwelling on the dualism of good and evil, what is your original face before you were born?" Finding no logical way to answer it, says the author, "one throws himself against the iron wall of the Koan, and this unexpectedly opens an hitherto unknown region of the mind. Intellectually, this is the transcending of the limits of logical dualism . . . the awakening of an inner sense which enables one to look into the actual working of things."

One may only suggest in a brief review something of the elusive quality of Zen. After reading the whole book, it will still not be clear. Indeed, after reading

the lengthy introduction provided by the famous psychologist, C. G. Jung, most readers still will not get it. But it will have been an interesting bit of reading at least. Since Zen must be experienced to be known, and can never be logically explained, perhaps this is all one may hope to get out of it. Some may even be tempted to seek the experience. Unless one is willing to undertake to attain the experience, at any rate, he cannot properly deny that the experience is possible and real. Of the practical results of Zen, there can be no doubt.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

Humanism as a Philosophy, by Corliss Lamont, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 368, $3.75.

This enthusiastic and able "introduction to the Humanist philosophy" is a welcome relief in the recent stream of pessimistic, and sometimes cynical, otherworldly and "realistic" philosophical literature. The author has tried, as he says, "to describe in clear and simple terms that fully rounded philosophy of life that I call *Humanism.*" His "own version of the much-debated concept of Humanism," he calls, "naturalistic Humanism." This he briefly traces back, with an imposing list of philosophical and literary names, and not without noting necessary qualifications, through the Enlightenment and the Renaissance to Greek, Hebrew, and oriental sources.

Naturalistic humanism he sharply distinguishes from the "Academic Humanism" represented by Babbitt, the "Integral Humanism" of Jacques Maritain, and from the "subjective variety" of F. C. S. Schiller. The eight central propositions which he finds at the centre of naturalistic humanism emphasize a naturalistic cosmology, ethics, and theory of human nature, a rejection of fatalism *and* of determinism, and an appeal to the large untapped resources of human thinking and appreciation of art and nature.

As distinguished from supernaturalist philosophies, naturalistic humanism, we are told, holds "that the universe at large is indifferent, *neutral* toward the welfare, the ideals and the fate of man" (p. 149). For this reason, according to Mr. Lamont, it is "a philosophy for mature people and grows increasingly influential with the maturity of the race" (p. 212). The author objects to those naturalists who call themselves "religious humanists" on the ground that they have not justified their adoption of the term "religion" which has been traditionally associated with the supernatural (pp. 34, 182). Serious theists may agree with him on this point, as well as with the claim that the prevailing tendency today "is to retire the Almighty from his former role in this-earthly affairs and to look upon him as a sort of Honorary Chairman of the Universe" (pp. 161-162); although they may demur to the claim that this is a sign of cultural advancement.

The deliberate omission of most theoretical questions allows a wider selection of representatives than would otherwise be possible. No question is raised, for example, about the crucial issue between the *experimental* unification of theory and practice as represented by Dewey and the more orthodox historical and dialectical efforts of Marx. This limitation also permits of some hazy references to a *qualified* economic interpretation of history (p. 255), to the basic means-end relationship (pp. 282 ff.), and, in a puzzling way, to the "subjective" nature of individual happiness (p. 304). The same limitation, it seems to me, imposes an oversimplified account of the "ethical" neutrality of science and hence leads to the completely mistaken claim that the nazis utilized scientific methods and techniques "very effectively to advance their hideous end" (p. 271). That the nazis used both physical and social *technology,* as well as individual scientists, is clearly evident, but in this use of knowledge they were the opposite of "scientific" in any proper *experimental*

sense of the term. This serious error is also reflected, I believe, in the author's failure to realize that social inquiry for the most part has yet to arrive at a significant scientific method (p. 258).

In spite of these few deficiencies, which in the book are mainly theoretical, and because of the vigor and clarity of style and the wide range of information which gives it substance, the book seems to me to accomplish well its purpose of introducing the reader to an important and growing humanist movement today.

HORACE S. FRIES

Sacred History, by Daniel-Rops, New York, Longmans Green, 1949, pp. xi, 433, $4.50.

It is unfortunate that M. Daniel-Rops, with his obvious literary ability, did not take the time to become acquainted with the major contributions of literary and historical criticism before writing his *Sacred History.* According to the jacket of the book the work was done in three years; the dates on p. 405, however, indicate that the writing occupied but half of this time. Haste is everywhere apparent. Obviously the work was done under considerable stress. It was begun in the year that the Germans occupied France, in order to show "the real character of the German persecution of the Jews" (jacket). The French edition, carrying the authorization of the ecclesiastical authorities of the Archbishopric of Paris, had been out but three weeks when the *Gestapo* appeared at the publishing house and broke the plates. It may be expecting too much to ask that a book born in those days of crisis should evidence careful judgment and a sober regard for all the evidence. While the strain of a national conflict may explain, it does not excuse the mistakes in fact and the shortcomings of interpretation in this book.

M. Daniel-Rops details many of the biblical narratives in a racy and crisp style. He gives the narratives as they appear in the Bible and brings to bear upon them his own imagination as well as many suggestive analogies drawn from a wide knowledge of literature and history. Joshua is like Du Guesclin (p. 142); Joseph, Disraeli (p. 48); Samson, Robin Hood (p. 159); the "peoples of the sea" suggest the Normans (p. 134). All of this is suggestive and reveals not only the imaginative powers of the author but the wealth of historical lore upon which he is able to draw.

The author has not taken into account the major conclusions of biblical criticism. For him, David is the author of the Psalms. "There is no trace of polytheism in the patriarchal tradition, and even many indications that prove an explicit monotheism" (p. 60). The documentary hypothesis is mentioned, but the results of the analysis are not used. For example, the duplicate stories of Abraham's sojourn in Egypt are both treated as facts. The double appearance of the story does not seem to bother the author. Rather, he is concerned with the question, "How was Sarai able to inflame such passions? She was at that time sixty-five years old" (p. 19). His answer is theological: "It is evident that the Biblical narrator intends to indicate in this a divine purpose, a rare prerogative extended by God to His chosen people." Needless to say this is not the method of history. Frequently M. Daniel-Rops offers an apology for a biblical character. Of Samson he says, "Only when he was driven to break his vow did he fall, and afterwards, how eloquent was his repentance!" (p. 167).

The book literally swarms with strange departures from the usually accepted English spellings of biblical names. There are mistakes, too, which could have been avoided had the manuscript had a careful going over by a competent specialist in biblical history. The pleasing style of this book will serve to gain a wide reading. Its chief service will be to arouse interest in things biblical; for those who demand a sharper accuracy and a reliance upon more solid sources than legend and

folklore this account of "The Civilization of the Old Testament World" will prove to be unsatisfactory.

As the title suggests, the history is written from deeply rooted theological presuppositions. There is a pattern of faith into which the author fits his events. He says: "Two thousand years separated these two equally mystical events [Abraham's departure from Ur and the birth of Christ], but the thread of an impeccable logic undoubtedly unites them. No history gives in a greater degree than does that of Israel the impression of having obeyed an internal development, of having borrowed from circumstances only the means of being the more completely itself" (p. 403). It is clear, I think, from these words what the author means by the puzzling term "sacred history."

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

C. S. Lewis: Apostle to the Skeptics, by Chad Walsh, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xiii, 176, $2.50.

The reasons why, in my judgment, this little book does not quite come off are two. First, one reads Lewis for his adept use of words (monism is "everything-ism"), his skillful analogies (three Persons remain one Being "just as a cube is six squares while remaining one cube"), and his psychological insight ("women speak a language without nouns"). Some of these appear in a commentary like the present one but not enough. Further, Lewis' fanciful allegories lose their color when retold in a summary, and the story of strange deeds by strange characters with unpronounceable names when presented in outline misses its point. It must be said also that Lewis is not—as yet—a sufficiently important writer to make a detailed analysis of his ideas and their antecedents seem worth while.

In the second place, when an author is so helpful in many of his comments on specific problems one yearns to know more about the sweep of his logic and what it is that forced him to shift from atheism to orthodoxy. Especially does one want to know why the shift has left him, with all his appeal to "reason," so consistently unsympathetic to the plight of "modernist" Christianity, which he dubs "Christianity-and-water." Mr. Walsh's book doesn't really explain why Mr. Lewis insists on hell, the devil, and original sin. It gets us nowhere, for example, to say that the modernist refuses to face the question whether the Supernatural does in fact exist. Nor can I think that the issue of Christ's divinity is fairly presented in the statement: "Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse. You can shut Him up for a fool, you can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at his feet and call Him Lord and God." The "either—or" approach is no more convincing here than it is in Kierkegaard.

It is hard to see how anyone can deny the extraordinary appeal Lewis has in certain respects. On some ethical issues he is truly brilliant. But, so far as this book goes, he just seems not to understand why many of the cardinal tenets of orthodoxy cause trouble for the inquirer. On this account he is an apostle not so much to skeptics as to believers.

J. S. BIXLER

The Ethics of Ambiguity, by Simone de Beauvoir, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. 161, $3.

This is an interesting exposition of the ethical side of the new version of existentialism advanced by the school of Jean-Paul Sartre. The position of man in the universe is ambiguous or ambivalent. He is at once "rational animal," "thinking reed," "a part of the world of which he is a consciousness," "a pure internality against which no external power can take hold," and at the same time he "experiences himself as a thing crushed by the dead weight of other things" (p. 7).

For the Sartre school there is no God who either rewards or punishes man, and

no future life for man. Each individual man should resolutely work out his own salvation in this life, here and now, with whatever assistance he can obtain from his fellows. Some persons indeed have no opportunity to do this, *e.g.*, children, slaves, Mohammedan women enclosed in harems. There are "sub-men" who try to avoid the responsibility of real living. When a "sub-man" finds that he cannot wholly escape this responsibility, he becomes a "serious man," who seeks to escape self-determination by posing as "a father, a boss, a member of the Christian Church or the Communist Party" (p. 48). Nihilists, surrealists, adventurers, arrivists, fanatics in different ways fail to realize themselves properly, as well as those whose "æsthetic attitude" claims to have no other relation with the world than that of detached contemplation, and so treats the present in a manner justifiable only with respect to past history (pp. 74 ff.).

On the contrary, a truly moral man aims at a goal for himself and others that can be attained in an immediate and foreseeable future—something concrete and practicable. This type of existentialism has no universal formula that can be applied *a priori* in every situation that will ever arise. On the contrary, it warns us against absolutes and universal maxims. In every situation the problem is to act in the manner that, so far as can be judged, will most further the welfare of individuals here and now.

In the fields of metaphysics and theology this version of existentialism rejects Christianity and has most in common with movements like the new humanism. However, its ethics in most of the concrete applications given in this book is not far from what liberal Protestants would probably affirm. The book is worth studying. The opening chapter is difficult upon first reading by one who is not familiar with this movement, but it becomes clear if read again after one has completed the volume.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

A Short History of Existentialism, by Jean Wahl, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 58, $2.75.

Existentialism: the word is on the lips of all those who believe in being *au courant* with the latest intellectual fad. All the recent excitement over Jean-Paul Sartre has focused attention on what is really a much older philosophy, the longer tradition of which is not well known. This little book is therefore a useful volume. It is, however, a *very* short history of this movement of thought, for, despite its price, it is only a fifty-five-page survey; and of these pages twenty are comments by other philosophers on Wahl's brief lecture.

To summarize in 7,500 words the development of so subtle and obscure a philosophy is sure to achieve little more than a deepening of the obscurity. And this is true of the present volume. Passing rapidly from Kierkegaard (d. 1855) to Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, the author comes at last to Sartre; but it is Heidegger who receives most attention.

The definition of the existential thinker is taken from Kierkegaard, who sets subjective intensity of feeling over against systematic, objective knowledge. Four characteristics are mentioned: infinite relationship with himself and infinite interest in his own destiny; a sense of becoming and struggle; impassioned thinking; and, finally, "the passion for freedom." But in all this the man is in contact with something beyond himself on which his fate depends, with God.

But with Jaspers this is secularized, and in place of God we are offered an uncertain reality which we cannot identify, so that we are defeated and brought to "shipwreck" until we find solace in a struggling love with other persons. For Heidegger the only form of being with which we have real contact is the being of man. But this awareness, found in human anguish, leads to "the nothingness from

which all being erupts." Hence we have no reason for our existence, and there is nothing ahead for us, but we are incurably transcending ourselves in a movement towards the future.

Faced by this dilemma we accept our past and our future in acts of decision, and these always take us beyond ourselves. This involves great risk and hence anxiety, and yet we assert our destiny which is somehow linked with a deeply-felt totality.

Jean-Paul Sartre, whose particular brand of existentialism has won popular attention in America, is treated in this volume almost exclusively from the standpoint of his theory of knowledge, and receives barely five hundred words. Little light is thrown on the broader aspects of his thought.

This philosophical movement challenges all our preconceptions about philosophy and its functions, but Wahl raises a final question as to whether the existentialist does not destroy the very existence which he seeks above all to preserve. Comments follow by Berdyaev, Gurvitch, Koyré, Gabriel Marcel, and, in more extended form, Levinas.

I doubt if the volume will illuminate this philosophy for the general reader, but students of philosophy will find it full of suggestive problems and distinctions for further reflection.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Southeast Asia, by Kenneth P. Landon, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1949, pp. 215, $4.

A generation ago, there was considerable interest in what was called comparative religions or more lately, the history of religion—and many books on the subject were published. Recently the output of such works has dwindled, and although popular and often unreliable literature continues to be published, few scholarly works appear. Of those few, a number have been published by the University of Chicago Press, and the present volume is fully up to its high standards.

One of the reasons for the diminution of good books on the history of religion has been the failure to formulate a definition of religion that has been generally accepted, and this has meant that various books on the subject have been so different in their contents and treatment that a reader would hardly know they were treating the same subject. The mistakes of earlier writers have been continued, and the lack of an accepted discipline has brought the whole field into disrepute among serious scholars, particularly with regard to books which must draw upon other sources for much of their material, when those sources may be very uneven in quality.

It is a real pleasure, therefore, to find a book like the present volume, which is consistent in its treatment, which is fully documented, and in which the attitude is, so far as possible, historical. It should be recognized that no one scholar could possibly master all the languages required to make a first-hand investigation of the native literature in so wide a field, but the author shows a thorough knowledge of the studies made in European languages, and the book is provided with an index, footnotes, and a good bibliography. Dr. Landon himself spent eleven years in Siam, and during the war was assistant chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs of the U. S. Department of State.

The book considers religion from the point of view of behavior, rather than of belief and of religious formulas, and contains accounts of folkways, ceremonies, taboos, and religious calendars. It is historical in its treatment so far as possible, and lays special emphasis upon changes in culture due to the diffusion of the world's major missionary religions, all of which have entered this area. Considering the wideness of the area, it is surprising how thoroughly it is covered. The book is particularly concerned with Sinicized Annam, Hinduized Siam, and Islamized Indonesia, and with their reactions to western civilization.

The chief criticism of the book is due to an unavoidable defect. The author is obliged to assume a knowledge of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Chinese religion which an ordinary reader, and indeed few scholars, would possess. The reader is expected to understand references to the school of Shāfi'ī, Mt. Meru, characters of the Ramayana, and Lou Pan, with little or no explanation. However, the book is of great value, providing a reliable study of what is, from the view of the diffusion of religion, the most important area in the world. JOHN K. SHRYOCK

Cardinal Mindszenty: The Story of a Modern Martyr, by Bela Fabian, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. vii, 207, $2.75.

This book follows a definite pattern of the *Lives of the Saints,* better known in the form given to them in the popular biographies of the Industrial Revolution by Samuel Smiles in England (*e.g.,* Watts and Stephenson) and the author of *From Log Cabin to White House* in America. The form is probably derived ultimately from Plutarch's *Lives,* of whom J. B. Bury wrote, "He was not an historian, for his object was primarily ethical." The author claims the authority of first-hand knowledge of an old friend. The account is written at times not without deep emotion, in straightforward English, and much intimate knowledge. The Cardinal is a native Catholic of Hungary, and the author a native Hungarian Jew. There is no reason to doubt the friendship. The reviewer is therefore in a difficult position, as there is little or no indication of what is known in modern historical jargon as source material. The admiration and affection are beyond doubt or question.

The picture of the Cardinal presented by the author is one of charm: a hard-working, devoted young priest, who makes himself competent, not only in the details of his calling and his duties, but also in the life and work of his parishioners. He tolerates no interference in his duties in his parish or diocese. He is kindly to the poor and weak and not sycophantic to the wealthy and powerful. His patriotism leads him to resent any external influence—German or Russian. The author insists that the bulk of the militant pro-Russian party are mainly converted members of the pro-Hitler party of Hungary. Eventually the young priest's devoted and effective work led him to the throne of the cardinal archbishop, and, from his status, face to face with the chiefs of the Red *régime,* and he realizes his destiny. The dust cover gives two portraits—mentioned in the text—before and after the ordeal. There are some quotations from documents. A century ago it was Kossuth, facing the Orthodox Russians and the Catholic Austrians. Such is the brief outline of the story.

The question is how far can the author's worship of his hero be trusted, in judging his place and rôle in the issue of the reborn feud between the See of Rome and the Barbarian. It is a question supremely difficult to decide, and the author does not really help the reader in his task. Here, if the glowing heroic story is true, and if it is not merely another piece of propaganda, Cardinal Mindszenty is a very great man, a hero—in the best sense—of his people. That would have to be admitted without reserve. He was not a poacher of souls nor did he discriminate between the needs of Catholic and Protestant in times of dearth. Nevertheless, the author has failed his hero, if this is the case, and left the impression of an overstated case, which produces the mental reservation which might be expressed in the manner of Marguerite when she looked into Mephistopheles' magic mirror and sang, "It is not I!" Your reviewer has to confess to that impression which lingers more strongly after a second reading, but he shrinks from any criticism of the hero of the book in case he is the victim of his biographer's injudicious praise and his object—apparently, primarily ethical. F. W. BUCKLER

BOOK NOTICES

Creed or Chaos? by Dorothy L. Sayers, New York, Harcourt Brace, ©1949, pp. 85, $2.25.

Dorothy Sayers is a trenchant and arresting writer who, it would seem, just can't be uninteresting. When she lays about her on behalf of orthodoxy, downing an opponent by an epigram, she inevitably reminds one of Chesterton and his use of the sword of paradox. Yet I must confess that the first half of this book held my attention for its style rather than its content. It is, in effect, a protest against the neglect of dogma, specifically the dogma that Jesus Christ the Son of God is both God and man. Perhaps the theme is too large for a few short essays, delivered for the most part as addresses to English audiences during the war. Or perhaps the prejudices that come with the habit of teaching theology unfit a reviewer to see what a book like this might mean to a reader who approaches the field with fresh and untrammeled vision. In any event, I could not help feeling that the author was more convincing when she turned from the meaning of theological words to the meaning of practical work. On this subject some pertinent things are said: "Work is not, primarily, a thing one does to live, but the thing one lives to do." Our trouble is that "nobody works for the sake of getting the thing done. The result of the work is a by-product; the aim of the work is to make money to do something else." Attention is called to the way in which during the war an object was apt to be valued for what it was and could do rather than for what it would bring on the market. Interesting comments are made on what might happen if we could go further toward making work and its product an end rather than a means. The one difficulty is that little is said about the economic order this would entail or the kind of education that would prepare for it. On the subject of "The Other Six Deadly Sins (wrath, gluttony, covetousness, envy, sloth, and pride) the author is really eloquent. Listen to this, for example, on covetousness: "Do the officials stationed at church doors in Italy to exclude women with bare arms turn anybody away on the grounds that they are too well-dressed to be honest? Do the vigilance committees who complain of 'suggestive' books and plays make any attempt to suppress the literature which 'suggests' that getting on in the world is the chief object in life? . . . Does the Church arrange services with bright congregational singing for Total Abstainers from Usury?" Whatever its status as theology this book is certainly good homiletics.

J. S. BIXLER

The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, by W. A. Visser 't Hooft, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 271, $3.50.

Amsterdam has already become a well-worn word in the ecumenical vocabulary, but the importance of the assembly held there in 1948 increases rather than diminishes during the months. Official reports of such gatherings, however, do not always make thrilling reading. Even the most stirring speeches lose much in cold type. No attempt is made in this volume to reproduce even the most important. Instead, the sessions are summarized in skillful fashion and only the official documents and pronouncements are printed in full. Probably most important of all, the gist of the discussion of the commission and committee reports is summarized, material that has not hitherto been available in mimeographed form. For those who had the privilege of attending the assembly, this well-organized chronicle will recall the details of the

never-to-be-forgotten fortnight. Others will find in compact and accessible form all of the results—the section reports, the committee reports, accounts of the special events and public meetings, the statements by the youth delegations, the constitution and rules of the World Council, and the personnel. From the list of participants it is possible for the first time to reconstruct the membership of the various sections and committees. This notice is written just before the Central Committee is to convene at Chichester in England. Its membership is listed together with other items of interest. Churchmen from all denominations will desire to have a copy of this book for future reference concerning a most significant milestone in the development of Christendom.

CLARENCE T. CRAIG

Understanding the New Testament, by Ian W. Fraser, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 160, $1.75.

This pleasant little volume was first published in New Zealand, apparently in 1946, under the title *Understandest Thou?*, and is being reissued for American readers. The author, a Presbyterian minister and teacher in New Zealand, and one especially interested in working with young people, has studied in various institutions ranging from Edinburgh and Bonn to New York City. And ever has he been a zealous and retentive pupil. It would not be difficult to label many of his pronouncements with such names as Barth, Baillie, Scott, and Moffatt. As I read this book, constantly there came before my eyes the ideal for the ancient Jewish student: a carefully plastered cistern which would never lose a drop nor add one. At times, apparently inadvertently, quite contradictory views are preserved on different pages, sometimes in successive paragraphs. For example, on p. 27 it is said, in explanation of the absence of teachings from the Gospel of Mark: "Perhaps it was because the content of his teaching was already available in Q, and Mark wrote his Gospel to supplement Q, giving the narrative it omitted." Yet on p. 15 he had written: "Although Q was written earlier, it was evidently unknown to Mark." This is but one sample of a not infrequent catholicity which is more usually the quality of one who follows than of one who leads. And it can be confusing. But it would be unfair so to dismiss the book. It will probably prove very convenient as a text for Sunday-school classes and other lay groups desirous of gaining a not too fatiguing bowing acquaintance with the New Testament. After a brief but essentially sound chapter of introduction, "How the New Testament Came to Be," he treats the various books one by one. His principal interest is to give answers to the questions: Why? When? By whom? To whom? The analysis or contents of each writing comes at the end of its section and is usually so brief as to be of doubtful value. For the most part his general outlook and approach appear to me sensible and wholesome and fair. Many of his statements appear, on the other hand, actually incorrect—*e.g.,* that it was from Corinth that Paul sent Timothy back to Thessalonica (p. 51) or that there is only one word in Greek for *slave* and *servant* since all servants were slaves (p. 99). Other statements seem to me at best uncertain: "Ephesians" is a genuine Pauline letter written to Laodicea; a fine example of the early church's ability, though itself weak, in uniting and inspiring all men under God is to be found in Franklin Delano Roosevelt's ability, though himself handicapped, in uniting and inspiring the entire country. And also I am a bit homœopathic in supposedly historical and critical writing to the constant intrusion of such pious preachments, true though they undoubtedly are, as "But God's ways are wiser than ours." Scholars will probably find the volume of little concern; pastors, on the other hand, will likely feel it a useful book to make available to their people. I read it through with

interest and appreciation, despite my few strictures, and would like to know the author personally.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Édouard Estaunié, the Perplexed Positivist, by Ruth Carter Hok, New York, King's Crown Press, 1949, pp. 116, $2.25.

The author of *Édouard Estaunié* has taken the complex life of the French writer and after an introduction has divided her study into chapters on Life and Light each with two subheads: Man and Forces, Reason and Hope. There is a conclusion and a careful section of notes and bibliography. Estaunié's point of departure is the lie of appearances. Solitude, the importance of resolving the problem of destiny, the drama of the dependence of sentiment in education, the need to hope are the ordinary themes of his preoccupation as a thinker. All of his books—he wrote seven over a period of twenty-six years—deal with the struggling aspirations of the human souls in a world of crushing reality. "In the last analysis the universe is a desert where each goes his own way without hearing any voice but his own." Solidarity among physical things is visible everywhere. The sequence is that of a tree which dies and gives no shade. Then the grass dies, and afterward comes the desert. A distant water drop from the ocean traveling with the cloud gives life to a withering plant thousands of miles away. For Estaunié the source of truth to which we must return is nature. By contrast, the church has little to offer and in *L'Empreinte* one of the characters, having sought solace in the church of Saint-Sulpice, gives way to bitter disappointment, when the priest refuses to see him, by saying, "From six o'clock on God was no longer at home." God, a chimera and a lie, no doubt brings comfort to those who believe in him. Throughout Estaunié's books is the regret in the mouth of the disillusioned priest of *La Vie secrète,* who says, "Blessed are those who living by a lie are not disabused." Ruth Hok has given an accurate appreciation of Estaunié, but with almost too many quotations for a slender volume. The analysis is accurate, and the section on Light is more illuminating than the earlier chapter on Life. The notes are careful, and the index shows studious checking. Two typographical errors do not spoil the whole book. On pp. 10 and 55, Miss Payrolles uses "Madamoiselle" and in other places the correct form, "Mademoiselle" is used. The interest of Estaunié was centred on the human being's relationship to guiding and molding forces from which there is no means of escape. He was concerned about furnishing relief from suffering. It is Estaunié's thought that only a storm or great sunshine can make green stems grow. After the storm comes the sun; and if religion does not become an efficacious means to brightness and happiness, nevertheless the sturdy green shoots grow and add beauty to the earth. Forgetfulness for others has for reward forgetfulness for oneself.

JOHN LANGDON JONES

The Best of Alexander Maclaren, edited by Gaius Glenn Atkins, New York, Harper, © 1949, pp. xix, 167, $2.

The best of Alexander Maclaren, edited by Gaius Glenn Atkins, is good reading for ministers. The selections which have been chosen are carefully gleaned from seven different volumes of the published works of this famous expository preacher. They illustrate the powers, the insight, the style, the substance, and the homiletical genius which across so many years have made Alexander Maclaren the preacher's pastor and placed so many of his sermon volumes upon their library shelves. The introduction by the editor, himself a minister and former professor of homiletics, is worth the price of the book. It carefully analyzes the work of Alexander Maclaren and should prove of inestimable value to the minister who is interested in im-

proving and developing his expository preaching. A brief sketch of Dr. Maclaren's life and work is included in this introduction. Dr. Atkins points out that political and social agitation were not this minister's vocation. His philosophy and theology were implicit rather than explicit. He was conservative, accepting the Bible records and following traditional positions, but by analogy and vital interpretation he developed his texts in regions usually beyond controversy. His preaching was Christ-centred, presenting an all-sufficient gospel for the needs of people who wanted to be Christians and for Christians who faced trials and tests. Social rightness was to him a projection of individual rightness. His style was marked by balanced forms and carefully chosen words. His texts, topics, and organization are always in supporting harmony. The editor holds that no one has produced sermonic materials of an expository nature to challenge in excellence the works of Alexander Maclaren. The volume is comprised of twenty sermons which represent, in Dr. Atkins' judgment, the best of the great preacher's efforts and which illustrate his genius. Each sermon is prefaced with a meditation of Dr. Maclaren taken from *Similes and Figures* and concluded with a prayer from his volume, *Pulpit Prayers*. They have been selected with the thought and spirit of the particular sermon in mind. Among the sermons selected for this volume are "Unpossessed Possessions," "A Song of Faith," "Christ's Musts," "The Singers by the Sea," "Death," "The Friend," and "What Lasts." Any pastor will be rewarded in the study of this volume which puts in concise form so much of the wealth and spirit of Alexander Maclaren.

JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

The Function of the University, by R. S. K. Seeley, New York, Oxford University Press, ©1948, pp. vii, 79, $1.50.

This slim volume consists of a series of six lectures delivered at a conference which was held under the auspices of the Hazen Foundation by the provost of Trinity College, Toronto. The author deals in turn with the nature of a university, its vocational aspects, its responsibilities for cultural and moral development, the nature and extent of student government, and the relation of the university to the community. Defining the university as "a community of people pursuing knowledge and truth for the sake of more perfectly adjusting themselves to society," Dr. Seeley proceeds to examine the function of the university not only as a centre of teaching and research but as a force to be reckoned with in the cultural life of the community. His observations on the subject of academic freedom appeal to the reviewer as much the most cogent which he has seen on this controversial subject. The author holds that the university is a repository not only of learning but of the moral and spiritual traditions of the past, and ably defends the thesis that while such an institution is a community in itself, it must not be regarded as divorced from the total life stream of the nation or the world. There is much wisdom in this little book.

JOHN M. FOGG, JR.

Negro Students and Their Colleges, by J. Irving E. Scott, Boston, Meador, ©1949, pp. 179, $2.50.

Dr. Scott, out of his many years of experience as a principal of a school and a dean of a college, has written a handbook on college selection for Negro youth. Part I deals with choosing a college and discusses topics such as Why People Go to College, The Opportunities that College Life Offers, Are You Ready for College? Which College Shall I Attend? Part II gives data on individual Negro junior and senior colleges regarding location, type of college, physical plant, rating, degrees offered, major fields, student activities, and requirements for admission and gradua-

tion. Part III presents interracial colleges and universities, giving brief descriptive statements of each of the schools, in which the number of Negro students is shown as well as the activities in which such students participate. This book should be of real value to the school counselor or minister who is doing guidance work with Negro young people in college selection. It can be used more successfully by an experienced counselor in interpreting college than by a high school student himself, for it is entirely too general in the sections dealing with college life and choosing a school. An average secondary school student should have much more detailed information than is here given on the opportunities of a college education and the process of evaluating a school. A very valuable addition would have been a discussion of scholarships available and methods of self-help. However, when one considers the numbers of questions the average young person has unanswered concerning his choice of college and the apparent lack of guidance given in this very important field, one is grateful for an objective volume such as this aimed at a specific group of youth. By following it, general though most of the material is, a young Negro will be in a much better position than is the average student to choose intelligently an institution of higher education.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

From Copenhagen to Okanogan, by U. E. Fries, Caldwell (Ida.), Caxton Printers, 1949, pp. 437, $5.

American readers have a perennial interest in pioneering, and, generally speaking, in the settlement of the Far West. Lately, this appetite has been whetted by the appearance of several volumes such as this one. The youngest settlements—the rawest towns—are becoming history. There are a few old-timers still living in these places ready and eager to discuss things as they were: "before the road was built," or "before the railroad went through." As a result, there are a number of first-hand accounts. A good many of them are lurid, and more or less garbled; some, as in the present case, are photographically clear and carry conviction. Mr. Fries has remembered almost every event in his long craeer as a settler in the Okanogan valley. Born near Copenhagen, Denmark, he came to America at the age of seventeen, and worked his way west to the State of Washington. Here he staked a claim in what is now the famous apple and cattle country between the Okanogan and Columbia rivers. He and his family have prospered, confining their activities to the raising of dairy stock. They were among the first settlers, and certainly the first to attempt to get adequate schools, roads, and recreational facilities for a section which is sparsely settled even today. Mr. Fries, now well over eighty years of age, still lives in the log house which he built for his bride in the 1890's. He is in partnership with one of his sons, and apparently still active in local affairs. So long as his facts are of historical or descriptive importance, photographic exactness in presenting them is not a fault. But Mr. Fries is not an experienced author, nor is he able to separate the chaff from his wheat. For example, he describes a splashing which he received when driving through a mud puddle with as much detail and space as he gives to the flood of 1894. Too often this technique (or lack of it) reminds one of the village gossips sitting around their favorite stove, allowing words and anecdotes to drift in limbo with the tobacco smoke. But this is only a minor flaw in style and does not spoil the book. The various chapters are groups of similar incidents, and in some cases groups of chapters form a complete section. There is no strict chronological development. On the whole this serves the author's purpose. Particularly interesting are the sections on Indians and Indian lore. Mr. Fries has made many transliterations of the Chinook dialect, which he has followed by English translations. These, and the

descriptions of tribal customs, are the most valuable contributions in the book. When I had finished reading, I was able to visualize the sage flats and pine forests of the Okanogan district. Mr. Fries attempted to picture his country to us, and he has succeeded—handsomely.

THEODORE V. ENSLIN II

Enriching Worship, edited by A. J. William Myers, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 393, $3.50.

Dr. A. J. William Myers was for a quarter of a century head of the department of religious education at the Hartford Seminary Foundation. The present volume is the fruit of his studies through many years. Although retired, his works will live after him. In *Enriching Worship* his selection of poetry is for the most part good. It ought to be helpful to ministers and church-school workers in building worship programs. Well chosen and usable, it fits various needs. There is a good selection of the Psalms; the prose is striking and carefully chosen; so are the prayers and the aphorisms. While there are five books, the book of poetry occupies nearly one half of the volume. The indexes help the reader to locate quotations readily. The organization of the volume leaves something to be desired, but the compiler has brought together between the covers of a single book a great deal of material that is useful for purposes of worship. It is a superior volume and will be a valuable aid to those who wish to enrich their programs of worship.

JAMES D. MORRISON

When the Lamp Flickers, by Leslie D. Weatherhead, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 206, $2.50.

There are times when the words and attitudes of Jesus seem difficult to understand and even more difficult to accept. The Bible is said to be a lamp unto our feet, but what should we do when the lamp flickers? In this volume twenty-one questions commonly asked by sincere people are presented. They are familiar to every minister. Leslie Weatherhead's answers may also be familiar to many, but unfortunately not to all, especially laymen. In the final analysis, however, the most important contribution he makes is not in the answers he gives, but in the mood out of which he writes and the purpose of his preaching. He speaks to the religious needs of people and the manner of his speaking is direct and stimulating. It is easy to imagine many ministers using his material for the encouragement of their own straightforward answers to similar questions—and others—of their congregations. Preaching like this ought to be heard in more pulpits.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Songs from the Land of Dawn, by Toyohiko Kagawa and others, New York, Friendship Press, ©1949, pp. xi, 80, $2.

Our western world would do well to consider these Japanese poems. Simplicity, charm, beauty, sincerity, and imagination are characteristics that come easily to mind. Kagawa contributes one section; his contemporary Christians, mostly from the leper colony at Oshima, contribute another; the third section is a collection of classical poems covering the period from the seventh century to the present. This last section is largely in the strict form requiring but seventeen syllables. The reader must be impressed and inspired by the effortless expression of confidence and faith in the basic nature of the world here offered. When the poet writes from a Christian experience, there is the added effect of religious strength. One does not read these poems rapidly. They are like negatives; to get the pictures they represent one must reproduce them in the developing room of his own sensitive imagination.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOKS RECEIVED

**How Came Our Faith,* by W. A. L. Elmslie, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. xii, 417, $3.25.

**Recovery of Man,* by F. R. Barry, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. viii, 109, $2.

**Time to Spare,* by Douglas V. Steere, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 187, $2.

**The Populace in Shakespeare,* by Brents Stirling, New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, pp. 203, $3.

**History of New Testament Times,* by Robert H. Pfeiffer, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xii, 561, $4.

**Japan Begins Again,* by William C. Kerr, New York, Friendship Press, ©1949, pp. vi, 180, $1.50.

**Goethe: Four Studies,* by Albert Schweitzer, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 116, $2.50.

**Jesus Then and Now,* by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 224, $2.50.

**Holy Wisdom,* by F. Augustine Baker, New York, Harper, no date, pp. xxvi, 667, $5.

**Christ,* by Maximilian Beyer, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. ix, 284, $5.

**Introduction to Comparative Mysticism,* by Jacques de Marquette, New York, Philosophical Library, 1949, pp. 229, $3.75.

**Christian Unity in the Making,* by Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Federal Council of Churches, ©1948, pp. 376, $2.75.

**The Realities of American-Palestine Relations,* by Frank E. Manuel, Washington, Public Affairs Press, ©1949, pp. viii, 378, $5.

**How to Teach the Bible,* by Joseph M. Gettys, Richmond, John Knox Press, ©1949, pp. 163, $2.

**The Small Sects in America,* by Elmer T. Clark, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, rev. ed., ©1949, pp. 256, $3.

**The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,* edited by Kathleen Coburn, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 480, $7.50.

**Story of American Protestantism,* by Andrew Landale Drummond, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1949, pp. xii, 418, 30/.

**After England—We,* by A. H. Maloney, Boston, Meador, ©1949, pp. 183, $2.50.

The Fundamentals of the Christian Religion, by Joseph Jacobs, Boston, Meador, ©1949, pp. 270, $2.50.

Examination of this book fails to reveal any convincing reason for writing, printing, or reading it.

Peace Terms to All Peoples and *Gone with the Whirlwind,* by John Maley Wilson, Boston, Meador, ©1949, pp. 290, $2.50.

A loosely articulated collection of biblical material, observations on the situation of the world, original poetry of a sort, and letters (mostly unanswered) to such figures as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, Joseph Stalin, and John L. Lewis, by an aged gentleman who describes himself as a "Kentucky Mountaineer, Farmer, Music Teacher, Soloist, Song Writer, Preacher and Theologian, Poet and Author."

**The Religious Revolt Against Reason,* by L. Harold DeWolf, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 217, $2.50.

**Psychology and Religion for Everyday Living,* by Charles T. Holman, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. x, 178, $2.50.

**The Weight of Glory,* by C. S. Lewis, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 66, $1.25.

**The Book of the Twelve Prophets: Vol. II,* by Julius A. Bewer, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 112, seventy-five cents.

* To be reviewed.

ANNUAL INDEX

I

ARTICLES

By Title

Clear Thoughts on a Cold Morning (*Eugene M. Austin*), 108
Confessions of a Bibliophile, The (*Mitchell Bronk*), 227
Critique of Modern Missions, A (*John K. Shryock*), 132
Epistolary Form in Paul (*Alfred M. Perry*), 48
Fallacy of Negation, The (*Milton C. Westphal*), 219
Function of a Theological Seminary, The (*Howard W. Smith*), 333
"Gentlemen, Be Seated!" (*Alexander Mackie*), 127
Heinrich Heine and Christianity (*Philip S. Miller*), 307
Human Goals in the Light of Science (*Mark Graubard*), 289
Jews and Palestine, The (*S. Vernon McCasland*), 115
Jews and Palestine, The: a Correction (*S. Vernon McCasland*), 246
Miracles—Possible or Probable? (*Vergilius Ferm*), 215
Nature and/or Grace (*Robert L. Cope*), 325
Pacifism—the Way to Peace? (*John H. Hallowell*), 30
Possibility of Miracles, The (*J. Calvin Keene*), 208
Reckoning of the Day in the Gospels and Acts (*Julian Morgenstern*), 232
Reformed Church Music (*Robert Stevenson*), 41
Significance of the Community for the Religious Situation, The (*Maynard L. Cassady*), 1
Sources and Results of Augustine's Conception of Evil (*Franklin P. Smith*), 19
Tell Me—Is It a Prayer? (*Winston L. King*), 299
Tragedy of Religion, The (*F. W. Buckler*), 193
We Believe in Liberty, But —— (*Arthur C. Baldwin*), 97
When Is Pantheism Not Pantheism? (*William A. Shimer*), 336
World's Great Poetry, The (*Frederick C. Grant*), 317

. . . . . .

Book Notices: 87, 183, 278, 374. *See Index II*
Book Reviews: 58, 147, 247, 342. *See Index II*
Books Received: 95, 191, 287, 380
From Off the Campus and On: 56, 145, 243, 340
Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly: 54, 143, 241, 338

By Author

Austin, Eugene M. (*Clear Thoughts on a Cold Morning*), 108
Baldwin, Arthur C. (*We Believe in Liberty, But——*), 97
Bronk, Mitchell (*The Confessions of a Bibliophile*), 227
Buckler, F. W. (*The Tragedy of Religion*), 193
Cassady, Maynard L. (*The Significance of the Community for the Religious Situation*), 1
Cope, Robert L. (*Nature and/or Grace*), 325
Ferm, Vergilius (*Miracles—Possible or Probable?*), 215
Grant, Frederick C. (*The World's Great Poetry*), 317
Graubard, Mark (*Human Goals in the Light of Science*), 289
Hallowell, John H. (*Pacifism—the Way to Peace?*), 30
Keene, J. Calvin (*The Possibility of Miracles*), 208
King, Winston L. (*Tell Me—Is It a Prayer?*), 299
Mackie, Alexander (*"Gentlemen, Be Seated!"*), 127
McCasland, S. Vernon (*The Jews and Palestine*), 115
(*The Jews and Palestine: a Correction*), 246
Miller, Philip S. (*Heinrich Heine and Christianity*), 307
Morgenstern, Julian (*The Reckoning of the Day in the Gospels and Acts*), 232
Perry, Alfred M. (*Epistolary Form in Paul*), 48
Shimer, William A. (*When Is Pantheism Not Pantheism?*), 336
Shryock, John K. (*A Critique of Modern Missions*), 132

Smith, Franklin P. (*Sources and Results of Augustine's Conception of Evil*), 19
Smith, Howard W. (*The Function of a Theological Seminary*), 333
Stevenson, Robert (*Reformed Church Music*), 41
Westphal, Miltton C. (*The Fallacy of Negation*), 219

II

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The reviews are arranged alphabetically by authors. The names of the reviewers (in parentheses) follow the titles.

Adams, G. P., *Man and Metaphysics* (E. S. BRIGHTMAN), 68
Andrews, Elias, *The Meaning of Christ for Paul* (M. S. ENSLIN), 350
Atkins, G. G. (ed.), *The Best of Alexander Maclaren* (J. H. IVEY), 376
Baab, O. J., *The Theology of the Old Testament* (H. G. MAY), 342
Baker, J. G. H., *The Changing Scene in China* (J. H. FRANKLIN), 186
Beck, L. W. (ed.), *Critique of Practical Reason, etc.* (H. W. SCHNEIDER), 279
Bergin, T. G., and Fisch, M. H. (edd.), *The New Science of Giambattista Vico* (A. G. WIDGERY), 359
Best of G. A. Studdert-Kennedy, The (R. E. KEIGHTON), 285
Bewer, J. A., *The Book of the Twelve Prophets: Vol. I* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 259
Blanshard, Paul, *American Freedom and Catholic Power* (M. S. ENSLIN), 247
Bluemel, C. S., *War, Politics, and Insanity* (J. H. HOWSON), 84
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, *The Cost of Discipleship* (W. L. SPERRY), 262
Bonthius, R. H., *Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance* (F. T. WILSON), 175
Bower, W. C., and Hayward, P. R., *Protestantism Faces Its Educational Task Together* (P. B. IRWIN), 348
Bowman, J. W., *The Religion of Maturity* (E. W. PARSONS), 157
Brunner, Emil, *Christianity and Civilisation* (W. M. HORTON), 346
Bryson, Lyman, *et al.* (edd.), *Learning and World Peace* (R. E. ALLEY), 176
Buber, Martin, *Hasidism* (RALPH MARCUS), 254
Carnell, E. J., *An Introduction to Christian Apologetics* (G. W. DAVIS), 77
Cashman, Robert, *The Finances of a Church* (M. C. WESTPHAL), 283
Church, L. F., *The Early Methodist People* (C. D. BENJAMIN), 365
Clark, D. L., *John Milton at St. Paul's School* (C. E. BATTEN), 284
Cloud of Unknowing, The (A. C. OUTLER), 80
Dalberg-Acton, J. E. E., *Essays on Freedom and Power* (R. E. E. HARKNESS), 169
Davies, D. R., *Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet from America* (A. G. WIDGERY), 58
Davis, G. W., *The Inquisition at Albi* (F. W. BUCKLER), 268
Dawson, J. M., *Separate Church and State Now* (H. M. GEHR), 153
de Beauvoir, Simone, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (W. K. WRIGHT), 370
de Grazia, Sebastian, *The Political Community* (EARL CRANSTON), 358
Dewey, John, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (E. A. BURTT), 263
Dick, R. L., *Pastoral Work and Personal Counseling* (J. W. THOMAS), 280
Dirks, J. E., *The Critical Theology of Theodore Parker* (VERGILIUS FERM), 354
Dooyeweerd, H., *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought* (W. K. WRIGHT), 91
Dun, Angus, *Prospecting for a United Church* (W. N. PITTENGER), 72
Duncan, G. S., *Jesus, Son of Man* (S. V. MC CASLAND), 261
Easton, Jr., W. B., *Thinking Christianly* (C. M. BOND), 156
Eckardt, A. R., *Christianity and the Children of Israel* (I. G. MATTHEWS), 87
Einstein, D. G., *Emperor Frederick II* (W. S. HUDSON), 286
Elson, J. H., *John Hales of Eton* (R. M. VAUGHAN), 179
Epstein, L. M., *Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism* (W. F. STINESPRING), 363
Fabian, Bela, *Cardinal Mindszenty* (F. W. BUCKLER), 373
Fairchild, H. N., *Religious Trends in English Poetry* (J. S. DAUERTY), 276
Felton, R. A., *The Home of the Rural Pastor* (H. B. WHITE), 185
Ferm, Vergilius, *What Can We Believe?* (J. L. CLAYTON, JR.), 258
Fey, H. E., *The Lord's Supper* (H. W. SMITH), 178
Finegan, Jack, *Youth Asks about Religion* (C. M. BOND), 356
Frankel, Charles, *The Faith of Reason* (P. A. BERTOCCI), 70
Frankfort, H., *Kingship and the Gods* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 257
Fraser, I. W., *Understanding the New Testament* (M. S. ENSLIN), 375

Fries, U. E., *From Copenhagen to Okanogan* (T. V. ENSLIN II), 378
Froeschels, Emil, *The Human Race* (EUGENE AYRES), 94
Gandhi, M. K., *Gandhi's Autobiography* (A. G. WIDGERY), 151
Geren, Paul, *The Pilgrimage of Peter Strong* (J. H. FRANKLIN), 181
Gibran, Kahlil, *Tears and Laughter* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 286
Gilkey, J. G., *Gaining the Faith You Need* (T. F. ADAMS), 184
Gordon, C. H., *Lands of the Cross and Crescent* (I. G. MATTHEWS), 184
Gorham, D. R., *Understanding Adults* (J. H. IVEY), 183
Gross, J. O., *Education for Life* (RITTENHOUSE NEISSER), 64
Harmon, N. B., *The Organization of the Methodist Church* (J. E. SKILLINGTON), 274
Hazelton, R. M., *In Our Midst* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 285
Heard, Gerald, *Is God Evident?* (EUGENE AYRES), 93
Hedley, George, *The Symbol of the Faith* (R. M. GRANT), 171
Herrick, E. C., *Turns Again Home* (M. S. ENSLIN), 277
Hiltner, Seward, *Pastoral Counseling* (W. C. BOWER), 269
Hobhouse, Stephen (ed.), *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law* (G. W. DAVIS), 81
Hok, R. C., *Édouard Estaunié* (J. L. JONES), 376
Hollister, W. W., *Government and the Arts of Obedience* (EARL CRANSTON), 187
Hunter, A. A., *The Audacity of Faith* (J. H. IVEY), 266
Iremonger, F. A., *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury* (O. J. HART), 185
Jepson, J. J. (ed.), *St. Augustine's The Lord's Sermon on the Mount* (M. S. ENSLIN), 90
Johnson, A. A., *Prayers for Young People* (R. M. GREY), 158
Johnson, F. E. (ed.), *Wellsprings of the American Spirit* (G. W. DAVIS), 89
Johnson, N. B., *Prayer in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha* (C. M. COOPER), 160
Johnson, R. B., *What Is Happening in Religious Education* (F. H. WILLKENS), 162
Jones, E. S., *Mahatma Gandhi* (A. G. WIDGERY), 151
Jones, E. W., *Preaching and the Dramatic Arts* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 179
Jones, R. M., *A Call to What Is Vital* (G. W. DAVIS), 81
Kagawa, Toyohiko, *et al., Songs from the Land of Dawn* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 379
Kates, F. W. (ed.), *Things That Matter* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 283
Kennedy, Gerald (ed.), *The Best of John Henry Jowett* (H. M. GEHR), 282
Kiang, Wen-han, *The Chinese Student Movement* (J. K. SHRYOCK), 78
Kierkegaard, Soren, *Purity of Heart* (G. W. DAVIS), 280
King, W. L., *The Holy Imperative* (WILLIAM HUBBEN), 357
Kirk, G. E., *A Short History of the Middle East* (S. V. MC CASLAND), 252
Kleist, J. A. (ed.), *Didache, Epistle of Barnabas, etc.* (M. S. ENSLIN), 90
Lamont, Corliss, *Humanism as a Philosophy* (H. S. FRIES), 368
Landon, K. P., *Southeast Asia* (J. K. SHRYOCK), 372
Lee, E. G., *Mass Man and Religion* (E. E. AUBREY), 265
Leiffer, M. H., *The Effective City Church* (R. D. HERSHEY), 278
Leslie, E. A., *The Psalms* (R. E. WOLFE), 353
Lewis, W. O. (ed.), *Seventh Baptist World Congress* (E. C. STARR), 285
Liebman, J. L. (ed.), *Psychiatry and Religion* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 177
Ligon, E. M., *A Greater Generation* (H. E. ALLEN), 267
Man's Disorder and God's Design (A. C. SWAIN), 264
Matsumoto, Toru, *The Seven Stars* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 286
Maves, P. B., and Cedarleaf, J. L., *Older People and the Church* (R. J. HAVIGHURST), 270
McCarthy, J. W., *The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander* (VERGILIUS FERM), 67
McCracken, G. E. (ed.), *Arnobius of Sicca* (M. S. ENSLIN), 363
Mead, F. S., *On Our Own Doorstep* (M. C. WESTPHAL), 282
Meland, B. E., *Seeds of Redemption* (E. P. LAM), 85
Miao, C. S. (ed.), *Christian Voices in China* (J. K. SHRYOCK), 79
Micklem, Nathaniel, *Religion* (G. B. KING), 279
The Doctrine of Our Redemption (D. D. WILLIAMS), 161
Montgomery, J. A., *The Bible: The Book of God and Man* (R. H. PFEIFFER), 168
Morrison, C. C., *Can Protestantism Win America?* (E. E. AUBREY), 147
Morrison, J. D. (ed.), *Masterpieces of Religious Verse* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 93
Murphy, R. E., *A Study of Psalm 72 (71)* (R. E. WOLFE), 190
Myers, A. J. W. (ed.), *Enriching Worship* (J. D. MORRISON), 379
Niebuhr, Reinhold, *Faith and History* (E. S. BRIGHTMAN), 249
Nikhilananda, Swami, *Essence of Hinduism* (T. V. ENSLIN II), 188

Nollen, J. S. (ed.), *The Way, the Truth, the Life* (M. S. ENSLIN), 92
Northcott, Cecil, *Religious Liberty* (H. M. GEHR), 280
Nuttall, G. F., *Studies in Christian Enthusiasm* (J. W. BRUSH), 190
Our Protestant Heritage (E. C. STARR), 189
Ouellette, E. F., *Church in World* (C. E. BATTEN), 286
Park, C. E., *Christianity* (H. J. CADBURY), 87
Parmelee, Alice, *A Guide Book to the Bible* (E. W. K. MOULD), 167
Peterson, R. A., *The Modern Message of the Psalms* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 94
Phillips, D. B. (ed.), *The Choice Is Always Ours* (H. M. GEHR), 90
Phillips, H. C., *Bearing Witness to the Truth* (J. D. MORRISON), 284
Polanyi, Michael, *Science, Faith and Society* (VERGILIUS FERM), 52
Porada, Edith (ed.), *Corpus of Ancient Near Eastern Seals in North American Collections* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 361
Powell, S. W., *Toward the Great Awakening* (E. C. HERRICK), 285
Radhakrishnan, S. (ed.), *The Bhagavadgītā* (W. N. BROWN), 273
Reid, A. C., *Resources for Worship* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 283
Reitmeister, L. A., *A Brief Essay about the Gods and My Friends* (H. A. CARPENTER), 286
Richardson, Alan, *Christian Apologetics* (H. R. HOLCOMB), 60
Rops, Daniel, *Sacred History* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 369
Rosenblatt, Samuel (ed.), *Saadia Gaon* (S. L. SKOSS), 165
Roth, Cecil, *The House of Nasi: Doña Gracia* (M. J. COHEN), 74
Rudhyar, Dane, *Modern Man's Conflicts* (H. S. FRIES), 154
Sackton, A. H., *Rhetoric as a Dramatic Language in Ben Jonson* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 94
Sayers, D. L., *Creed or Chaos?* (J. S. BIXLER), 374
Scherer, Paul, *The Plight of Freedom* (W. K. WRIGHT), 73
Schofield, W. G., *The Deer Cry* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 93
Schonfield, H. J., *The Jew of Tarsus* (K. W. CLARK), 83
Scott, J. I. E., *Negro Students and Their Colleges* (C. E. BATTEN), 377
Seeley, R. S. K., *The Function of the University* (J. M. FOGG, JR.), 377
Sherrill, H. K., *The Church's Ministry in Our Time* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 278
Shimer, W. A., *Conscious Clay* (E. S. BRIGHTMAN), 174
Snyder, R. C., *The Most-Favored-Nation Clause* (V. H. HOLLOWAY), 182
Spann, J. R. (ed.), *The Christian Faith and Secularism* (W. K. WRIGHT), 75
Springer, Gertrude (ed.), *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (R. H. ABRAMS), 188
Spurrier, W. A., *Power for Action* (A. C. KNUDSON), 272
Steere, D. V., *Doors into Life* (J. W. BRUSH), 187
Steiger, H. W., *Christian Science and Philosophy* (C. S. BRADEN), 172
Stuber, S. I., *How We Got Our Denominations* (ALEXANDER MACKIE), 92
Suzuki, D. T., *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (C. S. BRADEN), 366
Talon, Henri, *William Law* (J. W. BRUSH), 282
't Hooft, W. A. V., *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches* (C. T. CRAIG), 374
Thurman, Howard, *Jesus and the Disinherited* (D. V. STEERE), 281
Trueblood, Elton, *Alternative to Futility* (P. E. SCHMOYER), 183
The Common Ventures of Life (R. E. KEIGHTON), 284
Urquhart, Clara (ed.), *Last Chance* (E. E. AUBREY), 92
Vaughan, W. F., *Social Psychology* (J. H. HOWSON), 344
Vogt, Von Ogden, *Art and Religion* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 189
Voices of Liberalism: 2 (W. K. WRIGHT), 170
von Hildebrand, Dietrich, *Transformation in Christ* (G. W. DAVIS), 271
Wahl, Jean, *A Short History of Existentialism* (E. E. AUBREY), 371
Wallis, C. L. (ed.), *Selected Poems of John Oxenham* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 189
Walsh, Chad, *C. S. Lewis: Apostle to the Skeptics* (J. S. BIXLER), 370
Weatherhead, L. D., *When the Lamp Flickers* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 379
Weigle, L. A., *The English New Testament* (G. B. KING), 362
Weisfeld, I. H., *The Ethics of Israel* (MOSES HADAS), 166
Wilson, P. W., *General Evangeline Booth of the Salvation Army* (J. H. SCAMMON), 88
Wolfson, H. A., *Philo* (H. M. ORLINSKY), 148
Wood, L. F., *Pastoral Counseling in Family Relationships* (RITTENHOUSE NEISSER), 91